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ABSTRACT. 
The consequences for public sector medical care of 
the introduction of medical insurance into New Zealand are 
traced. The analysis is based on a simple choice model 
describing consumer decisions and their consequences; it 
is elaborated by data drawn from government records, 
survey interviews with insured and uninsured groups and 
mail questionnaire responses from politicians. It is 
argued that the ultimate consequence of the introduction 
of medical insurance is the destruction of welfare state 
arrangements for the provision of medical care. The 
thesis concludes with the formulation of a proposal 
likely to prevent this. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
These days there is widespread belief that the provision 
of public sector hospital care is inadequate. Most New 
Zealanders know someone who is or has been on a hospital 
waiting list or are themselves in such a position; in 
March 1973 hospital waiting lists totalled 33,989. 1 
Most New Zealanders have heard stories about children 
who can't hear properly at school or adults who "just 
deteriorated" waiting for surgery .. 
The establishment and rapid growth of medic insurance 
organisations has been the single most important consequence 
of belief in the inadequacy of public 'sector care.. The 
Southern Cross Medical Care Society has grown from about 
1,000 to more than 30,000 members in less than fifteen 
. -
years; each year its membership has roughly doubled. Other 
similar societies also report impressive growth, although 
their total membership is much lower. 2 
In this thesis I attempt to trace the consequences ~r 
public sector medical care of the introduction of medical 
insurance into New Zealand. The matter was considered at 
some length by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social 
Security in New Zealand. In the absence of relevant data 
the Commission could only speculate about what might be 
going on; the results were sufficiently disquieting for it 
to conclude, "We think that this whole question needs 
examination in the context of the optimum delivery of 
health services lf .. 3 This thesis is first of all, a 
systematic attempt at such an explanation. 
My analysis suggests that the ultimate consequences 
4 
of the introduction of medical insurance is the destruction 
of the welfare state provision of medical care and its 
replacement by market arrangements. On the basis of the 
available evidence I believe this to be an outcome 
desired by few New Zealanders. Thus the ,thesis also 
involves a proposal for a single, simple policy innovation 
that promises good quality, "no waiting" hospital care 
distributed through the public sector. 
I begin the analysis by developing a choice model 
based on the work of Albert O. Hirschman. 4 The model 
is used to generate a number of empirically testable 
.. . 
propositions about the strategies likely to be followed 
.by those dissatisfied with public sector care, the likely 
actions of other interested actors, and the overall 
consequences for the provision of public sector care. 
In the second chapter I outline the data collection 
methods I used and evaluate the research design as a whole. 
In the third and fourth chapters I bring the propositions 
developed from my argument and the real world together. 
My basic conclusion is that there is a nice tlfit" between 
what appears to be going on in the real world and my 
argument. Finally I assess the likely consequences of the 
trends I have identified and, on the basis of the preceding 
analysis, suggest a solution likely to please most New 
Zealanders. 
The thesis could have been written either as an exercise 
in the application .and testing of a social science theory, 
or as an attempt to use social science theory to make 
sense of a concre~problem. Although the two approaches 
invariably overlap, I have chosen to lay emphasis 
on the second. Thus, the third function of this thesis 
is to provide an exemplar of the kind of work that might 
be done by a Centre for the Study of New Zealand Society 
and hopefully, by demonstration, an argument in support 
of its establishment .. 5 
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The chief consequences of this approach appear "in my 
use of the available literature. Because the research 
problem is drawn from my own concern about developments 
in New Zealand society, rather than from a "problem area" 
in social science theory, a number of literatures in 
several social science disciplines bear on the argument. 
In my use of this literature I have drawn only on those 
ideas that seemed to contribute directly to an under-
standing of the concrete problem at hand; I have 
deliberately refrained from the cut, thrust and "brilliant ll 
synthesis of theoretical gamesmanship .. 
It remains to clarify my own position .. 1 care a 
great deal whether medical care is allocated on the basis 
of need or on the basis of ability to pay; I would not like 
to live in a society where access to medical care, and thus 
the enjoyment of life and sometimes life itself, is once 
again determined by the size of a sick person's purse. 
The research question arose from my concern that the 
legislation providing for the welfare state provision of 
medical care was being repealed de facto, by market 
encroachment. What follows represents my attempt to establish 
as accurately as possible the extent to which my concern 
was justified and, as well I could~ suggest a workable remedy 
for it .. 
6 
NOTES. 
1The Press September 13, 1973. 
2For details see Chapter 3. 
3The Royal Commission on Social Security in New Zealand, 
Social Security in New Zealand (Wellington: Government 
Printer, 1972) p.397. 
4Albert O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Lo alt 
Decline in Firms Or anisations 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 
5Geoffrey Me Fougere and John M. Orbell, "A Proposal to 
Establish a Centre for the Study of New Zealand Society" 
(Forthcoming, Australia and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociologl~ October 1974). 
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People dissatisfied with the quality of public sector 
hospital services have three options open to them: they can 
transfer their custom from the public to the private sector; 
they can act to improve the quality of public sector 
services; or they can simply do nothing. 1 The introduction 
of medical insurance schemes into New Zealand has changed 
the costs of the first option relative to the other two. 
By spreading the costs over time and between people, 
medical insurance makes it possible for many more people 
than previously to afford private sector care. My major 
concern is to trace the consequences of this change. 
DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS: EXIT AND VOICE. 
Albert Hirschman has outlined a general theory of 
organisational decay based on th& use of the first two 
options. 2 He argues that consumers who ~re dissatisfied 
with the performance of an organisation they patronise can 
either 'exit' or 'voice'. Exit involves leaving the 
organisation or switching to a competing producto 3 
Voice is: 
eeo any attempt at all to change, rather than to 
escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, 
whether through individual or collective petition 
to the management directly in charge, tnough 
appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various 
types of actions and protests, including those that 
are meant to mobilise public opinion. 4 
In Hirschman's terms, the person who opts out of the 
public sector in favour of the private, exits. A person 
who exits gives up none of his rights to make use of public 
9 
sector services; nor can he stop paying taxes to support 
the public sector. At the same time, exit only possible 
where the public and private sectors offer competing medical 
services: I can choose between a public or private 
hospital to have my tonsils removed, but only public 
hospitals have the facilities to transplant kidneys. Thus, 
exit involves the decision to use private, rather than 
public sector, facili es in ecific circumstances; it is 
not necessary that a person quit the public sector in its 
entirety. In this sense exit from the public sector is 
always partial. 
Establishing the actions necessary for exit poses a 
second prbblem of definition: do I have to actually make 
use of private sector facilities (for example by having my 
tonsils out) to be said to have exited, or is it sufficient 
that I insure against the possibility? Taking out medical 
insurance involves my decision to make use of private 
sector services in future; properly speaking paying 
insurance premiums constitutes pre-payment of private 
sector benefits I hope to enjoy if I should fall ill. 5 
Thus, people exit, either when they take out medical 
insurance, or (not being insured) they make use of 
private sector services. 
As a first approximation, the person who voices i~ one 
who would rather, "fight than switch" through the use of 
any strategy calculated to improve public sector service. 
Two quite different categories of motives may lie behind 
the use of voice. My voice" may be aimed at winning benefits 
10 
that accrue only to me (selective benefits): for example I 
write to the hospital board in an effort to get ~ name 
moved up the waiting list. Alternatively my voice may be 
aimed at winning benefits that accrue not only to mys f 
but to everyone else (collective benefits): for example 
I again write to the hospital board, this time in an effort 
to improve hospital performance so that everyone waits less 
time for service. 6 
But the. results of my use of voice may be quite 
different to those I intend. The efforts of myself and 
others to get our names moved up the waiting list may 
alert those responsible to the political fact that there is 
widespread dissatisfaction with waiting times. Thus, my 
efforts to improve welfare may result in steps being 
taken to improve public sector performance; a benefit that 
accrues to everyone .. 7 Alternatively, my pursuit of a 
collective benefit may result in attempts to "buy me off" 
with selective benefits: for example, to save trouble, 
the hospital board arranges to have me immediately admitted 
to hospital. 8 Here my main concern is with voice that results, 
or may result, in steps being taken to improve overall 
public sector performance (i.e. a collective benefit), 
regardless of its motivation. 9 
Hirschman's theory focuses on the consequences for the 
organisation of clients' decisions to exit or voice: will 
the actions taken by those dissatisfied lead to an 
improvement or deterioration in the organisation's 
performance? This is my main concern in regard to public 
sector hospital care. Is exit or voice more likely to 
improve public sector performance? I will argue that 
voice, rather than exit, is most kely to bring about 
11 
improvement in the quality of public sector service. 
Exit, unlike voice, fails to focus the attention of those 
responsible on public sector deficiencies, while, at the 
same time, it acts to deplete the public sector of those 
resources most necessary for its improvement. 
HOW EXIT FAILS TO·SIGNAL THE NEED FOR REMEDY. 
That the use of exit may work to make things worse, 
rather than better, contradicts conventional economic wisdom. 
Everyone knows that competition keeps organisations on 
their toes. In fact, one response to the failure of 
public sector organisations to deliver the goods in the 
Uni ted states and elsewhere, .has been the advocacy of. 
institutional reforms to introduce competition into the 
provision of public services. Milton Friedman, for example, 
has argued that competition between schools may improve 
. 10 
the performance of school systems. The rationale under-
lying his and other similar arguments is as follows: 
The classic antidote to monopoly is competition. 
By introducing alternative sources of supply, 
competition expands the choice available to consumers. 
Moreover, these alternative sources are likely to use 
different methods and approaches, or even to develop 
wholly new products, thus greater variety makes 
expanded choice really meaningful. Since consumers 
can shift their trade from suppliers who do not 
ease them, suppliers have a strong incentive to 
provide what the consumers want. This attitude also 
means competitors regard innovations positively as 
potential means of winning more business ••. In 
contrast monopolists usually view innovations 
negatively, as a bother designed to upset established 
routines for no good reason. Clearly if greater 
competition causes these results in general, it 
might produce some tremendous improvements in big 
city school systems. 11 
When consumer decisions determine the allocation of 
12 
resources among competing companies, those who control the 
companies are likely to pay close attention to evidence of 
change in consumer preferences. Losing customers ~an mean 
the loss of managerial positions and sometimes the 
extinction of the company. Thus managers are alert to any 
indication of customer exit, and, where it occurs, will 
have a maximum incentive to improve the organisation's 
product to stem further losses and perhaps win back old 
(and some new) customers. 
But the case of public sector medical care is not 
analogous. 12 Entering the private sector requires ready 
cash, thus guaranteeing that no matter how unsatisfactory 
the performance of the public sector it will at least 
retain those consumers who are too poor to exit. 13 At 
the same time, exit by those who can afford it, may fail 
to alert those responsible to deficiencies in public sector 
services. Because the public sector draws its funds from 
Treasury rather than directly from its clients, even quite 
large amounts of exit are unlikely to pose a direct threat 
to the system's continuance. Not surprisingly the public 
sector does not monitor its customer gain or loss and is 
not curious about the reasons for shifts in consumer 
preference. 14 Even when exit is seen as a signal that 
something is wrong, the insulation of the allocation of 
13 
resources from the decisions of consumers, means that no 
financ incentive to remedy deterioration is created. 
fact the self interest (financial and otherwi~e) of 
many of the actors involved may lead them to take ac ons 
aimed at encouraging rather than stemming exit. 
The many doctors who have private, in addition to 
public hospital practices, are in such a position. 
Because the renumeration for private sector work is 
considerably higher than for public, and because they 
enjoy their public sector salaries regardless of how many 
patients they treat, the more private sector patients such 
doctors see, the higher their income. 15 But the flow of 
private sector patients depends in part on continuing 
deficiencies in the public sector. Thus the harder doctors 
work in the public sector, the fewer patients exit and 
the lower their incomes become. 16 
The members of hospital boards may also welcome exit. 
The more exit, the happier their part-time medical staff 
will be; thus boards anxious to cement good staff relations 
may be pleased by exit. More distantly, the growth of 
active rionsumer dissatisfaction with public sector 
services may threaten the re-election chances of those 
apparently responsible. The existence of the exit option 
allows discontented consumers to avoid "poor" service, 
helping to "keep quiet" and making the re-election 
of board members more likely.17 
Regardless of their ideological commitment governments 
may also seek to make exit more readily available (or at 
least not the "exit" legislation of their 
predecessors). The Medical Association of New Zealand 
(M.AoN.Z.) is a powerful and successful interest group 
which has 'stubbornly opposed any attempt to erode the 
private sector. No government will lightly cross it. 
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But even if M.A.N.Z. did not exist governments still 
have g?od reason to make exit more readily available. As 
voting surveys reveal, citizens wish governments to provide 
them with as many goods and services as possible but at the 
same time are anxious that they should personally bear as 
few as possible of the costs involved: for example, I 
want more government money spent on schools and I also 
want to pay less taxes. Anthony Downs argues that 
governments that wish to be re-elected in such circumstances 
will seek to "carry out those acts of spending which gain 
the most votes by means of those acts of financing which 
lose the fewest votes". 18 
Governments faced with evidence of citizen dissatisfact-
ion with public sector medical services have several options 
open to them. They may choose to do nothing, estimating 
either that dissatisfaction is not widespread enough to 
appreciably affect their re-election chances, or that more 
votes can be won by spending the required money in other 
areas .. 
Alternatively governments can expend resources to 
upgrade the entire public sector to the satisfaction of 
those who complain. Finally governments may seek to 
selectively provide better hospital services for those who 
are dissatisfied; either by subsidising the costs of 
obtaining private sector care, or in areas where such care 
is not available, upgrading public sector facilities. 
15 
Expending resources to upgrade public sector services 
on a nation-wide basis lessens the dissatisfaction of those 
who complain but obviously does not make those who are 
already perfectly satisfied any happier. Such people may 
in fact resent extra spending on medical services if this 
makes less money available to upgrade other services 
with which they are dissatis ed. Thus only when very 
large numbers of citizens are actively dissatisfied with 
the provision of public sector services, 
are governments likely to undertake major new expenditures 
to upgrade them. Such occasions are infrequent. 19 
More usually, governments face situations in which 
some small percentage of the population is ssatisfied with 
the provision of hospital services at anyone time (although, 
over time, a majority of the population may t into the 
dissatisfied category). In these circumstances, subsidising 
the costs of obtaining private sector care allows 
governments to reap the greatest amount of satisfaction for 
the smallest expenditure of their resources in each time 
period. Governments only subsidise the costs of private 
sector care, while they would pay in full for the provision 
of similar care in the public sector. 20 Better still, the 
subsidy is a selective one, going onl~ to those people who 
are dissatis ed with public sector services (although even 
when exit is heavily subsidised, it is unlikely that of 
those dissatisfied will be able to leave). Finding a 
"cheap" solution to discontent frees scarce resources for 
the pursuit of other government objec ves, whether these 
be the advancement of class interests or the personal 
enrichment of politicians. 
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Thus governments, anxious to avoid the electoral 
consequences of dissatisfaction with public sector medical 
services, will be unlikely to restrict exit and may seek 
to make the option more widely available. (In areas where 
no private sector exists, and none can be created by 
government subsidy, this strategy is of course unavailable: 
then governments have to upgrade public sector services in 
the locality)~ 
SUMMARY. 
I have suggested that exit has different consequences 
according to whether it occurs in the private or public 
sector (assuming that the private sector operates in 
competitive market conditions). Thi~ is because: 
a. In the public sector (unlike the private) attention 
is not routinely paid to any loss or gain of 
customers; even large scale exit may pass unnoticed. 
Thus exit will often fail to alert those responsible 
for public sector performance of consumer 
dissatisfaction. 
b. Even if alerted to dissatisfaction, the existing 
incentives encourage efforts to make exit more 
readily available rather than efforts to stem 
exit by remedying public sector defects. 
Thus exit does not precipitate efforts to improve public 
sector performance. 
HOW EXIT MAKES THINGS GO FROM BAD TO WORSE. 
But exit is an effective means of worsening public 
sector performance. By expanding the private sector, it 
drains the public sector of its resources of capital, 
personnel, and energy and concern. 
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The state heavily subsidises private sector activities. 
It provides low interest loans for the creation of new 
private hospitals and the expansion and renovation of 
. t' 21 eX1S lng ones .. It also directly subsidises use of the 
private sector through the payment of a patient benefit and 
through a tax subsidy on the payment of medical insurance 
. 22 premlums$ well further "invisible ll state subsidies 
occur: drugs and laboratory services are paid for by the 
state, radiological services are state subsidised and so one 
The more people make use of the private sector, the more 
the state pays out in subsidies; thus exit has the effect 
of diverting financial resources from the public to the 
private sector. 23 
The public and private sectors also compete to secure 
the services of doctors. 24 The pool of doctor services 
on which both sectors draw is characterised by an important 
fact: the total size of the pool is too small to satisfy 
present demand; waiting lists occur, in the first instance, 
because there is a shortage of doctor services. 25 Because 
demand for medical services tends to rise with increases 
supply, and because the long training time of doctors 
. means that there always a delay between increasing 
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demand and increasing numbers of doctors, the situation is 
unlikely to change in the next few years. 26 Thus the 
competition for doctor services between the public and 
private sectors will often be zero sum. Because the 
pool of services is tttoo small", every doctor joining the 
private sector will mean one less doctor for the public 
sector. 
Private sector practice is inherently more attractive 
than public for many. doctors. Specialists who can 
establi themselves in the private sector are likely to 
earn much more than their counterparts in the public 
sector. 27 Pr~vate practice also offers escape from the 
demands of bureacratic organisation. Consequently, if 
sufficient demand exists, many doctors will prefer private 
to public sector practice. 
Demand for private sector services depends on conSllmer 
exi t from the public sector: .the greater the number of 
people exiting the greater the demand for private sector 
services and the more likely doctors are to choose private 
rather than public sector practice. Thus by making the 
choice of private sector practice more likely, exit works 
to drain the public sector of its resources of skilled 
personnel .. 
Exit also works to drain the public sector of s 
resources of energy and concern. rschman points out that, 
eo. those customers who care most about the 
quality of the product and who, therefore, are 
those who would be the most active, reliable and 
creative agents of voice are for that very reason 
also those who are apparently likely to exit first 
in the case of deterioration .28 
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In the present context, those people who care most about 
securing satisfactory medical care for themselves and their 
families are those who have the greatest incentive to do 
something, either exit or voice, in the face of poor 
public sector performance. Their choice of exit means 
that the public sector loses the energy and concern of those 
customers who, if they had stayed, would have had the 
greatest incentive to seek ways to improve public sector 
services, a situation, "which paralyses voice by depriving 
it of its principal agents ll • 29 
SUMMARY 
I have argued that exit is unlikely to stimulate 
efforts to improve public sector performance. At the 
same time works to drain the public sector of those 
resources on which its recovery depends. Thus exit, 
rather than leading to the improvement of the public 
sector, makes it likely that public sector performance 
will worsen .. 
HOW VOICE MAKES THINGS BETTER 
Voice will have the opposite effect, working to remedy 
rather than worsen public sector deficiencies. The agents 
of voice, as of exit, are those consumers who are actively 
dissatisfied with public sector services. However, they 
choose to resolve their dissatisfaction, not by .leaving 
the public sector, but by seeking to bring about its 
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improvement. 30 Thus unlike exit, voice does not drain the 
public sector of its resources. 
Voice also works to alert those responsible to public 
sector deficiencies and often provides powerful incentives 
for remedial action. The immediate responsibility for the 
provision of satisfactory hospital services in an area 
lies with local hospital boards. There is some evidence 
that the elected members of the boards pay attention to 
public demands. 31 Certainly, inasmuch as board members are 
anxious to be re-elected and their re-election depends on 
satisfying voters 3 they have every incentive to pay 
close attention to community spokesmen. 
But real responsibility for the satisfactory provision 
of hospital services and medical services in general, lies 
with the central government, rather than local bodies. 
The amount of money that local boards have to spend on 
hospital services is decided by central government, and 
local boards have little discretion in the allocation of 
the finances they do receive. The ultimate power to decide 
how many nurses will be trained, how many doctors employed, 
at what salaries and in what specialties, what new building 
will be done and so on, is exercised in Wellington. 32 The 
new Hospitals Amendment Bill making Board members personally 
lia bl e for spending. IIwi thou t du e regard II 0 f the provisions 
of the Hospitals Act limits still further the discretion 
of local boards. 33 
As well, other kinds of government decisions determine 
the kind and amount of demand that will exist for hospital 
services, and thus affect public hospital performance. At 
the most basic level, government decisions affecting the 
distribution of wealth within a society vitally affect 
the incidence and distribution of sickness. Public Health 
measures such as the financing of sewage treatment plants, 
the enforcement of building and industrial safety and 
health caBs, the use of mass X-rays and vaccinations and 
so on, all vitally affect demand for hospital services. 
Finally, within the medical care system itself government 
decisions about the number and distribution of doctors 
(as for example are involved in the decision to build a 
new medical school) help to determine how many sick people 
end up in hospital~ 34 Thus the decisions most crucially 
affecting hospital performance are those made by 
government .. 
There is every reason-to believe that members of 
parliament will pay careful attention to voice. Politicians 
who make decisions without calculating the likely electoral 
consequences soon lose office, as do politicians who wro~J[ 
calculate the electoral consequences of their decisions .. 
And positively, politicians who early detect the emergence 
of new public concerns can build new power bases or restore 
themselves to old ones. 
Not surprisingly members of parliament spend a great 
deal of time looking for and listening to, voice. They 
have regular contact with organised public opinion in the 
form of pressure groups at both the local and national 
levels and even when parliament is in session~ they spend 
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a good deal of time in their own electorates listening 
to the grievances of their constituents in formal office 
sessions. As well through party canvassing and their own 
regular attendence at local functions they actively seek 
out public concerns. Thus voice, unlike exit, is likely 
to quickly alert politicians to the existence of 
dissatisfaction. 
Voice also serves as a powerful prompt to politicians 
to seek out and implement remedies for deterioration. 
Because it represents active discontent with government 
policies, voice threatens to drain off the electoral 
support for government. Further, voice is usually highly 
contagious. Those people who are dissatisfied communicate 
their concern to others and often try to recruit them to 
the cause. 35 New Zealand, where quite small changes in 
public opinion make important differences to electoral 
outcomes, governments that wish to be re-elected will seek 
to·stlll voice by remedying its cause .. 36 Thus voice both 
alerts those responsible to the fact that something is 
wrong and provides incentives for them to implement 
remedies. 37 
The recent efforts of people in rural areas to secure 
better medic care for themselves is an example of the 
successful use of voice. Changes in the distribution of 
population and the practice of medicine, have made the 
practice of medicine in rural areas increasingly unattractive 
to doctors. At the same time, New Zealand's overall 
shortage of general practitioners has made entry into 
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successful city practice easier and more lucrative.38 The 
result of these changes became apparent in the early 1960's 
as country areas began to lose their local doctors~9 As 
a consequence a number of representations to government 
were made by Federated Farmers and rural loc bodies 
arguing the need for urgent government action to encourage 
doctors to enter and remain in practice in rural area. 
These efforts resulted in a number of government measures 
climaxing in the government's decision to introduce a 
Rural Practice Bonus (as of October 1, 1969). 
The latest information on the distribu on of doctors 
within New Zealand sugg~s that the situation has improved 
considerably since then. This improvement was "partly due 
to population changes, but the rural practice ••• incentives 
played an important part 1,.40 It is clear that the use of 
voice both alert government to the fact that something 
is wrong in the provision of medical care and encourage 
government eff6rts to findremedies~ 
The final option open to dissatisfied consumers to 
simply do nothing. Passivity does not drain resources from 
the public tor and thus, unlike exit, does not actively 
worsen public sector performance. But neither will it alert 
those responsible of consumer dissatisfaction, nor provide 
them with an incentive to implement remedies. Observed from 
outside, passive dis~atisfaction indistinguishable from 
contentment and~ll usually be understood as such. 
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SUMMARY 
Thus of the three options discussed, only voice both 
fails to drain resources from the public sector and works 
to encourage e.fforts to remedy public sector deficiencies. 
I conclude that it is voice, not exit or passivity, that is 
likely to bring about an imprpvement in public sector 
performance. 
WHICH OPTION WILL BE USED? 
Clearly it is now important to know the circumstances 
in which dissatisfied consumers choose one option rather 
than another. Choice is simplified in situations where 
exit or voice is unavailable. For example, in rural areas 
without a local doctor, dissatisfied consumers cannot 
purchase the services of a locqlly available general 
practitioner substitute, no matter how much they might like to" 
Thus exit is unavailable: consumers anxious to improve the 
local provision of medical care have only voice open to 
them. 
But for consumers dissatisfied with public sector hospital 
services, both exit and voice can be used to remedy 
dissatisfac on in areas with alternative private sector 
services. By switching to the private sector, consumers 
can avoid the long waiting times associated with the public 
sector and ensure themselves of more "personal" service, 
all without giving up any of their rights to use the public 
sector. Alternatively, consumers can seek to remedy their 
dissatisfaction by working to improve public sector 
performance. In these circumstances how will consumers 
choose whether to voice, exit, or remain passive? 
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I begin by making the simple assumption that a 
dissatisfied person chooses between options by weighing the 
likely costs of each option against the benefits that he 
expects will accrue from it. He will choose that option 
which seems to him to offer the greatest personal benefit 
at the least personal cost. 41 
For the moment I assume further that the act of exiting, 
like passivity, costs the consumer nothing, involving only 
the simple decision to leave the public sector. But this 
switch, unlike passivity, which gains the consumer nothing, 
guarantees the immediate enjoyment of the private sector 
benefits outlined above. Clearly exit will be chosen over 
passivity in such a situation. But what about voice; will 
voice occur at all in these circumstances? To know it is 
necessary to estimate the costs and benefits of voice 
relative to those of exit. 
Even a small amount of voice may often cost the 
dissatisfied consumer a considerable investment of time, 
energy and perhaps money. First, for voice to have any 
chance of working at all, the consumer will need to collect 
some information on where and how best to use it. For 
example, does responsibility lie with hospital boards, the 
government or the medical profession; how is it possible 
to influence those responsible and so on? Second, the 
consumer must expend time and energy in the act of voicing 
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itself. While sometimes energy expenditure may be minimal, 
as in the case of voting, or complaining to a doctor, more 
effective forms of voice are likely to require considerable 
effort ... 
Those who voice may also suffer social costs for their 
activity_ For example, among many groups of people the 
use of voice strategies such as demonstrating, striking 
and even writing letters to a newspaper may carry considerabl~ 
sO'cial stigma. Simple personal embarassment may consti tu te 
another formidable voice cost.. One articulate, ~ealthy and 
well educated respondent in the Medic Insurance sample 
argued that ni-heJ would have to be a pretty green Joe 
Soap to go along to Chis_7 local M.P. and say, "Look here, 
our health system I s crashing down around our ears lll '. More 
generally many respondents in bo~h samples were reluctant 
to answer some of the survey questions becau'se they· were 
not "complaining types" of people. 
Voice costs accruing to individuals can be drastitally 
reduced by the existence or creation of organisations that 
allow members to share these costs. Often organisation 
allows the delegation of the actual task of voicing to full 
time (paid and unpaid) personnel. At the same time the greater 
ability of organisations to explore and utilise channels of 
influence and accumulate information means that the total 
lIunit .cost" of voice is likely to be considerably lower than 
if each member relies on his own efforts. 
For example, rural people wishing to improve their 
local general practitioner service, were able to exercise 
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voice through the Federated Farmers, a body whose continued 
existence depends on its ability to effectively articulate 
the concerns bf its rural members. 42 Working through an 
organisation, they gained immediate access to established 
community contacts in all rural areas, allowing them both 
to collect information about other areas and quickly 
disseminate their concern about their own. Federated Farmers 
also provided research personnel, opened up an institutionalised 
channel to government and allowed the utilisation of the 
organisation's accumulated influence and skill in bringing 
pressure to bear for remedy. 
No comparable organisation exists to represent the 
concerns of the consumer of public sector medical care. 
Of established New Zealand interest groups only the Public 
Service Association (to my knowledge) has expressed concern 
at public st~ctor performance .. 43 Paradoxically, the chances 
of voice costs being reduced either by the creation of a 
new organisation or the utilisation of an established one, 
will vary, in part, according to the number of dissatisfied 
consumers who decide to stick with the public sector and 
voice. But the hig~ cost of voice in treabsence of 
organisation increases the attractiveness of the exit option. 
The extensive use of exit reduces the chances of successful 
organisation. Thus the absence of organisation constitillBs 
a major structural restraint on the appearance of voice: 
where no organisation exists, and exit is easy, the costs 
of voice are likely to remain high. 
In addition to their expenditure of ~ime and energy, 
dissatisfied consumers who choose voice will also bear 
considerable opportunity costs. By staying with the 
public sector they forgo the immediate and certain 
enjoyment of the benefits that exit provides. Overall 
then, the costs of voice are high. 
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At the same time the effectiveness of voice may be 
in doubt: the benefits to be gained by it are uncertain 
and (if they occur at all) expected in the future rather 
than the present. Thus they must be considerabl~ 
discounted when measured against the certain, present 
benefits secured by exit. 
In such a situation, which option will the dissatisfied 
consumer choose? At no cost exit offers the present 
enjoyment of improved medical care while at considerable 
cost voice offers only the possible, future, enjoynmt of 
improved care. Acting on the choice assumption outlined 
above,the consumer will choose exit. 
But in real fe users do have to pay for exit: either 
making direct payments to the private medical sector or 
through the intermediary of a medical insurance 
organisation. 44 The previous argument makes it clear that 
the adoption of the ex~t option depends in part on its costs. 
If the cost to the consumer is high and/or the benefits to 
be secured by exit are negligible, it is unlikely that 
many people will use it. Exactly what constitutes "high" 
cost and "negligible" benefits is an empirical question 
that can only be answered by asking those affected: consumer 
definitions of "high" cost and "negligible" benefit are :li.1cely 
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to vary over time, between groups and so on. 
Nevertheless, a tentative generalisation- can be 
made about the extent to which changes.in the cost of 
the exit option will affect its use. As Hirschman points 
out, quality conscious consumers are likely to be rather 
insensitive to price increases. When people care a great 
deal about the quality of the service they receive, small 
changes in quality will markedly affect the level of their 
enjoyment. Consequently such people will be willing to pay 
considerably more to se~ure even marginal improvement in 
the service they receive. 45 So long as voice appears 
less effective, and more costly than exit, consumers. 
anxious to "do something" to improve the medical care they 
receive are uniikely to be discouraged from the use of exit 
by small increases in its price. Thus I expect demand for 
exit to be relatively price inelastic; only "steep" increases 
in the price of exit are likely to make much difference to 
its use. 
LOYALTY AND EXIT 
However non-monetary barriers to exit (in Hirschman's 
terms: loyalty) may also exist, thus restraining dissatisfied 
consumers who are otherwise willing and able to leave. 
First Hirschman points out that consumers may refrain from 
exit when a) they believe the consequences of exit to be 
negative for the organisation left and b) they continue (for 
one reason or another) to care about the output of the 
organisation even after they have exited. 46 For example, 
consumers of public sector medical care realise that their 
exit will worsen public sector performance and moreover 
believe that this fact is likely to inflict significant 
costs on themselves. They may reason (for example) that 
further decline may greatly increase the chance of the 
outbreak of infectious diseases, a situation in which those 
who have and those who have not exited, are equally at risk. 
Thus while exit will secure them better medical care, it 
also increases ~he probability that they will suffer sickness; 
consequently consumers may decide not to leave. 
For consumers to be restrained from exit in this way 
they must appreciate both the contribution their action 
will mak& to worsening public sector performance and the 
consequences of this fact for themselves. In the present 
situation both points seem in doubt. The P.S.A. has argued 
that the expansion of the private sector is harmful to the 
public sector. At the same time successive government 
reports and the representations of private hospitals and 
medical insurance companies have held that private sector 
expansion has been, or will be, beneficial to the public 
sector. 47 Inasmuch as those considering exit think about 
the matter at all, they' could be forgiven for their 
confusion. Similarly, the linkages that may exist between 
public sector decline and personal costs accruing to those 
who exit are not obvious. Consumers are unlikely to be 
restrained from exit by information they do not have. 
But even when consumers possess the necessary information 
about the consequences of exit for the public sector and 
believe these consequences to be undesirable, they are still 
likely to exit. To state the argument formally, I assume a 
31 
situation in which each person knows: 
a. that exit works to further weaken the public 
sector 
b. that he prefers, for one reason or another, 
that the public sector not be further weakened. 
c. that nevertheless, exit ensures him the personal 
enjoyment of significantly better medical care 
What are the conseque~ces of sticking with the public 
sector? First- if I stay I forgo the benefits of the private 
sector. At the same time my decision to stay is per se 
unlikely to make any difference to public sector performance. 
Public sector performance, like that of an army in battle, 
only suffers when man;y: individuals decide to flee. Thus 
if I stay and everyone else leaves, the public sector will 
still collapse. On the other hand, if everyone else stays 
and I leave, the public sector holds together, a fact f~om 
which I benefit equally with those who have stayed. Thus 
staying bars me from the enjoyment of private sebtor care 
and fails to contribute appreciably to the improvement of 
the public sector. My best strategy, like everyone else, 
is always to exit. Thus the existence of costs of this kind 
will deter few people from exit. 48 
But there is a second basis for loyalty that cannot 
be so easily disposed of: some people care a great deal 
about whether medical care is distributed through the private 
or the public sector, regardless of the kind of medical care 
they personally receive. Passionate aguments over the extent 
of a person's right to free medical care still go on in 
some quarters, and cannot be subsumed under a description 
32 
of the simple self interest of those involved. Some people 
(hereafter called ideologues) are ideologically (or morally) 
committed to the public sector distribution of medical care. 
Will such a commitment stop ideologues from exiting? 
No simple answer can be given; the previous argument 
suggests that ideologues will not refrain from exit because 
of damage their leaving may do the public sector. On the 
other hand, the ideologue's calculus of value is not simply 
instrumental: "here I stand; r can do no other", may be the 
motto of some ideologues. 
But the most important characteristic of ideologues 
is not their propensity to exit or not, but the fact that 
they alone have good reason to voi,ce j .. 
For ideologues, exiting solves the problem of securing better 
medical services for themselves, just as it does fOr others. 
But unlike others, ideologues have a second problem which 
remains unresolved by exit; they continue to care a great 
deal about how medical care is distributed. Thus ideologues 
may be a source of voice regardless of exit. 
SUMMARY" 
The benefits to be gained by voice remain uncertain 
and cannot be won immediately.. At the same time the costs 
of using voice may be high.. In contrast, exit secures 
certain benefits, immediately. As long as its cost is not 
"too high" (I have argued that consumers will tend to 
"undervalue" its monetary cost), consumers anxious to· 
"do something" to improve the hospital service they receive 
are likely to prefer exit to voice. The existence of 
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"loyalty" based on the consequences of exit will make no 
difference to this decision.. However "loyalty" stemming 
from ideological commitment to the public sector distribution 
of medical care may lead people to voice regardless of 
whether they exit. 
WILL ANY VOICE OCCUR? 
In these circumstances. where the overwhelming 
majority of dissatisfied consumers will prefer exit to 
voice, will any voice appear at all? Apart from 
ideologues, the potential agents of voice (if in fact they 
exist) will be drawn from the pool of people who for various 
reasons have not exited. First, the pool may contain 
people who are unaware that the quality of the public 
sector is less than satisfactory.. For example, the fact 
that consumers' contact with the medical care system 
often sporadic may mean that even a quality conscious person 
remains unaware of quality changes for sometime after they 
have occurred. 49 For whatever reason it occurs, lack of 
awareness precludes the possibility of dissatisfaction and 
thus of voice .. 
Second the pool is likely to contain people who care 
very little, if at all, about the quality of public sector 
care. Again such people will not become the agents of 
voice. Finally the pool may contain people who are 
dissatisfied with public sector care but unable to exit.. The 
previous argument makes it clear that such people will be 
reluctant users of voice; it is likely that, in common with 
other dissatisfied consumers, they would have preferred to exit 
'. 
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if the option had been available to them. 
Not being able to exit is a consequence of being too 
old, too sick or too poor. Medical insurance companies 
refuse to insure anyone over the age of 65 who is not 
already a member and. at least one, doubles the price of 
the premium paid by their current members when they reach 
this age. Thus the costs of exit for old people, insured 
or not, increases greatly at the time when retirement 
reduces their income and their need for medical care 
grows. Some old people are likely to find it difficult 
to stretch a newly restricted budget to cover the increased 
premium cost, while very few old people can afford to 
themselves, directly pay the costs of extensive private 
sector caree Thus it is likely that many old people, 
dissatisfied with the quality of public sector care, will 
nevertheless find themselves unable to exit. 
Similarly medical insurance companies refuse t_o accept 
the chronically sick as members. Again suchpeopl~ are 
unlikely to be able to themselves afford to buy from the 
private sector the extensive medical care they need. 50Thus, 
even if they are dissatisfied, exit is usually impossible, 
Finally there are those who are too poor to exit, despite 
their dissatisfaction, and the introduction of medical 
insurance. Thus other than ideologues,voices' potential 
agents are to be found among the old, the sick and the poor. 
Such people are likely to find the use of voice 
extraordinarily difficult. I have already argued that in 
general the use of voice is costly; its outcome remains 
uncertain while it may involve its user in the expenditure' 
of a considerable amount of time, energy and sometimes money. 
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But at the same time, the costs of voice and the likelihood 
of its success differ signi cantly from person to person. 
It is obvious that sick people and old people will be 
considerably handicapped in th r use of voice. Old 
people especially are often bewildered and bemused by 
their contacts (often tenuous) with community agencies, 
bureacratic or otherwise. Both groups lack the energy 
and usually the po tion for the effective use of voice. 
Poor people are also disadvantaged in their use of 
voice. The amount of use made of voice (as measured by 
indices of political participation) varies signi cantly 
by education, income and prestige of occupation; poor 
people enjoy less of these resources and make much less 
use of voice than richer people. Similarly the resort to 
voice likely to have different consequences for rich 
and poo~;- poor p~ople, unlike rich people, report that the 
use of voice- makes little 
affect them. 51 
fference to outcomes that 
Thus the old, the chronically ill, and the poor are 
doubly disadvantaged in their efforts to improve the quality 
of medical care; effectively barred from exit, they are also 
likely to find voice peculiarly fficult. In such a 
simply doing nothing is almost always the most rational 
response. 
C HAP'fER S UHMARY 
tuation 
Those people who are actively dissat fied with public 
sector care and who can afford exit will usually choose it, 
rather than voice, as a remedy; ideologues constitute the 
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only exception to this rule (both, in that they may choose 
to exit rather than voice and still have reason to voice 
after exiting). The remainder, those people who are 
dissatisfied but handicapped in their use of exit and voice, 
will usually end up dOing nothing. Thus the existence of 
a large amount of dissatisfaction with public sector 
medical care will lead to a large amount of exit but little 
or no voice .. 
Bu~ the absence of voice lessens the probability that 
steps will be taken to remedy public sector deficiencies, 
while large scale exit worsens public sector performance. 
As a result, the number of those dissatisfied is likely to 
grow further, leading to further exit and more public sector 
decline, and so on. At the same time the political 
difficulty of attempting to rehabilitate the public sector 
at the expense of the private grows. The more people exit, 
the greater the support for increasing government subsidies 
to the private sector and the more bitter the opposition to 
their removal. The more subsidies, the easier exit; the 
easier exit, again the more public sector decline, and so 
on; the vicious circle is further compounded. 
If such a process were to continue long enough our 
institutional arragements for the provision of hospital 
care would be revolutionised. Most New Zealanders would 
come to depend on the private sector for part or all of 
their hospital care; the remainder being dependent either 
on a severely depleted public sector or on the receipt of 
private charity. The discussion as to whether it is 
likely or even inevitable that the process I have outlined 
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will continue "long enough" for such a revolution to occur 
I leave to the last chapter. 
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10Milton Friedman, "The Role of Government in Education", 
Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). pp.85-107. For similar arguments 
about the beneficial effects of competition, ensuing 
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from the dismantling of the National Health Service in 
Britain, see Michael H. Cooper and Anthony J. Culyer, 
The Price of Blood, Hobart Paper no. 41 (London: The 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1968), and D.S. Lees, 
Health Through Choice, Hobart Paper no. 14 (London: 
The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1961). 
11Anthony Downs, Urban Problems and 
Series in Public Policy Analysis, 
Publishing Company, 1970). p.264,. 
12Whether in reality the private sector is analogous to 
the orthodox economic model of it is also a moot point. 
13For example, in Australia, Scotton estimates that in 
196b; 1 ~/b of Australians (excluding those from Queensland) 
were not covered for hospitalisation by voluntary or 
pensioner schemes and 17~ had no medical cover. See 
rt.B. Scotton, "Membership of Voluntary Health Insurance", 
Economic Hecord, 45 (1969), pp.69-83. 
14In contrast, 'private sector firms as well as keeping a 
close eye On sales figures etc., often hire the services 
of market research organisations to systematically 
discover consumer preferences. Some very large New 
Zealand firms have their own "in house" market 
research teams. 
15In their submission to the Board of Hea~th Inquiry into 
Private Hospitals, 1972 Southern Cross report a survey 
they, 
conducted among a number of surgeons in Auckland 
in.1970. It showed that while, on average, they 
gave almost half of their working time to Public 
Hospital service, the rewards from that work 
accounted for only about 20~ of their income, 
the other 8o~ coming from private practice under-
taken during the remainder of their time. 
See Southern Cross Hedical Care Society, "Submissions 
to the Board of Health Inquiry into Private Hospitals, 
19 (mimeo.). p.8. 
16R•J • Latimer, then Operational Officer, Research and 
Planning Unit, Department of Health, writes: 
To conSUltants and in particular consultant 
surgeons whether general surgeons or other, 
they i-waiting lists_7 are a guarentee of full 
employment. If there were nOl~iting lists, 
fewer patients would pass by the subsidised 
services of the private hospital. So long as 
consultants are employed in public hospitals on 
a part time basis, they are unlikely to pursue 
policies in their salaried hospital role which 
could jeopodise that part of their living which 
they derive from fees in private practice • 
R.J. Latimer, "Introduction" In R.J. Latimer, ed., 
Health Administration in New Zealand (Wellington: 
New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 
1969), 7-14, p.ll .. 
17Lack of knowledge about local body candidates and the 
generally low turn out at loc body elections may 
mean that the connection between performances and 
re-election is a loose one. 
18Anthony Downs~ An onomic Theor of Democrac 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957 ,p.52. For an 
exc lent review of the 1 erature on governmental 
choice see, William C. Nitchell, "Theories of 
Governmental Choice: Downsian and Post Downsian 
Contributions." (Paper prepared for delivery at the 
1971 Annual meeting of the American Poli cal Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 11, 1971). 
19The depression of the 1930's was one such occasion in 
New Zealand. 
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20This point was clearly appreciated by the first Labour 
government. Lovell-Smith reports that in the course of 
discussions with th~ B.M.A. (now M.A.N.Z.) about Labour's 
proposals for medical care, 
Both Ministers LFraser and NashJ agreed that 
private hospitals filled a need and saved public 
money and that any hospital benefits should be 
available in private as well as public hospitals ~ 
See J. Lovell-Smith, The New Zealand Doctor and the 
Welfare State (Auckland: Blackwood and Janet Paul, 
1966). p.67. The idea became of cial government writ 
with the publication of the Barrowclough Commission 
Report. See, New Zealand Consultive Committee on 
Hospital Reform. Report. (Wellington: Government 
Printer, 1953) pp.29-)1. 
21Details of government loan schemes to the private 
sector are contained in Private Hospitals in New 
Zealand, Board of Health Report Series: No 20 
(Wellington: Board of Health, 1974) pp.27-29. 
22A 1967 amendment to the Land and Income Tax Act made 
medical insurance premiums tax deductible. Thus in 
1973, the state forfeited the tax payable on $3,070,138 
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(members' contributions to the Southern Cross Medical 
Care Society) as well as the contributions made to other 
medical insurance organisations. For other details of 
Southern Cross's "Record levels of attainment in 1973" 
see The Press, 13 April, 1974. p.13. 
23No that this assumes that money not spent on the 
private sector would be spent instead on the public 
sector. It is possible that government may choose 
instead to use the money "saved" to reduce taxes, or 
in some other area of government spending. 
24And nurses to~. As well in conditions of full 
employment the public sector may also have difficulty 
in recruiting unskilled labour. Recently the 'Chief 
Executive Officer of the North Canterbury Hospital 
Board announced that a "laundry crisis" was forcing 
the Board to restrict the number of admissions from 
the Christchurch Hospital waiting list. Because of 
acute staff shortages the, 
laundry has not been able to keep pace with the 
amount of laundry coming in. Wai ti'ng list 
admissions had to.be stopped last weekend and this 
week to try and cut down on soiled linen., 
Christchurch Star, 24 October, 1973.-
25&26For documentation see Chapter 4. 
27And specialists who stay with the public sector, even 
although they could earn a great deal more by private 
sector practice, themselves subsidise the public 
sector's operations to the extent of the difference 
between what they could and what they do earn. Thus, 
if private sector demand is very high, the fact that 
the public sector continues to function at all,depends 
on the altruism of specialists. 
28Hirschman, 
29Ibid .. , p.Sl .. 
30Some people may of course exit and still 
possibility is further discussed below. 
empirical evidence in Chapter 3. 
voice. The 
See also the 
31 For example the superintendent-in-chief of the North 
Canterbury Hospital Board (Dr L. McH. Berry) recently 
stated, 
Complaining to the Minister of Health about North 
Canterbury Hospital Board institutions or services 
was not the best way of getting anything done •••• if 
people were really concerned about something they 
should approach him or the deputy medical 
superintendent •••• 
And one of the Board members suggested tha,t, 
It should be made public that the board and i 
administrative officers encouraged comments and 
ideas from people 
See, The Press, 27 April, 1974. 
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32The legal re~ationship between the government and 
hospital boards is spelled out in The Hospitals Act 19~7 
and its subsequent amendments. 
330riginally the bill made hospital board members able 
for spending !lin reckless disregard".of the provi ons 
of the Hospi s Act. After representations by the 
Hospital Boards' Association, the present wording was 
adopted. See, , 25 October, 1974. 
3~echanic points out, 
Innumerable studies have demonstrated that the poor 
have a greater prevalence of illness, disability, 
chronicity, and restriction of activity because of 
health problems than those of higher status, and 
that they have less accessibility to many types of 
heal th services and r~cei ve lower quali ty . care'. 
David Mechanic, Public Expectations and Health Care 
(New York: Wiley Interscience, 1972j.p.80 •. These 
fferences persist even after the introduction of the 
welfare state provision of medic care, For 
evidence on the British situation, see for example, 
R.M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1968), and J.T. Hart, 'The Inverse Care Law", 
==~==~~, (1971) pp.405-412. In New Zealand, 
Districts with a low socio-economic rating in 
Auckland provide the greatest proportion of cases 
for the major hospitals. 
See, A.N. Thompson and R.B. iott, IIFactors in 
Hospital Usage and Morbidity in the Auckland Area", 
New Zealand Medical Journal, 75 (1972) pp.19-22. 
For information on the effect of the number of general 
practitioners in an area on hospital performance see 
G.C. Salmond, "A Comparative Study of Disease Specific 
Length of .StaY in New Zealand Hospitals", The Department 
of Health New Zealand, Occasional Paper, Number 1 (Wellington: 
The Department of Health, 1972 mimeo.). 
35See E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). 
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36Alternatively governments may seek to still voice by 
striking at its agents: they may be imprisoned, driven 
into exile, discredited and so on. Such practices 
have been rare in New Zealand, occurring principally 
in times of of cial emergency. See for example, 
H.E.H. Bassett, Confrontation' '1' The 1 1 Naterfront 
,Disput~ (Wellington: Reed, 1972 • 
370f course voice does not guarentee that remedial action 
will be taken by governments. First, governments are 
less sensitive to voice from some groups than others; 
National governments are more responsive to farmers' 
wishes and less to those of trade unionists, than 
Labour. Second, even if governments wish to respond 
to voice, they may sometimes lack the power or resources 
to make a difference. The only claim I make here for 
voice that it does work to alert those responsible 
to dissatisfaction, and that it often provides incentives 
for them to seek out remedies. 
3 bFor an account of the attractions of urban practice for 
general practitioners see, Erich Geiringer, If Doctors 
Grew on Trees .••• (Dunedin: John McIndoe Limited, 1969), 
4!:: 47 pp • .,r o. 
39 In 1963, the Federated Farmers could only quote 4 
localities in which there was difficulty getting 
a doctor •. In 1969 the Committee investigating 
rural shortages has conceded that there are at 
least 50 such places. 
Ibid. p.46 .. 
40A•n.s. Tho~pson, ~here Should I Practice? (Wellington: 
Department of Health, 1973), p.l0. 
4'This formulation of the choice assumption of "economic ll 
man, is adapted from, John M. Orbell and Toru Uno, 
IIA Theory of Neighborhood Problem Solving: Political 
Action vs. Residential Mobility", American Political 
Science~eview, 66 (1972), 471-489, p.473. 
42In fact the failure of the Federated Farmers organisation 
to effectively represent their members' wishes on the 
compulsory acquisition of wool issue led to the setting 
up of the rival New Zealand Sheep and Cattlemen's 
Association (Inc) in 1973. The information on fue actions 
of Federated Farmers in this matter is drawn from material 
Kindly provided by Federated Farmers. 
43PubliC Service Association Inc., PSA Newsletter, 19 
(1973) It 
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total hospital bill themselves. For example, Southern 
Cross pays 8010 of the total cost computed from i 
Schedule of Surgical and Anaesthetic Fees, leaving its 
policy holders to themselves find the remaining 20~. 
45Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. pp.44-54. The same 
tendency for quality conscious consumers to "under-
estimate" the cost of an action will also be true for 
voice. 
47For example, New Zealand Consultative Committee on 
HosQital Reform.Report. Board of Health, Private 
Hospitals in New Zealand, Board of Health Report 
Series: No 20, (Wellington: Board of th, 1974); 
Southern Cross Medical Care Society, "Submissions 
to the Board of Health Inquiry into Private Hospitals, 
1972". 
48The argument presented here is an application of the 
logic of the "tragedy of the commons" first advanced 
by vVilliam Forster Lloyd 1833. See, Garrett Hardin, 
liThe Tragedy of the Commons", Science 162 (1968), 
1243-1248. For a related argument see Mancur Olson Jr., 
The Logic of Collective Action. Dawes has formali 
the problem in a commons dilemma, "that has all the 
properties of the commons dilema and that reduces, to a 
prisoner's dilemma game when there are only two playersll" 
Robyn M. Dawes, liThe Commons.Dilemma Game: An N-Person 
Mixed-Motive game with a Dominati Strategy for 
fec tion", Ori Research Bulletin, 13 (1973) 1-12 .. 
49This fact raises special problems for political action. 
Because information about medic care is diffused 
gradually, each person finds himself more or less alone 
in deciding how to g better medical service. In 
contrast, when many people undergo a similar deprivation 
all at the same time, knowledge that others f~ce a 
similar situation would seem much more promising 
for the emergence of political action as a remedy. 
This idea is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
50For a review of the conditions under which medical 
insurance organisati'ons accept members see, "Private 
Medical Insurance, Is it Fostering a Two-Tier Health 
System?", Consumer Review, (1974) pp.11-19. Group 
schemes may be partially exempt from these strictures. 
51At least according to overseas studies. For a summary 
of such findings see Lester Milbrath, Political Participation 
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(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); and also Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). Little work seems 
to have been done in New Zealand to ascertain rates of 
political participation by income. Richard Thompson 
shows how the poor and old in Christchurch do 
significantly worse than others in stopping their 
homes being taken for motorways, and in winning 
adequate compensation for them. 3ee, Richard Thompson, 
Planners, Motorways and People. (Christchurch: 
Department of Psychology and S9ciology, 1973) 
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As Friedman points out the test of a good theory is 
not how likely its assumptions sound (he argues that the 
best theories will always begin with the most'unlikely' 
assumptions) but how accurately the hypotheses derived 
from it describe the real world. 1 Here I outline the 
processes involved in collecting data to test my argument. 
The variety of phenomena referred to by the argument 
. I 
multiplies the'usual ~ifficulties of data collection. In 
testing it I have drawn on a.number of sources of information, 
ranging from accounts given by medical care consumers, to 
official statistics describing public sector performance. 
Similarly" I have used several research strategies, 
including structured interviews, content analysis and mail 
questionnaires. 
Like all researchers I have been faced with constraints 
imposed by strictly limited amounts of time, energy ~d 
money. Thus in choosing between research strategies my 
cri terion has' been,' "How best can I use my limi ted 
resources to ground the argument" rather than simply, Tthow 
best to ground the argument". In what follows, I have tried 
to give an account of some of the strategies forgone, as 
well as describing the research strategies I actually used. 
lJ:1HE SURVEYS. 
Three surveys were completed: the first (and major 
one) involved interviewing cqnsumers of medical care, the 
second and third, mail questionnaires sent to parliamentarians 
and members of the North Canterbury Hospital Board 
respectively .. 
The Survey of Medical Care Consumers" 
Sometimes the best and occasionally the only way, 
to collect information about different groups of people 
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is to ask the people themselves, about their activities, beliefs, 
resources and so on.. Through the consumer survey I sought 
to answer a variety of questions including who (if anyone) 
is dissatisfied with public sector care; what (if anything) 
do they do to remedy their dissatisfaction; and what political 
resources and how much political energy do they have? 
Because I preferred to use interviewers rather than 
mail out questionnaires the survey population(s) had to be 
contained within the Christchurch urban area. 2 But who to 
interview? 
Choice of Populatiog 
The most obvious choice was to draw a random sample of 
the adult population of Christchurch. I needed no one's 
permission to draw such a sample.. Further, from the 
sample, I would have been able to make precise statements 
about the numbers and kinds of people dissatisfied with the 
public sector, the total incidence of voice in the community 
and so on.. But the crucial hypotheses deal with the 
actions taken by those who are dissatisfied. I expected 
that many~ if not most, people in Christchurch would have 
no firm opinion about the quality of medical care. Thus 
to find a sufficient number of dissatisfied .people to 
test my hypotheses I would have had to interview a 
prohibitively large number of respondents. 
The second strategy was to look for groups whose 
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incidence of dissatisfaction was likely to be high. The 
first such group were those who had actually taken out 
medical insurance; if my argument was correct they should 
be representative of those people whose dissatisfaction 
led them to exit. 
The second such group were those people on public 
hospital waiti~g lists. waiting lists appeared to have 
two important attributes. 
a. They list the names of those, who, of all the 
people seeking attention for medical condition Y 
(where Y is any medical cQndition that appears on 
the waiting list), find exit difficult, impossible 
or (although free to exit) choose not to. Because 
a wide variety of conditions are subsumed under 
Y the names cover men and women in all age groups. 
Also the attribute "not exitingll is given by 
people's own behaviour in concrete situations, rather 
than being arbitrarily affixed by the researcher. 
b. They list the names of those, who, of all the people 
who potentially do not exit, have the most personal 
and immediate reasons for being dissatisfied with 
public sector quality.3 
Interviewing the medical i~surance group would allow 
me to trace the crucial connections between dissatisfaction 
and exit and between exit and subsequent voice. Interviewing 
the" waiting list group would allow me to systematically test 
the hypotheses that those dissatisfied and unable to exit 
would also be unlikely to voice. By putting the information 
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drawn from both groups together, I could find empirical 
referents for such concepts as "few political resources", 
and make sense of the context in which both groups acted. 
The strategy also ran into obvious difficulties. First, 
it required that I gain permission from a hospital board 
and a medical insurance company to draw the samples. 
Second, it left open a number of interesting questions 
(for example exactly how many and what kinds of people 
are dissatisfied with public sector services) that could 
only be answered by a sample of the whole community. 
The best strategy, drawing samples from the whole 
community, from the waiting lists and the medical insurance 
company files, far exceeded my available resources. Thus 
I adopted the second strategy: drawing waiting list and 
medical insurance samples. 
I applied to, and was granted permiss~on by the North 
Canterbury Hospital Board to sample the waiting list at 
Christchurch Public Hospital. 4 Although r enclosed an 
6utline of the areas the interviews would cover (and 
later the first draft of the questionnaire) with my 
application, the Board made no stipulations concerning the 
questions I could ask. 
I was also granted permission by tiE Southern Cross 
Medical Care Society, to draw a sample from their files. 
Understandably, Southern Cross were anxious that the 
inquiry be "handled in a manner we can approve" and made 
certain stipulations about the kind of questions that 
could be asked. However, once a mutually agreeable 
questionnaire had been constructed, I was given every 
assistance in drawing the sample. 5 
How many people to sample? 
There are a number of rules of thumb available to 
guide the researcher in his choice of optimum sample 
size. In each case sample size is dependent on both the 
kind of analysis to be used and the precision with which 
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the researcher wishes to be able to generalise; in general 
returns by way of increasing precision diminish sharply 
after quite small sample sizes are reached. 6 The 
researcher's problem is to determine how much of his 
resources he is prepared to expend for each increase in 
precision" 
The number of interviewers available to me and the 
number of interviews they could be expected to complete 
-reliably suggested an optimum sample size of between 
three and fourhundred. 7 Such a sample size would allow 
me to carry out the analysis I wished to do, and provided 
acceptable levels of precision .. 8 
Allowing for the usual attrition between sample drawn 
and interviews completed I drew a sample of 380 people: 
200 from the waiting list at Christchurch Public Hospital 
and 180 from Southern Cross files. 9 
Drawing the sample. 10 
The sampling frames used were the waiting list at 
Christchurch Public Hospital and the lists of the Southern 
Cross Medical Care Society. The former holds the names of 
all those waiting for medical attention in hospitals 
controlled by the North Canterbury Hospital Board except 
for Plastic Surgery and Gynaecological cases. The list is 
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subdivided by surgical specialty. Within each specialty 
a person's position on the list depends on how long he has 
been waiting and how urgent his condition has been listed 
as. 
The Southern Cross list was divided into names stored 
on a computer file (all of those with "individual" 
policies plus some with "group" policies) and those 
still stored on the original card file (all "group" 
policies). The nomputer file listed names alphabetically 
by locality. The card file was divided according to the 
"group" involved and contained all of the names in the 
Group, regardless of locality. By following a set of 
quite complicated procedures (set out in full in 
Appendix 1) I was confident that all Southern Cross 
policy holders in Christchurch (with the exception of 
some members of small groups) were correctly represented 
in the sample frame. 
The general procedure followed in drawing the samples 
(sometimes called systematic sampling) was as follows: 
1. I calCUlated the total number of names in each 
sampling frame. 
2. The number of names to be drawn from each 
category, in each sampling frame, was calculated 
according to the total. names listed in that 
category. For example, 19;;& of the waiting list 
names were sted under "Orthopaedic ll : therefore 
19~ of the sample names were drawn from this 
category. 
3. By dividing the total number of names in each 
sampling frame by the number of names I wanted 
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to sample I calculated a sampling interval i. 
4. I then picked at random a number between 1 and i 
as a starting point. 
5. For each category in each sampling frame I began 
with the starting number and then took every ith 
number thereafter, until the required number of 
names had been drawn from the category. 
6. Where the name sampled dd not have a Christchurch 
address, I recorded instead the name of the first 
person "behind" (i.e. closer to the starting point) 
with a Christchurch address. 
This sampling procedure is used as an alternative to 
simple random sampling when a large population is being 
sampled. When, as in this case, the feature by which the 
lists are arranged "is- not related to the subject of the 
survey" the procedure can be treated as lIapproximately 
eqUivilent to simple random sampling". 11 
12 
Each schedule contained questions designed to elicit 
information about: 
1. How saiis ed the respondent was with the supply 
and standard of public sector care (questions two 
and three on the medical insurance schedule, 
qaestions two and six on the waiting list schedule). 
2. 'v'vhat strategies the respondent knew of through which 
to remedy any grievance he had with the public 
sector, and which ones (if any) he had used or 
planned to use (questions four and five on the 
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medical insurance schedule and questions three 
and seven on the waiting list schedule). 
3. How the respondent evaluated different strategies 
for remedying grievances presented to him by the 
interviewer~ (que on nine on the medical 
insurance schedule and question ten on the waiting 
list sc hedule ) .. 
I 
4. How the respondent evaluated public and private 
hospitals respectively (question seven on the 
medical insurance schedule and ques on five on 
the waiting list schedule). 
5. What loyalty (if any) the respondent felt for the 
public and private sectors other than because of 
the care they provide. (question eleven on both 
schedules) • 
6. How much politic energy the respondent has. 
(questions twelve to eighteen on both schedules). 
7. How many political resources the respondent has. 
(questions nineteen and twenty on both schedules). 
The medical insurance schedule also contained questions 
concerning: 
1. details of the respondents membership of the 
insurance Society (ques on one) , 
2. the respon6ents choice of hospital if not covered 
by medic insurance (question eight) and 
3. How inuch extra the respond en t vJOuld be prepared 
to pay for his insurance cover. (ques em ten ) .. 
The waiting list schedule contained questior..s conc ng: 
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1. details of how long on the waiting list (question 
one) 
2. whether the respondent was considering exit or had 
exited as a remedy for his grievances (questions 
eight and nine). 
Both schedules are characterised by the extensive use 
of open endeq questions and a focus on the respondent's 
-actions rather than his attitudes or beliefs. Use of open 
ended questions was dictated by a lack of any kind of 
systematic knowledge about how (for examp~ people set 
about remedying their dissatisfaction with the medical 
care they receive. The focus on behaviour arises from 
the discrepancy between people's actual behaviour in 
particular situations and their behaviour as predicted 
on. the basis- of carefully measured "attitudes". '_3 
The Selection and Training of Int~rviewers. 
The waiting list interviews were carried out by 
Stage 3 Sociology students as a part of their course 
requirements. The medical insurance interviews were done 
by volunteers from Sociology 1 and Sociology 3.. (Medical 
insurance interviewers were paid at the rate of $1 per 
interview).. As well, I did almost fifty of the interviews 
myself, and friends did about the same number of others. 
All interviewers were given written instructions on 
how to locate and interview the respondents. 14 In 
addition all interviewers attended a training session which 
culminated in their interviewing each other under my 
supervision .. 
The problem in any survey is to ensure that the 
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interviewers locate the correct respondent (rather than 
their next door neighbour or best friend) and accurately 
record the interview. The best way to ensure that this 
happens is to recruit interviewers, who for their own 
reasons, are keen to do as good a job as possible. The 
interviewing of the medical insurance sample was done by 
people (selected from a large numb~r of volunteers) 
interested in the project itself, rather than the meagre 
amount of money to be gained by their participation in it. 
The interviewing of the waiting list group was done 
by Stage 3 students who were happy to work hard on the 
project, as long as they regarded their interview load 
as "fair". Both groups of interviewers on their own 
initiative visited homes five or more times in an effort 
to locate straying respondents. 
In~~ddition, interviewers knew that I held information 
about the respondent that was o asked for in the 
interview schedule (for example the respondent's age, hmv 
long on the waiting st and so on~. Thus, it was unlikely 
that mi~repres~ntation would pass unnoticed. As the 
interviews were returned I checked a number of them against 
this information; as I confidently expected, no discrepancies 
were found. 
Many of the names in the waiting list sample belong 
to children (defined here as someone under the age of 18). 
In gneral children have to rely on their parents both to 
recognise and do something about problems that affect them. 
But which parent to interview? It is often argued that 
mothers are closest to their children, and do most of the 
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battling on their behalf. Alternatively, fathers generally 
have more poli cal resources, are more familiar with the 
workings of bureacracies and more often make major 
financial decisions than their wives; they too care a 
great deal about what affects their children. 
Interviewers were instructed where possible to 
interview the busband rather than the wife, but to find 
out from the person interviewed what actions (if any) 
their spouse may have taken (obviously no problem 
in the case of solo parents). In this way I hoped to best 
characterise the political resources available to the 
family and accurately trace the actual incidence of voice. 
Sociology 3 students tried out and extensively 
cri ticiseci the first draft of the Que-stionnaire as nart 
~ _. - ~ 
of their course work. ']1he final draft was pret ed on 
ve waiting st respondents by myself and another 
interviewer and again t ed out by the Sociology 3 class. 
All respondents were sent letters informing them fuat 
an intervievrer would c ,explaining the subject of the 
interview and asking for their help. 15 T,he response 
to this suggestion gave an early clue to the differences 
between the groups: more than twenty of the medical 
insurance 3rouP rang me in contrast to one person from 
. the waiting list group.16 
The fate of each name in each sample is set out in 
..::..:::..::..;:::...;::;"._':..-' below. 
Table 1: What happened to each respondent sampled.* 
No. No. add- no no re- total 
names names ress con- con- fusal att-
sampl- ine un- tac t: tact: rition 
ed. igibl.e trace- wrong other 
able add-
ress 
Wait- 200 4 1 1 15 9 16 55 ing 
List ( 196) (185 ) (170 ) ( 161 ) ( 145) Sample 
.tvJed-
ical 
In- 179 4 3 13 24 9 53 
sur-
ance (175 ) (172) ( 159) ( 135) ( 126) 
Sample 
*Key: 
No. names ineligible = the number of people (of those 
contacted by an interviewer) who no lopger were on the 
waiting list or no longer had medical insurance. 
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no. 
inter-
views 
com-
pleted. 
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Address untraceable those people whose addresses could 
not be located on the latest U.B.D. map of the Christchurch 
urban area o 
No contact : wrong address = those people who were no 
longer at the address given and who could not be traced 
to a new address in Christchurch. 
No contact : other • those people with whom no contact 
was made but who were assumed to live the address given. 
fu = those people who were contact but refused to 
be interviewed. 
Total attrition = Number of interviews not carried out 
for any reason. 
'fhe numbers in hcacke represent the total ft in the 
sample after each successive source of tri on. 
The table makes it clear that a number of those whose 
names were sampled could not be interviewed. For this 
fact to "bias" the findings those people who were not 
interviewed must systematically differ from those who 
were; a useful (if rough) test of this possibility, 
is to compare the distribution of interviewed and non-
interviewed on some attribute known for both groups. 
In drawing the waiting list sample I recorded the 
age of each person whose name was drawn. Similarly in 
drawing the medical insurance sample I noted the kind 
of insurance the person had. below 
show how interviewed and non-interviewed compared on 
these attributes in each sample«' 
Table 2: 
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age less 18~19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ 
un- than 
known 18 
not 4% 
inter-
viewed (2) 
Com- 60 / plete /'0 
Sample (12) 
27% 4% 
(15) (6) 
25% 3% 
(50) (2) 
29% 
17% 
(16) 
9% 
(5) 
14% 
(27) 
14% 
(28) 
11 % 
(6) 
13% 
(26) 
4% 0% 
(2) (0) 
6%. 4% 
(11) (7) 
*Note that ages of those actually interviewed cannot be 
used for comparison because parents of those under 18 were 
interviewed, rather than the "child" himself. 
60 
Table 3: Comparison of complete medical insurance sample, 
interviewed and non-interviewed, in medical 
insurance sample. 
Surgical benefit 
only 
Surgical plus 
other benefit(s) 
Complete 
Sample 
Interviewed 
Not 
Interviewed 
65% (116) 
37% (46) 63% (79) 
32% (17) 68% (36) 
In neither case do those interviewed appear to 
markedly from the sample as a whole on the attribute 
used (althou in the waiting list sample there is a 
ffer 
tendency for the sample to under-represent those in the 
age group 20-29). I conclude, tentatively, that my 
results wou have been little different if I had been 
able to interview both samples in their entirety. 
Coding the interviews 
The coding frame was developed and all coding done 
by me, thus eliminating problems of inter-coder reliability_ 
In developing categories for coding each open ended 
question I used the following procedure: 
1. I read the response to the question in every 
second interview. Where it was apparent that t 
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responses would be particularly difficult m 
categorise I read all responses for that question. 
2. I constructed a rough set of categories, bearing 
on the questions I wanted to answer,. and thm again 
read through the interview responses, this time 
noting how well they "fitted". 
3. If there was a good "fit" (i.e. a minimum of 
cases falling into the "other" category) the 
categories were adopted. Otherwise the coding 
scheme was further revised and the same procedure 
repeated$ 
4. Once a satisactory set of categories was developed, 
these were applied tQ each response a person made 
to a particular question. Thus, for example, 
each reason that a person gave for taking out 
medical insurance was coded separately according 
to the order in which it was recorded: i.e. first 
response, second response and so on. 
Hembers.'? 
Another way of tracking down voice (other than asking 
dissatisfied people if they have used it) is to check with 
professional listener's: in this case parliamentarians and 
hospital board members~ 
I wrote to those members of parliament, whose 
electorates fell within the area served by the North 
Canterbury Hospital Board, asking them how many (if any) 
complaints they had received about hospital services, how 
the volume of hospital complaints compared wili1 the volume 
of other kinds of complaints and what, in particular, 
people compained about. All members replied. 
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SimilarlY I wrote to ~mbers of the North Canterbury 
Hospital Board asking how many complaints they received, 
what the complaints were abou t and what board members 
did about them. Twelve out of sixteen board members 
replied. Further I required information about how 
h0spital board members regarded the private medical 
sector and wrote a further letter to" all board members 
on this subject. Eight out of the sixteen members 
replied. 
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR. 18 
S 11 in pursuit of vOice, I undertook a content 
analysis of ~ll published letters to the editors ~f the 
Christchurch Star and 
September 1, 1972 to Augu 
for the year from 
31, 1973. By choosing quite 
a long time period, I expected to minimise the difficulties 
arising from the tendency of letters to cluster around 
different subject matters at different times. By including 
the General Election of 1972 in the pe od, I was able to 
focus on a period when letters to the editor bear most 
heavily on the question of what people want from government. 
Letters were classified according to whether or not 
they dealt with the provision of medical care and the aspect 
of medical care considered. The numbers of letters in 
each category was then counted and comparisons made with 
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other categories. 
USE OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS. 
I have used official statistics to trace government 
policy, characterise the performance of the public sector 
over time and so on. Two important problems, arise in 
any use.of official statistics; evance and accuracy.19 
Official statistics are usually collected for some 
purpose other than the convenience of social scientists. 
Thus the researcher must quickly accustom himsel f to 
boom and bust: a great deal of information on some points 
(sometimes the ones he cares ttle about) and very little 
on others. In the present study examples of bust include 
the lack of systematic information on the use of private 
hospi tals and the employment of hospital specialists. 
Offic . statistics may also be misleading-or 
inaccurate. For example until recently the Health Department 
calculated the number of doctors in the country by a 
formula that assumed recently dead, sick, retired and 
exported doctors all to be in active practice in New 
Zealand. 20 Unless the researcher is able to supervise 
the process through which official figures are collected 
he can never be absolutely sure of th6r accuracy. But 
naive mistakes can be avoided by checking the repute of 
sets of statistics with expert out ders and Health 
Department officials. 21 Overall I am reasonably 
confident of the accuracy of the official statistics 
used here. 
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OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION. 
I wrote to the principals in the Temuka "case 
study" reported here; drew extensively on public statements 
by politicians; checked through Christchurch newspapers 
since April 1973 for relevant material and wrote to various 
organisations f,or accurate descriptions of their current 
policies and activities.. Finally I worked through Isome 
of the submissions to the Royal Commission on Social 
Security, the Royal Commission to Inquire into and Report 
upon Hospital and Related Services in New Zealand, and the 
Board of Health Committee on Private Hospitals .. 22 
AN EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN .. 
The authors of Unobtrusive Measures point to the 
defects-inherent in any particular research method; for 
example, 
interviews and questionnaires intrude as a foreign 
element into the social setting they would describe, 
they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit 
atypical roles and responses~ they are limited to 
those who are accessible and will cooperate, and 
the responses obtained are produced in part by 
individual differences irrelevant to the topic 
at hand. 23 
The researcher, rather than relying on a single "best" 
method should use a set of complementary methods. The 
authors argue that, 
•• the most fertile search for validity comes from 
a combined series of different measures, each with 
its own idiosyncratic weaknesses, each pointed to a 
single hypothesis. When a hypothesis can survive 
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the confrontation of a series of complementary 
methods of testing, it contains a degree of validity 
unattainable by one tes~ed within the more constricted 
framework of a single method ••• 
... "the notion of a single "critical experiment" 
is erroneous. THERE MUST BE A SERIES OF LINKED CRITICAL 
EXPERIMENTS, EACH TESTING A DIFFERENT OUTCROPPING OF 
THE HYPOTHESIS.24 
Judged by ithis criteri~ the research design presented 
here is an unusually strong one; for example, three 
different measurement procedures are used to discover and 
estimate the incidence of voice, exit is checked both by 
the growth of medical insurance societies and interviews 
with different groups of people and so on G 
Most often the use of multiple measurement procedures 
has yielded inconsistent and disappointing results; when 
this is not the case there is reason to have a great 
deal of confidence in the hypotheses tested. 25 
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1Milton Friedman, . "The Methodology of Positive Economics", 
Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953). 
2The use of interviewers usually produces better response 
rates than mail questionnaires. As well the extensive 
use of open ended questions would have been impossible 
in a mail questionnaire, and the questionnaire would also 
have had to have been much shorter. 
3 It a cruel commonplace that people care much more about 
the deprivations they personally suffer than. those of 
strangers. 
4The waiting list at Christchurch public hospital lists 
the names of all of those waiting for public hospital 
care, except gynaecological and plastic surgery cases 
5In a letter dated 24th May 1973, the general manager of 
the Southern Cross Medical Care Society wrote: 
We will be glad to co-operate tb the maximum extent 
we consider possible but this wi be governed 
largely by the type of question· you will be asking 
and the general pose struck by the overall survey. 
For example, I do know that we would need to be 
assured that the survey would not include any 
suggestion implying that our members had joined 
because they were dissatisfied with the public 
sector ••• 
We would also not wish to have any reference made to 
member's attitude towards higher premiums or the 
tax deduction tuation as this could well give the 
impres on that such moves are contemplated when 
of course they are not, or that we are sounding out 
the possibility of doing so ••• 
We of course be glad to supply names and addresses 
of members provided that your inquiry is handled in 
a manner that we can approve • 
Their justifiable caution notwi tanding, Southern Cross 
were at all times helpful and accomodating (for example, 
the requirement that I not ask about premiums was dropped). 
6See for example, C.A. Hoser and G. Kalton, .survey ~1ethods 
in Social Investigation, 2nd • (London: Heinemann 
Bducational Books Ltd, 1971) pp.146-151; Bernard Lazerwitz, 
"Sampling Theory and Procedures", in Hubert M. Blalock and 
Ann B. Blalock ed., ~Iethodolog"y in Social Research (New 
York: HcGr:.aw-Hill Book CompanY,:, 1968) pp.285-287; Johan Ga~tung, ~heory and Methods or Social Research, revised 
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ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969)9 pp.,48-67. 
7Every New Zealand social scientist has heard stories about 
interviewers filling out questionnaires in the pub. To 
reduce the chances of this, I made sure that the sample 
size was such that none of students doing the interviews 
as part of,a course requirement, would have to do more 
than four half hour interviews each. 
8A procedure for estimating sample size according to the 
l~nd of analysis the researc~er wishes to do is set out 
in Johan Gitung, Theory and Methods of Social Research 
pp.59-62 e Given a minimum requirement of 10 units per 
'cell, the minimum sample size for the simultaneous 
analysis of three variables, each of which has three 
values is 270. The problem of precision is an interesting 
one. Most of the generalisations I wished to make, were 
based on survey and other data (for example, evidence 
from a number of sources, only one of which is the survey, 
is used to estimate the incidence of vOice.) Thus, even 
where a sample size much lower than the one I actually used, 
is chosen, if the evidence drawn from other sources is 
consistent with the survey information, there would be 
every reason to be confident of the findings" 
9It is widely rumoured that public hospital waiting lists 
contain the names not only of those people waiting for 
attention but also those of people who have died, moved 
away or gone to a private hospital, and thus lfor one 
reason or another) would have been ineligible for the 
survey. I therefore took the precaution of drawing a 
larGer sample from this group; as it turned out this 
was unnecessary; if anything the medical insurance list 
was less adequate asa sampling frame than the waiting 
list. I assume that this reflects the effectiveness, 
of government attempts to reduce waiting lists by clerical 
review. 
lOSee appendix 1 for a detailed description of the sampling 
frames used and the procedures followed in drawing the 
samples. 
l1 C•A• Moser and G. Kalton, Survey Methods, p.83. 
12Appendiz 2 contains a copy of both interview schedules, 
a copy of the letter sent to those to be inte~viewedand 
a copy of the instructions issued to interviewers. 
13The classic study on tile discrepancy that arises between 
attitudes and actions remains, R.T. LaPiere, "Attitudes 
vs. actions", 14 (1934), pp.230-237. 
14See Appendix 2. 
158ee Appendix 2. 
16Mos t of the calls were either to arrange a definite time 
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for the interview or to report that the respondent would 
be on holiday or otherwise unavailable. 
l7Appendix 3 contains copies of the letters sent to 
hospital board members and members of parliament. 
18In a much quoted definition, Berelson defines content 
analysis as, 
'a research technique for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the manifest content 
of communication • 
See, Bernard Berelson: Content Analysis in Communication 
Research, (New York: The Free Press, 1952) 
19Governments and government departments often have a 
vested interest in producing as rosy a view as possible 
of a situation" ,Thus wildly improbable figures may be 
accepted at face value and attempts to introduce 
change in,misleading methods of data collection resisted. 
For a ce account of the problem in relation to 
medical care in New Zealand see, Erich Geiringer, If 
21 For example, it turned out that one set of figures I,hael 
used to calCUlate some preliminary data about hospital 
staffing, reflected the compi rls confusion between 
the numbers of doctors actually employed by a hospital 
and the number of approved positions for doctors; the 
latter being a considerably higher fi~ure. 
221 wrote to each of the organisations and individuals 
who gave submissions to the Board of Health Committee on 
Private Hospitals, requesting a copy of their submission. 
The Department of Health ndly allowed me ,to see the 
submissions made to the Royal Commission to Inquire 
Into and Report upon Hospital and Related rvices in 
New Zealand and some of the submissions to the Royal 
Commission on Soci Security were either made available 
to me or were in published form. 
23Eugene J. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Heasures: Nonreactive 
Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Company, 1966). p.l. 
24Ibid ., p.174 
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Discussion of the dato is bro~en int~ two ch ers; 
in this chapter I look at possible solutions to the puzzle, 
"why no voic e? II) and in the next describe its consequencer:;. 
HHY NO VOICE? 
These days it is difficult for anyone not to know of 
the disloca ons occu ng in the provision of public 
sector care.;:uite apart from rst hand experience, 
information 8U long waiting lists, short es in the supply 
of doctors, an~ so on, has beeh widely reported in the 
merUa; even the recently d<?VOt8:~ 
as to the anno') ncement, 1I(~(i zone IS 
Ha.s Al:nos t " 1 . 
N ther are the results of public sector ficl.encies 
always trivial. Les8. than a month after the appearance of 
the article , the Auc&land coroner was moved. 
to co~ment on the death of a twelve year old child that, 
he res aware that the hospitals were short of be 
~nd u rstaffed but there seemed to have been an 
increase in the number of cases this year in which 
uersons refused admission had bee~ sent ho~e where 
they eG .• 2 
Plu st democratic theorists are quite explicit about 
what should harren. Dahl's Homo Civicus mi~ht an 
apolitical chap most of the time, but when his primary 
s are thre3.tene (in this case his "}:1rimordi quest" 
for "release from painll) he is likely to tlset out .jeliber~;tely 
to use the resources at his disposel in order to ence 
t at lr:;;tst in main centres, where the tU8.tiO~l 
io '::or there is little ave ev~dence of n citizenry 
clj E3satis ed th tlH'l provision of publjc sector care. Po 
:1n:::;ry q'..les on:3 have been d hospital board meeti 
no oreanisations (with exe 
,se ce oc tion) have derijc ed the~selves to rc 
1)11 hite sec tor'l es so on. remains 
quiet. 
One st~ple explanation is that spite deficiencies, 
p?ople are per ctly s ec1 with t qualtty of cere 
by the ~lblic sector; thUG no one is qrouse~ 
bc:'cfJ.use there is n hinS to be aroused 2,bou t 3 ':lh2:(; 
evi nce is there to support my eI'ClJ.ment th8.t ~1any l)8ople 
'CI.re sS8.tis ed th the present provi on of public 
sector hospit care? 
EVIDENCE FROB THE MEDICAL IFSURANCE SURVEY. 
Respondents 'were 8Bked, "What do you see as the 
aivantages to you of havine medic insuranc ~ Tb r 
r ies, liste~ in the order which they were eiven are 
set 011t in "below. 
sponden ts 'Here so csked. to r~1ecide bow i:nportEl.nt 
t e factors (bei sure of ttinc into hospital, the 
st8ndard of me cal care in private hospit 8) beine 2b1e 
to choose ~y own surgeon) "been in their ~ecision to 
take out me c~l r3nce. The results are set out in 
Table 5 bow. 
Ta.ble 4: Responses to the question, "What do you see as 
the adv8,n tages to you of having medical insuranc e?" 
Reason 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total 
Mentioned response response response response number 
givinG 
reason. 
Not having 
to wait 84 (67%) 5 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 89 ( 71 i:) 
Tax exempt-
ion 20 ( 16%) 4 (3%) 1 ( 1 %) 0 (0%) 25 (20;,f,) 
'saving on 
Dr and 
hospital 
bills 5 (4%) 16 ( 13%) 1 (1 %) 0 (0%)- (18;'~) 
Choice of 
Surgeon 2 (2%) 16 ( 13%) 3 (2%) 0 (0%) 21 (1 T;) 
Attractions 
of private 
other th8,n 
choi'ce of 
surgeon 2 (2%) 5 (4%) 3 (2%) 2 (2%) 12 (1 O;~) 
No 
advantages 
at all 2 (2}6) 0 (0%) 0 ( 0}6) 0 (0%) 2 (25~: ) 
Other 10 ( 8ib) 7 (6%) 3 ( (1 %) 21 ( 1 7%) 
Donlt Know (1 %) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1 %) 
No answer 0 (0%) 73 (58%) 115 (91 %) (98%) 
Total 126 (100%)126(100%)126 (100%) 126 (100%) 
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Table 5: 
Reason Ranking of importance of Reason given 
Suge;ested 
Very Quite Not Not Don't No Total 
Impt. Impt. very Impt. know anS'Ner 
Impt. at all 
Being sure 
of get tint!; 78 29 8 9 0 2 126 
into (62%) (23%) ( 6;0) ( 7:)~) (0%) (2%) (JOO;:{,) 
hospital 
Because of 
the quality 22 22 30 45 L~ 3 126 
of medic ( 1 7;~) (17%) (24%) (36%) (3%) (2%) ( 100}/) ,,~ /v 
care 
Being able 
to choose 51 28 27 19 0 1 126 
my own ( L~OjO (22;~) (21 %) ( 15%) (07b) ( 1}b) ( 1 OO~'w) 
surgeon 
From 
---'-_ .... 
, it is ·clear that those interviewed usp 
medical l~rance as a means of remedyinc their diss8.tisfaction 
th the public sector. 4. The chief source of dissatisf3ction 
is the i Cf.1.2.te supply· of rmblic Gec tor c[~re; "not havinG 
to wait" is seen as an advarltage by 71 ,'~ of the 1'0 ,ient 
(6 Sivi it as their first response). cor..trast 1 T:. 
and mentj()l1 IIch ce of surGeon ll 5.nd" trE1.ction of 
private sector (other than choice Df E3Ul'eeon)1I respectively 
(and in both cases only 2% gave it as their first response). 
Unsnrprisingly, the information in ___ "'- is consistent 
with this argument; 85% of the respon~ents ci "being 
sure of gettins into hospi tall! as an i.rnportant reason for 
taking out me c surance, while only 34% cite tithe 
standard of care in private hospitals". Bowever, with a 
prompt from the interview, "choice of surgeon" becomes 
more important to respondents in Table 5 than in Table 4. 5 
Further evidence that most respondents are not 
dissatisfied with the standard of medical care in public 
hospitals is given in "Table 6 below. Only 25% of the 
responden ts believe", unequi vocally, that pri va te hospi tals 
provide better care, while 35% believe that there is no 
di fference, and 10j6 think till t pu blic is best. Respondents 
were asked, 
"In gneral, do you think that puolichospitals provide 
better care than private hospitals, private hospitals 
provide better care than publj_c, there is no difference, 
or that it depends?" 
Hospital Public Private No It Don't ~o total 
with best best best differ- depends know answer 
care ence 
No. giving 
this 12 32 44 33 5 0 126 
response. (1 O~O ( 25,:0 (35);;) ( 26;~,) ( 4-;6) ( O/~) (100;:<) 
I conclude that people who take out medical insurance 
do so because they are dissatisfied wi th :public sector 
medical care. Because a great many people have, or are about 
to have, medical insurance, it follows that a great many 
people are dissatisfied with public sector medical care. 
Tne major source of their dissatisfaction is the 
supply, rather than the standard, of public sector care; 
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their concern is not that they will be badly looked after 
in a ~lblic hospital, but that they will be ~nBble to get 
into one when they want to. 6 As well some people (between 
20/1:1 and 80)6 of the sample depending on the question asked) 
are dissatisfied that the public sector does not allow 
them to choose their own surgeon. 
EVIDENCE FHOH THE ViAITING LIST SURVEY. 
The analysis of the waiting list interviews reveals 
further evidence of dissatisfaction. Again (see 
and 8) the source of dissatisfac on is the inEdequate sur..::,ly, 
rather than the standard, of public sector care. 
shows that, while almost half the wai ng list sample are 
dissatisfied with havi to wait, only about one tenth of 
them are dissatisfled vvi th the standard of public sec tor CCTF;. 
Similarly it is clear from that only ~bout one 
fifth of those interviewed unequivocally b ieve that the 
private sector provides better care. 
SUJ.IHA~iY • 
that me.ny ople are dis the provi on of 
blic f3ec tor ho tal care; the most impo~tant reason fer 
ssatisfaction bein~ inadequate supply. Thus the 
absence of voice is not expl ned by t absencc," of 
d sfaction. 
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Table 7: How those on the waiting list feel about havin~ 
to wait and the standard of public sector care.· 
Question; fully reason-
satis- ably 
fied. satis-
fied. 
How do you 
feel about 
this wait? 
14 51 
(10%) (35%) 
In lJlleral 
how do you 
feel about 
the standard?l 
of medical (49%) 
care in 
public 
hospitals 
once you t 
into them? 
Table 8: 
Hospital Public 
with best best 
care 
No. giv~ng 
this 47 
response. (32%) 
44 (30}6) 
Private 
best 
27 
( 19%) 
some- very don't 
what dis- care • 
• dis- satis-
satis- ed. 
fied •.. 
47 23 6· (32%) (16%) (4}6) 
1 1 
( 8;b) 
No 
53. (3%) (2%) 
It 
differ- depends 
ence 
37 (26%) ( 14%) 
don't 
know. 
o 
(0;£) 
4 (3%) 
Don't 
know 
13 
( 9ib) 
no total. 
answer. 
4 145 (3%) (100%) 
7 145 (5%) (100%) 
No Total 
answer 
1 145 (1 %) (100%) 
THE AVAILABILI11Y +1lJ'W RELATIVE COST/EFFECTIVEl\~SS OF VOICE 
AND EXIT: THE COST/EFFECTIVENESS OF VOICE. 
In ch1Jter 1 1 argued that the absence of voice is best 
explained by the availability of exit and its favourable 
cost/effectiveness relative to voice. To provide an empirical 
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referent for the concept of !lcost/effectiveness of voice" 
those int ewed were asked: 
1. -Is there any thine people like you can do to 
increase the chances that they get into a 
public hospital when they want to? and 
2. Is there anything that people like you can do 
to improve the standard of medical care in 
1JU bli c hospi s? • 
stribution of responses for both samples is 
set ou t 
'l'able 9: 
C:;,U e s on 
Increase 
supply? 
Table 9 belmy. 
Medic(?,l 
Insurance 
j1edical 
Insurc1nce 
List 
Yes 
34(27);;) 
(27X) 
No 
91 (?c%) 
OQ (71 i.n u/ ,'-', 
Tc.ble 9 OWB that less than 
know of any ce strategy that 
sec t () r c aT e . ce faiJs to 
the situation is such that 
Don't rio Tot 
know answer 
0(0%) 1 ( 1 %) 1 26 ( 1 OO;{) 
(100;{,) 
of those int ewer] 
to improve 
(see Table 1 O~ ther because 
could do any about it 
(c onstrained 1'\)1 tuation), or because they perso ly, (or 
people l~ke them), ;~r.e unable to inaJ~p any oiffereDce 
Cl'ersonal impotence). 7 
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In dition, a number of peopJe interpreter] the quest jon 
on the standard of public sector care as implyinc: that 
stanci.ard 1Nas 1.msa sfac tory; they then refused to 
an:::.:;wer further th~,n that the sta1Flard wa;:::; very 1Jit::h, [lnd thus 
the question of what to to improve it, meanJneless. Tho 
tlure 0 f the supply questi.on to create alar reactioll 
further supports my contention that di sfaction centres 
on supply, rather than the stan of public sector 
care (eee 
s of the tlvoice" reSpOl1:3eS reve8.1s that 
my ori~inal es te of the number who ow of effective 
ce E:~trat 8S is too hieh. te the most Generous 
possible construction of what constitutes voice, most 
21} of the medic insurance sample wai tin~' 
Ii sample report knowi ways of affectine the supply 
of public sector care a tively, 
I//ays of affec the staDt.lOrd of care: i. e. "true" 
voice (see OVl) • 
I further analysed the lltrue" voice respor:ses according 
to WIle they were likely to result in actions 
t to upcrade public sector services in 
n O' G 
(collective 
benefits) or simply result in a selective benefit accruing 
to the voicinG' As a 'rough rule of thumb, I codee 
re es aimed at poli c actors (includine hospitRl 
board members) as likely to bring about c lective bene ts .. 
ano· those aimed others as likely to ng about eelect4ve 
bene te. The results are presented in Table below. 
Clearly, few people ther e report knowing a 
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e strateGY likely to bring about gene~al public sector 
improvement (cf., the difference between the numbers the 
medical insurance, and the numbers the waiting 
sample suggesting 
sector defects). 
al strat s as a remedy for public 
Table 10: Reasons why voice strategies do not work. 
Reo,son 
TmlJotence 
,Supply/ 
.::;tandard () .1(" 
other 
Don't know 
Eo 3.fiswer 
Total 
rrot::;.l 
KGf'})onden 
l"Ieqic 
Insurance 
72 ( 7Q',,') ... ,,;J 
16 ( 1 8~:) 
( 1 ;{;) 
-;;: (3;s) J 
0 ( o>;~,) 
2 ( 2~:,) 
L' 
-J 
91 (1 OO~O 
Each voice strateJY 
pply 
':Jai ting 
t 
70 ( ,. ,.,'/) b (/L' 
(2Y£) 
T (1 >i) , 
1 9 ( 1 8;G.) 
3 ( 7:/) -;/~' 
2 ( 2:5) 
121 
, 
( 1 OO,{) 
uncertainty. 1. her contu.c 
4 
3 
2 
3 
91 
PC) 
-,.. 
ec UrJi.: tii1G ( C Od.8 ~~ (,18 
( 58~~) 
( 
{30;G) 
(3%) 
( .) 
( 
Standard 
V)fai 
e List 
72 (75/) 
42 (10.<.) 
19 ( 205·:·) 
0 ( O'~/) pJ 
2 ( 2;~) 
~ (~ 'I) - .. ' !~ 
./ _',, __ 1 
106 
(lOn,':') 9f ( 100, 1 I 
a(,hlJinistratorR approFlc hed (c od ed as "medical". stra tet,:;ies) 
l1'lB.Y often f.18 too bl.tsy to listen or m1able to responrl even 
if they wish to. Strategies such 0B IIwr1ting a letter to 
G neVlSpiJ.I'fH,lI, "sic;nip.G a pe tion", "C omplain::i .. nG to someone", 
(all coded as tfvoice strategiec;: aim not clear") do not 
3uarantee redress. 
'I'able 11: 
Eespol1ses 
"Tr1..1I3 f1 voice 
responses 
other 
I'E::'SpOnses 
. (includinc; no 
answer, don't 
Mechc 
11;3urs.nc e 
26 
know) 9 
'fotal no. of 
responses 
Total no. of 
respondents 
No. sUGGestinG 
"true" voice 
stra te~y as /-l 
of to 
sample. * 26 (21 %) 
.supply 
28 
11 
~n (19'/) cO f" 
S ta.ndiJ.rrJ. 
I·,[edic 
Insurance 
22 
12 
34 
22 (1 7X) 
Vh:Ji tin:: 
List 
23 
23 
41 
*Note that this nu~ber is calculated on the assumption 
each respondent giving a "true" voice response, gave one 
response onl;y: sit represents the maximuF! ssi e 
number in sample f~:ivin:.:: "h'ue" voice responses. 
Table 12: 
"Voice 
strat es 
Pressure 
poli cal 
au tho~rj .. ties 
(includ 
ho tc.:.l 
Hedic 
Insure.nce 
board members)15 
Pressure 
me,cUc 
au'tho:ri s 5 
C\irn 
unc ar (' r~, 
tal no. 
of responses 
r·'Jo" su t;gesti 
"poli calli 
,gtr8t .. , as i.; 
of total 
e. * 15 (12):) 
:Supply 
':Jaitint:; 
List 
1 G 
1 1 
28 
1 ( ll) 
,3t3.nO.ar rJ 
Medi.cal 
Insurance 
1 Z j 
II 
5 
22 
13 (10%) 
'.'!ai tint,' 
st 
r 
C 
5 
12 
6 ( 4;\) 
*Note that s number is culated on the assumption that 
each respon nt C;i ving a "I,oli tic 101.1" strateGY response ![3VE 
one response only; thus it represents maximum 
number each sample CivinC a tlDolit:Lcal" stra .. t c. 
:';esliondcnts I belief the uncertain outcome ~ ce :Ls 
reflected in r evaluation of each of even fferellt 
vo:Lce st egies Table shows that 
respondents are doubtful that any of the strategies 1 
much difference. Tocet the cc.tet:ories "Great. of 
difference" and. "some fference ll inclUde 50% or more of 
medic insurance: respondents only three times 011 t of eleyen 
\'IR:L tine list 1'e lent.s onl;y one time out of eleven. 
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The outcomes of these comparatively "sure fire" strategies 
(workinG throut;h an ore;anisation, worlant:: through a 
polttic party and complaining to an M.P.) are early 
not guaranteed. (Cf. the difference in evaluation of 
strat es betvleen two samples; only on the rec t 
action item, are those in the waiting list sample more 
opti c th8.n tho.se in the medic insurance sample). 
It is difficult to estimate the actual time, energy 
and money expendi required by the voice egies 
men oned. First, voice strat es include activities 
as diverse as "r:omplaining to someone ll , "eetting on to 
t doctor", and "workine; through a politic 
Second, the wi response to some of 
que ons, "I'rn not the c typel!, 
partyll. 
interviev! 
ts 
C?st of voice may inclu the price of deviance. 
finally, the uncertain outcome of each voice strateey 
means that the expenditure of any effort on voice may 
be juclCed as "just a \vaste of time ll • 
Most respondents in samples (approxim8.tely four 
fths) report th8t they do not knoYl of way in which 
they can affect the supply, or the standard of public 
sector car~ the present context voice is simply not an 
option for Of the ce strot s that are su ted. 
are characteri.sed by a sreat deal of uncertainty. Thus, 
the cost/ef tiveness a of voice unfavourable; 
even Cl. :..:;reat 
U,l t C o:;]e •. 
of e does not aTnntee a successful 
Table 13: 
Complaining to/ 
working throu:.:;h/ 
using. 
Hospi tal Superint-
endent. 
Hospital board 
Family doctor 
Cmbu 
Or~ani32 on (G.~. 
c'hurc'l, un:L:::;n, 
Poli lJart.;j' 
Sample 
Medical Insurance 
Waiting List 
Medical insurance 
::Iai tin[~ list 
dice,l insurance 
:/aitint; list 
insurance 
:Jaitir~c; st 
al i nsur:mce 
lif3t 
nLrect action (strikes)I'Ieclical insurance 
I;rot8sts etc) ::7,:li 'It 
th 
Department 
l'/re~nber of 
PcTlia:nent 
Cabinet nister 
Letter to newspaper 
rrotal e size 
1,'lecU,cal insurance 
~\!c;d tine: list 
jnsurcUlce 
st 
Medical insurance 
~;Jai tine list 
Medic su~ance 
,'fai. tin.::; l::i_ t 
Medic insurance 
\'1 tins Ii s t 
Make a ~reat dRal 
of difference or 
some difference. 
No. ,I of sample /') 
59 (47%) 
46 (32%) 
51+ ' (y 5;)~) 
45 (7, F') ../ 1-) 
L~ll (7. C::") ':)'7,,-
Ity, ( 70Y,) J / .... / 
51+ (L 7,"\ L",,~/ 
118 (-7.) ,J,J,,) 
f~)5 ( 52;~j 
70 ( y,8;~) 
(7 ( h -, .,/) 7 " 
-' ( r,n',/) 
./ '<-' I .) 
19 (1 5,:') 
It 1 (28%) 
61 (1 O"i) !·OL:~-;,/ 
6lt (LL' :") J....!.- .r \ ~ I' 
70 (5G:;,~) 
~J6 (7 q"!,) 
_) "" I, 
52 (hlt',l) j / ~ 
'+8 (33:;:,) 
(41)0 
55 ( 38':;~) 
126 ( 100;'{,) 
1 LI5 ( 1 OO;~() 
rrHE AVAILABILI'EY AND RELArJ1IVE COST/EFFECTIVENESS OF VOICE 
AND EXIT: THE 1v10NETAHYCOS frs OF EXIT. 
At least at present, exit is euaranteed to brins 
about imme ate improvements in hospital service to the 
person using it. Thus the effectiveness of exit is given: 
her~ I am concerned to asseSB its costs. 
In er 1 I argued that medic insurance makes 
financi 1 "\1 
-v e for people who could not otherwise 
afford it. As well, those ~ho e tare to "under-
e" its costB; thus thGy 1 be rEl ively 
to·price increases. 
The annu cost of Southern Cross's Bureical fit 
r f ~10 50·t ~?n 10' s rom if. 01;L./. I ... , the cal and Gureic 
benefi ts com.b:Lned from ;:,2l}o to ~69.40 (the cost in each 
case is for cO'lerace for a sin.gle adul t, 
a fa~ily of husband, wife two-or'more 
children under 19)~ 
OfthoB9 terviewed (16%) had their contribu OllS 
diseci by their oyer,s, average rate of 8ubsi~y 
reported beine: 65;,j. The mea}1 amount personally by 
all respondents for their coverage (calculat on the 
of 1'8 ndent s. 
shows that many of those erviewed are 
in fact relatively ins ve to increCl.ses the price 
of t; more than half of the respondent,s reporting 
themselves willing to pay premiums half as high 
as r present ones. 
t 
Tr.J.hle 1~.: 
_1. as much 1 8.S l:'1Uch 2x aR PlU c 1:: 'I- 2: 
aGain [3saj n in 
nnmber and }fJ ( 71[,';) 70 ( c:, (,<;',) .,/ ~,11"" i+ 1 (3370 
Howover, the facts that me cal insurance lowers t 
absolute costs of t, and that consu~or8 tend to t~nder-
valu e II thA se c 0S ts, s not necessarily mean that 
medical ranee has led to the UGe of t by people \VllO 
pre I)usly could not afford it. ~10 finG au t the. extent to 
which me c tnsurance e contained ople who, 
wj.thout insur::'Ylce, '\'.'Ou1r1 find it fficult to fOrrl t) 
I d, H'Lf YJU not bnve me c 'insurance 'olJl d n ee(~E:'rl 
tl) [;0 to Et ho to.l \,loulr1 you Co to ;;: private or ct public 
hospital or would it ?" (.see 
Table 15: 
to it don ' t no tot 
tc 'V 2". t 9 e'.~ent4s 0'" ' 0', c;.n.swer 
Plnd)er 7,7 22. (C, 0 1 1 2( (3-0,~) . , .,' ( 1 7"<' (S:y/) ( 0::'.) ( 1 ) ( 1 00") /. , j ,., ~ ,,,.,. L-, '" 
r) +' t 7.'7 e they llse the puol:i.c \ ... 1 
--' 
, 
sec tOl~, ( 1 of the [1e c1 j c ::'.1 in.'3urence c;'F:F,lp) l..-. - -~ J:: ~ , said tLct 
they coul~ net ~f ~d pri e sector care; of 
tll9..t it 1'.'00.1 "depend" the erucic 1, tor for 
21 of them (17,'" of tLe 'ned:Lc'!'-'l insuJ'ClncE': ~3E,-rn'plC') \V8'::~ thei r 
contention th::-ct medicel insurance has worked to tna}~e exit 
more widely·available. 
But still not everybody c~n exit. I pointed out in 
the chronically: ill or (as T8ble 16 below shows)', to rnost 
TL~ t,} e 1 [,: "6.p;e di,stri.bu tion 0 f mecUcal insure,nce responde]! t:::;. 
20-29 -;\n- -;;0 /.jo-~-() 50-59 60-69 '70+ To I,e-l 
../' --..-
-. -
Number 13 ,?LL 31 3:5 21 1 1 ~, -_ .. r, 
EUI ,3 ,.- .... ;f. ( 1 O(~) , , ( 1 C).;i) r. ' (2 h')) //C ( ;:>6;,:;~ ~ 1\""1 ( 1 <)~';: ) ( 1/) ( 1 r)o: ) 
.'':;,i{nilarly the fact that even the 'noiest cost of 
Medical insurance premiums mey be beyond the means of a 
lar~e number of Few ?,eaL--l_nders; is reflected in ille 
IJl'e6.o'nillanc e of high inc :)mes among those insured. (see 
Table 17 below). 
~ejical insurance effectively lowers the cost of exit> 
l11akinC it 9VEdJ able to many 1'11Ore 1'eO})le th3_D previously; tl.--l e 
survey l.cI'ovides evi Jence tba_t ~_ n~ll!')ber of the insured CQ;) 1(~1 
Dot afford exit otherwise. \t the S9me time, inspection 
of the aGe 2_n,], income grou})s in which the rnedically insure 1 
occur, maLes it cleaT that t;1e olu 8.nd the :poor remain 
la:ccely excluded. 
Table 17: Income di,'3tributi~n of merl.ical insurance 
re,s·pondents. 
Annual income of family Number and '" ;/1) 
less than 1t2, 000 6 (5%) 
$2, 000- ~~2) 999 8 ( 6;;~) 
'jt3,000- ,999 17 ( 13):S) 
~p4, 000- :;~4, 999 17 , ( 13%) 
;~5) 000- ,999 1 7 ( 1 
'1).6,000- '090 ,..I ./ 8 ( 6;,:;j) 
,000-~p7, 999 12 ( 10:>~) 
,999 4 ( ) 
(19 OOO_·tfo 9(lO 
,,' lP /" ./ 7 4 ( 
:j: 1 <] ,000- i,l, 10, 999 5 ( 4Jo) 
J11 ,000-~~11 ,999 (1 X,) 
,;12,000+ 1 ') 
./ (1 O~i~) 
It 1(.nov! 4 ( ) 
EJ,n::3;Ner 10 ( (; /~:) 
"'I~l -rTm • 
.. !! ,-" '....J..... _" • 
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consi " .. 
the~~elves N8 8d to the c ,sec tor for tter nr for 
sfied th the I'llbli c 
n'''' uo 
sect')l' \'Jill uSI,H).11;; not be restl':::dned fl'o~(] .~, t!:' 1lC(8 hy 
loyalty (or ~on-~onetary costs). 
I sUCGested that the grounds for loy ty to the public 
sector (except perhaps for past good performance) are 
unclear. rst., the consequences of t the pablic 
sector O.re sputed; the Barrowclou~h report and the Board 
of Health Comm~ttee Report on Private Hospitals arguing 
that private a public ho tala are complementary, 
private hospitals relievins the burden on the plblic 
sector. 9 Similarly the sent Minister of He th recently 
stat th9.t the government, "saw private hospit s 
line a complementary role in medical services 11 • 10 ' On 
this s, t may well be the first choice of the 
loyalist hopin~ to serve, or improve, the public sector; 
by exi n c 
--0 he reduce de~and for public sector 
services B.nd thils, rjresumabl~r, improves the qu ty of 
care received by those rerfl.ainihc.· 
term:lti vely, loya.lists may be swayed by the argumerts 
0,dvanced by t Pu c rvice Association and Dr Sutch 
who have ~lggested the consequences of exit, or 
at least government encouragement of it, are detri~ental 
to tIle p(lblic sector. ll 
But even if people are clear about th r loyalty, and 
the action it ent 18, I arCHed that they wOLlld still 
li1;;;ely to choose e t. l~ls shows, no one in the 
wai DC st sample who report himself r:liss8.ti,sfied with 
pll blic sec tor care, cave ideological commi_ tmen t to the 
public sec tor e.s a reRson for not (;oing to a va 
110 tal; similarly, only one person cited an i 01 cal 
reason for DO I: t insurance. 
i oloeical reason covers any response that sucgests that 
a person refrains from exit uec,:.tuse of the· consequences 
of his actions for the public sector, or because of bis 
adherence to an ideological or moral injunction 
p-r'ohibi tine exit). In contrast, the monetary cost of 
exi t is Em often cited reason for not using the 'Jptiorl. 
'rable 1.8: 
Reasons for not exiting 
Reason given aD ~rounds on 
for not: of cash ideal c 
(monetary) grounds 
toinG to a 
rrlvate 
hospital 
not takinG 
out medict:il 
insurance ' 
,SUNHAHY 
11.' ( 26;;;) 
o 
(O;:~) 
1 
( 2>~) 
other Tot~l 
(including Respondents 
don't know, 
no answer) 
18 
( 42:10) 
31 
(7 2;~) 
43 ( 1 00;:;) 
43 (100%) 
Overall, non-monetary factors are far less often cited 
than monetnry factors as a reason for not ti.ng. Thus 
few ople seem. 1jkely to be restrc:,ined from exit by 
loyalty. 
90 
In t cedins two Gec ons I have presented data 
\ 
hearing on whut people con der to be the cost/eTfective~pns 
of exi t voice. 'Jere my concern is to ve the notion 
e er'lpirical content "by eVCl,lu 
end sf c 8SS of ee.ch In relative to 
1 .... 8C!~1 1/'.-J:1'o c~rn be certain t 
orle, the t ['] .:::; c e r t ~)i. n [1 t tl: c i:!.' U r:; e 
the~ no hens tG ~t all. 
heilE fj t r:; r~le :ms th.,:, t :L t. is 
1'911:'. V9 ~) the ef 
",ct'j 
CJ .1 
co,S :in e:d tjn,::. e t option, at le~st in the 
t 
..... ,;-.;'\l' 1-, f' 
•• -0.1 -,' 
in2QrenC~, is sold to t~G recipient; thuE he need 
" -~ 
'J' 
10 
CG nf the In :ic 
ce 
,1-L:f r:nlt to c.?,l-:-ul e eth~T' 
ne; 
9l 
vance. Finally, inasmuch ps a person ChOOSRS to voj.ce 
rather than eylt, he fa es the certain bene ts t 
prnmi.'3(-;o. (relow I examine the pOGsi bili ty that 8. person 
may exit and still voice; in such a case the opportunity 
costs incurred loreoine exit do not apply). 
Of course, the relative costs of voice and exit illPY 
be BU bjec t to drastic chanc;e. In the same way tho.t mp.di c 
insurance has c0nstderably lowered the costi of e t,a 
so al innovation mRY dramatically lower the cost of 
voicE: • IIirE3eh'i1o.n pain au t, !It possible 
of lower cost ana 
1;J 
essence of voice". -
oJ effec ti veness js of the very 
Nevertheless, those ople who currently can afford 
ther e t or voice (I have argued that r10dical insunmc() 
rnc: ... kes e t vlidel;t aV.9.ilsble) wtll nd that the rela.tive 
~obt of voice ~reatly exeee~s that of exit. For those 
l1nable to exit (or choos1n~ not to) the h1[h cost of voice 
will scouraGe its use. In such a tuation I have ar e 
that t'1e inc:i.dence of exi t wi 8reatly exceed that of 
votee. 
'3T A CHOICE ~ITUATION: rn .L VOICE? 
In choosl. to sample the t ~r list I 8sswned rst) 
that those on it would have 88J~ and personRl reasons 
for vmnti Fg to lido Bornethtn;::;" to improve the supply ano 
rhaps the standard of public sector care. Second, I 
expected that bein~ on the waitin~ list (rather than beine 
~ prtvate hospital) was 2 consequence of exit bei 
fficult or unavailable. In fact it turned out that a 
92 
good number of those on the waiting st, if unable to exit 
this me, planned to, or had already, tak~n out medical 
insurance so as to avoid the waiting s tin fu t u r e. 1 3 
Thus contrary to my initial expectations, many of those 
found on the waiting list had a real choice between exit 
and voice. Which did they choose? 
On avera~e the use of ther option was considerably 
more difficult for members of the waiting list sample 
than members of the medical insurance sample. As Table 12 
below shows, the incomes of waiting st respondents are 
concentrated toward the bottom of the scale, while those 
of the medical insurance respondents are found largely 
toward the top; the mean income of waiting st respondents 
of $4,428 compares unfavourably with the medical insurance 
~l ~ 1 mean of >rb, 24 • [rhus it is more di f ficul t for those on 
the waitine list to find the money to pay insurance 
. . 14 
·premlums. 
The waiting list group 1;VRS short as well on edu cation 
(mean age e.ducation wed 15.5 years, compared with 17.3 Y83TS 
for the medical insurance sample) and occupational prestige 
(the me an status ranking fell between cate30ries 5 and 6, 
compa_red with Lj and ~; for the medical insurance sample) which 
~long with income I have earlier identified as important 
political resources (see 1 below). Thus the ~~~;~~-=--~-
use of voice may also be more difficult for waiting st 
reslJondents. (In line '.'lith this, I shoi\!:.d in that 
those in the waitins list s2-mple were cenerally less optiY!1is c 
about the use of voice than the medically insured and in 
that they were less likely than the medically insured 
to suggest political strategies as a remedy for dissatisfac on 
with public sector services.) 
'rable 19: Income rJistri bu tion: ·""ai ting list and medical 
in,'311raDCe respondents compared. 
"~nnual DrJle 
of fan:ily 
less than ,000 
t) 2 000-. ':.? Cl W, ,,~,./ 
"1..3; 000-
'~7~ 000-·:,,7,999 
,000-::~9, 999 
"~I; 1 ') 000+ , c., 
Don It };.now 
answer 
'T'o 
Hedically 
insured 
1 7 (1 3;{) 
17 (13/) 
8 ( :~) 
1 2 (10/,:) 
/"-'" 
4 ( 
( 1 ;6) 
13, (10%) 
1 0 (8;~) 
126 (1 OO>~,) 
Waiting 
list 
30 (21 ;'0 
o (0%.) 
2 (1};;) 
145 (100/;) 
Table 20: Years of education: waiting list and medical 
insurance respondents compared. 
Age education ended 
12 13-15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25+ don't 
or know, 
less no 
answer. 
l'/ai t-
inc; 7 72 57 L, 4 1 
list (5%) ( 50;:6) (39%) ( .' -/ ) ( ~~') .)~{: (1 :0 
medic 
insur- 2 36 60 12 5 10 1 
ance. ( 2j;) (29%) (~ (')(/) (10;,{) (4%) (8%) (1 %) ·OiO 
Table 21: 
total 
1/!. ~~ 
(100 . .0 
126 
(1 OO~:) 
hiGh occupational status 1 {"'1 T T 
retired; 2 7, I, 5 6 7 other total 
"" no 
occul1-
co'- on 
Given. 
Ivai t-
ins 11 1 n 1 ';; 10 l~ 1 36 22 1 1 ll~ :; '-' 
list ( 8;';) ( 1 ;;) (rHl (9,';) ( 7~':··) ( ?~·':'l (2Sn/,) ( 1 1:)':') ( n,!) ( 1 1 r, ' .."." / 'oJ'" .- .... / .. ;/ # 1- ,--,''- -, 
./, . 
;neclic-
al 
insur-13 10 14 17 21 18 22 r 5 1 0 
ance ( 1 0;,5) ( 0 .. ) 0/0 ( 1 1 ,.:(.) ( 1 7,,/) I ,.t -",' i'" ( 17%) ( 1 Lt7~) ( 17%) ( 5~f,) ( L~X·) (10O,.) 
Overwhelmingly, those on the waiting st 'Nho chose to 
II J tl' II h . t Tlll.1S ll4 peo;::le, or 30"','0/ of t11o c.)'e GO SOffie-lln~ , c _oce eXl • r _ ~ _ -_ 
in the waitinG list sample, reported that they plannert to 
take out I:leclico,l r~rnce h2d already taken out medical e:L , cc 
insurance, and/or planned to BO to a private ho tal for 
thi treatment of their present medical problem. For 
convenience, I hive called s group "1eavers" and those 
reElaining IIstayers ". ('See below: note 
that Table 23,27 of the 41 people who had already 
taken out medical insurance, or who planned to, also 
intended goin~ to a vate hospital the treatment of 
their present medical problem; thus they are leavers in 
a double sense). 
Table 
leavers 
Lh 
(30%) 
stayers* 
101 
( 70'c.~) \ /LI 
total 
llj·5 
(100%) 
*stayers jnclu:'le all of those (:i.ncludinc: don't Imovf3 an(i 
no answers) who did not positively report themselves 
as leavers. 
Table 23: 
have taken out plan to take all t plan to use 
me cal ranee medical surance private hospi 
but not take out 
medical insurance 
17 21+ -z; 
./ 
(~q''i) :J:; /0 ( 557;) ( 6:() 
In contrast few wai list respondents made use of 
voice. Overall 6 of 101 stayers (6%) reported usine voice 
to increase t supply of public sector care; no stayers 
l)lanned to voice about supply in futUre ( ther because 
total 
'+4 (1007:) 
cr:. 
, 
it worked, or more likely considering that they were 
still waiting list respondents, because it Vias inef ctive) 
(see Table 2~ below). 
Of the 6 instances of voice, only one even remotely 
involved political actors; the respondent supported a 
political party whose programme he believed to inclu 
improvement of the public sector. other five instances 
involved ople complaining to their doctors or hospital 
personnel (other than the board) and one -person who just 
"complained". 
As for the standard of care no -stayers, had made 
use of voice althoueh two planned to; the first complaining 
to hospital rsonnel (other than bo ) and the second. 
to a source unspeci ed (see below). 
Table 24: 
aim of voice: have or no voice don't know no total 
J}lan to answer 
voice. 
to increase /' 0- 0 2 101 lJ ,) 
supply ( '" ') 1;)/;; ( 02/) ,/ _;J:; (0"') ;':"" (2%) ( 1 OO~O 
to improve 2 99 0 0 1 01 
standard. ( 'Vd) C./\..~ (98.~) (0") /0 (0%) ( 100/j) 
Of the leEwers', 5 of 41f. (11 (~) reported 11 nc; voice 
to improve supply ( by complaining to th doctor or 
hospit (other thE: l!oard); 1ih:e stayers', 
no '-leavero ture. 
(see below). Only one leaver (who reported 
that he paid close attention to the c dates st 
c)7 
for election to the hospi board), was coded as u 
voice to improve the stan of care. 
Table 25: 
of voice: have or no e don't no t 
to know ansv/er 
voic e. 
rpo increase 5 39 0 0 l+Lj 
supply ( 111/) ,v . ( 89i'~:) (0%) (0%) (100;;,/) 
improve 1 41 0 2 ItLj 
standard . (2%) ( Q7,,'1') (oob) (5%) (100%) .;..,.//0 , , 
In all there , only 14 t or pIB tnsta.nees 
of ee were ed.; 1 1 about supply ( cantly no 
ce in future .... thj.s) and 3 about I, one planned to. 
6 of tances j.llvolve rl ·leavers' v1rho.se 
lac of future plans for voice sUGgest cone ern, 
le only 2 of tances even remotely involved politic21 
actors (i.e. the posstbility of c ve bene ts) ~ Th11s, 
those on the waitin~ t who wished to "(10 somethine'l anJ 
apparently able to bebveen voice and exit, 
overwb nely chose latter. 
LIST AS A CHOICE SITUATIOl\T: STAYERS AND VOICE:. 
Bu t vlna t abou t for whom no c ce was 
those whose only option appears to be voice. Clearly 
stayers as':l ::',;roup made little use of voice up 
until nmv , at least in the cruc 1 tel' of supply, 
plan none in the future. At the same ti me it is from 
ssatis ed stayers that the most voice might be expected; 
unlike either ntdical ranee respondents or leavers) 
stayers are the ones who can only remedy their ssatisfac on 
by voice. How is mat SO ttle voice occurs? 
Lack of voice is certainly not explained by an absence 
of cti sfactionamong stayers. Althou8h the idence 
of dissatisfaction is lower than among leavers (stayers as 
I argued in chapter 1 will inclu those who care lit e 
about quality, as well as those who are dissatis ed but 
unable to exit), it is still substanti i 43% of stayers 
rt themselves di sfied with supply 10% with 
the standard of public sector care. ( e 
below) • 
Table 26: 
fully reason- some 
satiH- a what 
very 
s-
don't rlon't no total 
care know ansv!er 
s;.. dis- s-
fied. satis-
[]tayersl1 40 30 1 7, l: 0 3 101 ../ ( 11 ,~) (LtO;O (30;S) ( 13~:) ( 1'/) (O}~) ( 7n') ( 1 00.70 'I'/~ , :J/;) 
LeaverB "7 1 1 1 7 10 2 0 1 4'1 J ( 7)~) (25;:n (39~6) (?""»<) ~:J, - ( S~'.'~) ~ t"" (0%) (2;.·b) (100:'(;) 
But still no ce. The simplest 8xplancltion is 
voice's int cally cost; as I have shown it arc:; 
sufficient to ef ctively scourege respondents in both 
somples itB use. :-;ut as '::81.1, as J u.rzuP.c1 in CHapter 1 J 
those people who are dissatisfied but unable to exit, 
wi find the use of voice more difficult than any other 
~roup. Not being able to exit is the outcome of havine ss 
resources than most others. 
Table 27: 
fully reason- some very don't don't no total 
, . D.bly \'{hat knoVi .':3a1:J.::':- G- care anSV!eI~ 
fiec~ Gatis- ('ii,s- s-
fiE.'d 2c).ti:3- fied 
fleel 
sto.yers52 7 ~ It 7 101 
( r:: 1.'/) (25::) ( 7,;) l' 
-) ( ( I /;') (7/) ( 1 OO,~) :J I'"~ _ .. (v, -+, ~ 
leavers19 19 L! 2 0 0 0 1;1+ ( 6) ( lJ. ::;"') 1 ....... /(...- ( q-/) \, .r , '-' ( S';!) .-' ,~ (0%) (0%) (0%) ( 1007:) 
rChree important poli cal resources are educa:ti'on, .iDcn;:;18 
and occupatio ]!restise. Leavers and medicall;y in8ure 
are better educated than ai sfied stayers on O.ver,3.r;e 
(fll thouGh the di fferenc e tween (lissatisfied stayers and 
. 1 h 
avers is sl2.t::ht)" ( See below) • hs well leavers 
and the r:1 c['.lly insured earn su bste.ntially more tl1an 
sfied stayers ('lIable 29 01.'.') are more likely 
to be found in more pre8ti~ous occupations (Teble 30 below). 
of those who are, or have been anxious to "do 
so:nething" to remedy their dissa tisfac on wi th pu blj_c 
sector ficiencies, Gsat:tsfiecl sta;yers have the =l..:;;,.::.;.;;;;...;...t 
voice resources. As well, t wo to drain off those in 
the tin:::; st set with more, mther than GG, voice 
resources: it selects disproportionate numbers of those v.'i th 
i THE! LIBRARY 
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more education, more incame, and higher occupational 
l;restige. 
Table 28: Mean years of education of dissatisfied stayers, 
leavers and the Dedically insured. 
Hean years 
dissatisfied stayers 15.05 
leavers 15.3 (N = '+4) 
medically insured 17.3 (N = 125) 
Table 29: Mean incone of dissatisfied stayers, lcavers a~d 
the medically insured. 
Ivlean inc ome 
dissatisfied ,stowers fIt, 13'+ _ (N = 41) 
leaver,s n4,881 (N = Y·2) 
medically insll . .:."e c1 ;~6, 241 (N = 1 1 2) 
Table 30: Occu pational Eresti{ie of dissatisfied stayers, 
lee.vers and the fl1edic81ly insured 
hi0h (' occupational prestiGe ) low 
1 8~ 2 3 8, 4 5 0 c' 7 ~otal c.< tJ 
dissatis-
fied 0 7 20 2- 35 
ste.Jr 8.I-'F3 (0 },~) (20%) ( r::T) :; IV, ( ?~C') LJI_' (100;D 
le3.vers 0 S ~6 7; 37 
-'" ( 0;';) ( :>2-') L- _,..) (71:~) ( 8;'~~) (1 OO;~) 
. 'l1edicc~lly 21, ~Gs;\) tOT') r 108 (-)2' J ) ~ C''') (1 OO .. ~~) lnSUreo. ,-=- _;0 ;; -' I ~ :J ;-" OlLJ~ 
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t sociQl scientists deal probabilities; thus 
volce pot a1 may vary widely between people 'Hi th the same 
resources as wellns between people with fferent resources. 
One determinant of voice for any 0i'1en 
level of resources is aGe. As I argu Chapter 1, old 
people 2.re likely to find exit more It than you::!::::; 
as well aIel e will find voice more fficult than 
tion of an old person is fficult; ~any 
people are "01 .. fore tb.eir tiDo" w~lilc t c 1ities 
of ot1:01:'8 re~:lO.i;l t unir:1F3.ired un rtr[;)ntJ 
2uGse11 i8 the best example). 
for most e reac ne 70 can be consi red a lS 
01e1 C\.~.:;e. 1 7 
that the only people over of 69 
in either Croup ed are found Q~onG the st ers; 10% 
'Jf all Jissa s ed stayer's ;].r'e by this old 
people. As well, ac son of the mean ages of leavers 
and st8Jlers in that exit 1Norlts to n 
off proportion'::1tely more yO',1n.::; than o}-r} people from t 
\'!ai'tin[.'; list set (ju,st as t t wODks to drctin off hisher 
than lower :Lncone pe e, those in more rather than less, 
presticous occupations ( ) tho,se 'Ad t11 1]01'e 
than less educqtion). ed stayers are thUG doubl~ 
handicappeCt; they have les8 ce resources than others, 
and the ability of some s 
1 () 
diminished by old age. a 
r8 to use these r08ource~ is 
The level of political en 
so appears lower than in the 0 
tho ~atter is leS8 clear cut). 
s isfied. stayers are less 
in the stayers Group' 
I' two croups Cal tho:1.:311 
the Tahles below show, 
than others to report 
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themselves as opinion leaders , less likely to 
belone to a voluntary association ttable 33) and, if they 
do, are likely to belone to 
than others. rrhey are 
(Table 34) associations 
likely to have voted in local 
body or general elections , to have gone to 
cGlJnpaign meetings to belong to a politic 
party, or (if they do one) to be active in it 
, .::.;.,..;;.;...-......;...,..:.---",-",,-
d 7.C;) an . .JL' • ,Stayers are about as likely as others to have 
contacted ~n M.P. but less likely to have 
contacted a Cabinet ster, the Ombudsman ora 
lawyer ly, stayers are less ly to YU:l.Ve 
\Ilorl-::ed throuGh an sation, written to a r or 
maGazine or strikes or protests ( .........;..;.........;..;----~ ... 
Teble 31 : 
Years 
19 20 30-39 Lf-0-i+9 50-59 60-69 69+ Total 
dis-
satis-
fied (' 1 1 (' 10 4 4 1+2 f,) 0 
. (?Oi) S1:ayers <-/0 ( 14~n ( 26;(,) ( 14%) ( 2Lf-%) (10%) ( 1 0>,;) (101';%) 
leavers1 () 13 1 1 8 3 0 44 c.) ( J ( 1 "i) o~~ ( -'O~/) J ':'0 ( 25~,;) ( 1 " ) iJ ( 7':'~) (07j) (1 OO~,'~) 
-----" 
mec1ic-
ally 0 13 2Lj ":1 33 24 0 1 
. l( 0'/) (10%) (1 q":.) (25%) ( 26:;'j) (1 o~/) (0;0 (lOO.n lnBU1~e( >1:.> ~,,", 
" /d 
dl 
10> 
e 32: Hean aGes of leavers, dissatisfied stayers ano 
the medically insured compared 
Hean ace 
isfied Gtayers ~6 (N 42) 
leavers LI·1 . (N = 44) 
medically insured 47 (1: 125) 
AlthouGh some of differences are small, each 
item thnt scriminates b en stayers and the other tva 
rs DB havins political enerey. Agair 
t ';'10 dif rentially, eeloctinS from the waitine st 
those who are '('lost enersetic. ThuG) le.::tvers belonc !,lOre 
often to voluntary associations, ,pllen they do, on.~ 
to more of the;n; 1.'.'hile there Gtre about the same pY'oporticl1 
of politic party !TIembe:cs a;non~ 1eD.vers as among stayers, 
2.11 of those o con ~J.er elves party mo::nb er,s 
OJ?:f.? 1 eave rr; GO on. 
E?fi st:].,)rers :J.r: .. zious to "de somethins" wind up 
face to fc.'cc e l'/i th Catch 22. Voic e is the only on they 
!!2.ve to remedy theiT dissD.ti,'] ti.oni the 
1 of resources and enercy s e ~11ore 
eli cult the:ll for others. In S11<;h a tu:tion 
I arcued in eh er 1) clif3satisfied stRyers 'irtll do exact] y 
t they in fact plan to do : nothinc. 
'rable Poli tical energy of cissa ttsfierl stayers; leaver!3 
and the medically insured, compared. 
Political Ener::;y: Action taken 
Belong to a voluntary 
sociatioll 
fieel 
,stayers 
707H30) 
Vot at local body elec ons 66%(27) 
Voted at Ja3t General elections 9.::;';<:'(38) 
'.Vent to an elec on campaisn 
meetinc 21%(9) 
Belong to a political party 
Contacted an M.P. 
Contacted a Cabinet Minister 5%(2) 
Contacted the Ombudsuan 0);( 0) 
Contacted a 1a'!yer 26%,( 11 ) 
aorked throush an organisation 16%(7) 
~ritten a letter to a 
ne'Hspaper 
Been in a s.tr.ilce or protest 
7>~'(3 ) 
2%( 1 ) 
eavers 
insurer' 
91 %(40) 7 9.:/:, ( q 5 ) 
-" I G ,/ " 
(.0"/ (29) 
" './ /'.,r' . __ 85"« 10.?) I;,,' "" 
98%(41) 9'-(~( 11 LI-) 
34%( 15) 30X(38) 
1 6>~( 7) 21 )~( ) 
11 %( 5) 1 3;;~'( 1 6) 
7%(3) 9%( 11 ) 
2%( 1 ) 2:";( 2) 
39%( 17) 37%(46) 
257;(11 ) 2/+A( ) 
1 O;'~( 1 2) 
16%( 7) 4%(5) 
But this extended comparison between the energy and 
resources of leavers and stayers does more tb<1n simply 
e}:plain why those Vlho are cis sfied, but cannot exit, 
remain passive. As well it sUGgests how for any eiven 
Get of people (in this case those on the tine list) exit 
I'forl:s to select out tholJe who otherwise could be expected 
to be voice's most active aGents. Thus exit c from 
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the waiting st 2 disproportionate share of those who 
have more r,3tller than less political resources and energy. 
Table 34: Mean number of voluntary associations belonged to 
by QS8ociation members amont'; dissatisfied stayers, 
le2,vers and the med:Lc ally insured. 
dissatis 
leavers 
rneclic 
ed stayers 
inEJlll"»ecl 
\T (; I"JT 
::'.cttve 
,liss9.tisfied IJ 
S ( <) 
, I 
lcover 
',"18 (:ic 
insured 
2 
(29;·n 
ac 
° (O,Y) 
2 
( :::9::') 
7 
I 
( 2r))~) 
Mean number 
1 .79 (N :::: ) 
2.31 (N :::: "Z,q) ~ ; 
2. (n - , :::: 95) 
How active a member 
Ld r 1y iYl:1C 
ir:.ac t:L ve 
1 r::; 
./ ( 1 7;';) ( ./ ) 
-
1 2 
( lL,':) 
. , -
( ~():/) 
- ... " . 
1 7 
° (F: ~"/) :).); .: (O~~) 
G 
(100;:) 
7 
( 1 OO~'';) 
27 
(100;':') 
10(, 
Table 36: 
more lih:ely as likely less likely total 
satisfied 6 22 HI- 42 
st8.yers ( 1 L~%) (52%) (33%) (100%) 
leavers 111' 18 1 1 1+3 (33%) (42~O (26%) (100,-'6) 
medically 35 62 27 126 
insured (28;7j) (lJ9%) (21 )"0) (100):';) 
SU>IHARY OF THE WAITING A CHOICE SITUATION. 
Those on the wai at who chose to lido something" 
to remedy their diss[..l. on th public sector care 
-
overwhelmingly chose t; who were dissatisfied but 
apparently unable to t, anned to do nothing. As well 
for any set of people t process works to drain off 
rwise be voice's most active 
THE OVEHA.LL INCI OF EXIT. 
More 
Southern 
insurance s 
mcdic8.11y 
1 ,000 members 
19 haLf. 
ethan wat tin:; list leaver,s have been exi tine ,,' 
the rst and largest of the me c 
es (with aoou t 80-(35%, of 8 of t 
on its lists) has crown ss than 
1961 to almost 300,000 members the en0 
h year its membership reased by rou(;hly 
Two ot societies, the New Ze are Society 
p Medicare Co-operative Society (both founded i3.nd _ 
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in October 1971) also provide medic insurance. Both had 
grown to between 20,000 and 30,000 members each by the end 
of 1973, their membership doubling or more each of their 
t f t " 20 wo years 0 opera lone In addition a new society, 
the Nu tual alth Society Ltd, is beinG planned to cater 
for the needs of trade union members; 'unlike the existing 
societies it will offer in addi on to the usual bene ts 
regular income rel8.ted ]J8.yments coverinG sickness periods. 
(A fourth Company, Manchester Unity, operated from 1968 
until the be nning of 1973 at which time its members were 
largely incorporated into the Southern Cross scheme). 
Overall, the in the numbers of people with medic 
insurance has been exponential; not only has the number of 
those insured rapidly increas ,b'.:t the rate of this 
increase itself increased. 
The records of tradittonal welf8,re societies provide 
further evidenc e of the increasinr; use' of exit. Friendly 
Socie es, such' ,as the Hibernian Society and the five ,state 
Bervic 8 ;:lel So eties, pay rebates to members ma1rinE 
use of private hospi tals (i the forr-!er CD.se the subsidy 
is no!ninal). e'f these organisa.tions, two, the st Of ce 
h~re Society and the Public Service '.'Ielfare Society, ke 
rec allord.nc the identification of rebates on J)r1vate 
fees (the records of the other orcanisations 1umr 
"merUcal" j)'l.yments tOGether). In both C,3ses (see 
Table 37 below) there an increa.Ge the nUY;lbers 
seekin;.; Teb.::d~c:;'3; for the POE:;'/: Office 1:JelfcT8 society t.he 
rved for the c;rO'l!tl:. 
of me~ical inE~~3nC8 occurs •. 
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Table 37: 
Year No. ef clEd.ms 
Post Offi.ce Public Service 
1962 32f t. 
1963 429 
1 961~ 1i-:;2 
19(;5 609 
1966 r 8'7 r.) i 
1967 72S' 
1968 8Lj-j. 
1969 89LI 
1970 0 
1 971 1391 0 
1972 2157 151 
1973 
Nevertheless actu use of private hospitals has 
increased at a rate considerably slower than the growth 
of medical in~lrance (see Table 38). Sur3ical admissions 
increclsed from ItO, 125 for the period H2.rch 1970 to l-1arch 
197\ to 44,601 at March 1972, and 51,792 at March 1973, 
representing increases of 11~ and 16~ respectively. (Note 
that ~he data, althollch insuf cient to reliably reveal 
any trends, is ronsistent with exponential growth). 
There are at least three possible explanations of tbe 
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"lag" between the e;roVlth of medical insurance and the 
increasing rlemand for private hospital care. The first and 
simplest, is that the private sector is unable to satisfy 
rapidly increasing demand; thus the use of private hospi bl.ls 
has not increased because the private sector is presently 
unable to accomodate any more patients. There is 
however no evi nce of unsatisfied demand for private 
sector services that I know of; certainly no waitinG lis~8 
comparable to those for public sector services occur. 
In addition) there is considerable evidence that a laree 
amount of II ack" exiEts i.n private hospi tal operations: 
i.e. that without new fac ties or resources the 'private 
sector can COlle th rapid increases in demand. Thus for 
exwnple, private hos~it in Auckland without any increase 
in facilities were able to cope with 5,419 (37%) more 
surgicnl admis ons i-,1 1972-1973 than j_n 1971 -1972 (see 
belov[ ). 
A Gecond possible explanation is that the population 
tc:ddn:l,' out rr.8(Ucal insurance and the population who normally 
use private hOGpi talG are IJretty much the same. Thus there 
has been little increase in the use of private hospit~ls 
because tho same peol,le, many nov! insured, are still wnl'iinc 
the same use ()f the pri vato f3(~ctor. 
,such an arcur'le is not inc stent th 
the previously presented facts that 20: or more of those 
with medic insurance could not use private hospitals 
without it, and that an increasing number of members of 
\velfRre societies ~ 1/1ho h·<;,vG 110t previously done so, a~e 
mDldng use of the priv e sector. It is, h01!{eVer~ clearly 
inconsi 
. 1 ...:l' • 
ent \':i th the 37;,~ increase in sur;::;l ca_ o'.tll1l8S10nS 
l1n 
in Aucl::land in 19 1973 (unless I am to b eve that, for 
no apparent re':1.30n, the incidence of medical problems 
amon~ the pool of private hospital users reaseci 
drmnatically in year). 
Ii third on, that, for sev reaso~ it tn!'.e'" 
some ti:ne for fm on in the numbers wi medical 
insurance to t a similar expansion demand for 
private hospital care, is the only cxplan on 
to adequately fit 1 of the facts avnilable. On 
explanation the reasons the "la[;" are b:lo , 
because the t:ro1!:th 8 of ~edical insurance 
been exponentia~ ~ost of se ins~red havo been ci u:.' 
the lE'.st one.: or bilO yea:cc. t::econrl, becG.use of the 
red to 1] y she 1:18 c o societies onl,,/ 
e can sien up, and even these people ~re not usu 
covered for any pre- s ,~ C01>~t~~)n.s 'J1' condition 
se in the fil~Gt th::-ee [10n 
I ct tl~e impact of c in,surc.nce on e 
os sense of the apparently 
inc stent facts, that a 1 e nlLnber of the me(~iCC1 
outside the pool of 
onal private hospital users, yet the increase i 
t O.C tu use of private ho s been relatively 
0"\"1. sugCests thnt a rapi~ reaoe in de~and for 
sector f:', ere! ·,1111 occur, t not riCht away. 'rbe fact 
en c1 iest and most 
heavily cl·:.1::l.nd of <111 the centres is consistent 
\'fi th the r:L s e in p ri v 8 to 
i~ tho city. Thus, in this view, t ~lcklRnd fieures re ect 
11 1 
what will soon occur elsewhere as the ~edically insured 
tncreasinr;ly (1evel-op 'conditions req1Jj_rinc; surc;ical remedy. 
Tel.bIe 38: Surc;ica.l Admissions to private hospitals by health 
district* 
ons 
oruB. 
nen ti:::1.11y ere 
,', sn.c t err-; () f 11;'~ 0:(' so of t 
TJ('q!i C 0 v e r 0 (' . r~nce ~ore than half have 
thr::: 197.2. t 
11 ~ 
translution of the Growth of me cal insurance into rapidly 
incre c: ctowJnd for private hosp! tal care has already 
beeun • 
rfFIE FUTUI~E INCIDENCE OF EXIT. 
Given a fini population, exponential curves L::;uch as 
the onp. plotteej for the diffusion of me cal insurance are 
most accurately seen as the 011e section of the familiar 
,s-shD.Iled lOGistic curve (see Gul'e 1 below). Thu s lLleur 
jec ons d on present crowth ':::tll likely be in eI'rC) 1---
of the diffu on curve '.'rill c nue 
to c l1G'o. Of cular interest in tho nt sellS (' Y) 
is the t}W.t Giffu on curve for me c 
out 
i.e. that the numbers of aplo with medical insurance 
8.1'(-> unlikely to inc :('e:-180 mn;:; h :rlOro. 
Fi 1'e 1: 
b. 
Eunber l1
'
Er1ber 
ed 
2. :-,1 curvo .')n of me::l.i :Lnsurance<~ 
b. Bwne curve fitted as of 10~i2 c curve. 
Such a possibility seems most unllkely. Finst, evi e~ce 
from other som8Dhat aT societies, in particular the 
United ,t3tate,(~ AU8tralia 8ho\'11'3 t it is p0Bsible 
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for 8o;~ or more of Ilopula tJ OT'. to have medical insu ranc e; 
thus the potential for selling medical insurance in New 
Zealand is still lar3ely untapped. 
Second, it appears that a considerable number of those 
presently makinG use of private hospitals are as yet 
uninsured; i.e. the market for medical insurance 8mon~ 
present private hospit users is . 21 far from saturated. 
In addition the overall cheapness of premiums, the 
cOi'ltinuing on of company sub dised schemes Rnd 
the development of trade union sche!:les means that exlt 
lil:;:ely to bec O!1e even ea er in future. 
Finally because (as I show in t~1e next chapter) exi t 
creates consequences likely to fUrther increase the incidencR 
of dissaUsfac on with the public sector, more and more 
people 11 heve reason to exit. 0verall, it appears that 
t.he incidence of exi twill conttnue tr.) increase thE: next 
few years. 
However it may be that the}!riv;:J,te sector is unable 
to cope with further increases in demand, thus makine exit 
impossible. such a possibi ty se~m8 most unlikely. 
I have already ar[u thD.t there is a good deal of "s1acl{1I 
in the private sector; thus it is 'obable the. t private 
hospitals could cope with many more patients than they do 
at present. As for further expansion, the encourasement of 
"trust" control in the pri v2,te sector means that expansion 
lna.y be undert2J:::en as a public ce, even if it is li~elJ 
to he only xar~inally (or not nt all) profitable. The 
"insulation lf of the COnGUmel~ fro'~'l increases in the costs 
of private hospital care provided by medical insurance 
meens that fees can be raised to finance expansion with 
I I': 
1 . ttl h ~ l' t . t 22 1 e C ance 01 a.lena lng CUS om. Finally, for reasons 
that I will outline in detail in the next chapter, it is 
likely that the expansion of the private sector will be 
heavily financed by public Dlnds. 
SUHMARY. 
In the next few years the growth of exit is likely to 
continue the same or at an even faster rate. This 
Growth will be accomranied by the further expansion of the 
private sector. 
THE OVERALL INCIDEl',rCE OF VOIC)l~: EVIDEN'CE FROM THE SUHVEY. . 
contr0st to the ext e use of t it appe~rs that 
little voice has occurred or 13 likely to occur. I have 
already shown how few waitin£list rssponcientB made Use of 
ce, and hO'r: elTen fewer planned to do so future. 
particular onl.Y one person I s use of voice invol'Ted (con~Jtruec 
in the broarJes t sen.se) poli cal BC tOl~s (see 
above). 
Even less voice was r ad by the medically inmlr 
Only three 1)eople (2%) h3d used voiced to increase tbe 
supply of me cal care (see below). Of these, two 
ho.d .L • SOmel-1me ~p.revi ou [;ly comrl to their doctor or 
t than the boari) about inadequate 
ne~Ct r had B.ny plans to voice in future. '1'he tLL 
re ent had in the past wo throu5h the National party, 
as an active member of the Ibcal electorate 0r2anis~tjon 
(2.mon~~st other ) to try to improve the supply of 
hospi b:,l care CI.nd plCl.:r:.ned to do 88 in the fu '.:c~r: 
11 ~ 
( thour;h not c.)~;.'-:'G~1tly c:n a::tive party mel'1rJE'T). The same 
respondent was the only rson in the medic insurance 
sample who repnrt tJ1tl t he ho.d I'r'e ou sly Q,r i11' fu tll re 
planned to use voice to improve the standarrl of public 
8ec tor care) 3e;ain by workinG througb 8. poLL tic p.3.rt,Y 
(see bel,)w) . 
Table 39: 
,'\ i. '1l of have or no don't no to 1 
v'Jice pla.n to voice ImoV! 8.nSV/er 
voice 
rro increiJse ~, 1 1 6 () 7 1 " /' ,~.' ( 2);;) ( 92::6) (0.'0 ( rrl) i)/O (100;/) 
'Po improve 1 113 0 12 126 
ct:::'...'1 ( 1 ,';') (90%) (0,:;;) (10%) (100;.' ) 
Thus, while di88ati8f~ctj,on with public sector care led 
the medically insllrecl to t, only in three Cases did it 
slso res'J1 t in voice. It also aI'S toed h:.wing exi ted, 
fu re voice i C' ,~' unl lyj only ·')ne re sllon d en t reporting 
that he emne to make furtber use of v ce. 'Phis nsle 
deviant caBe ts nes·:.tly into the categ·,;·ry "ir1eologue". 
As a previously active fational rty ~embpr (who had tried 
to cbange the party's Vietnam policy and m~rcbed public 
(lemonstra on,,: on the 1Nar)) tbe respnndent justified his 
terms of doctrine of 8 good soc ty and 
the connecti on of first rl-J.te public sector care with :"luch 
~ sDciety. ~hus the incidence of voice among those SAmpled 
bas bRen low a~rl may bR even lower in ture. 
THE INCIDENCE OF VOT : EVIDENCE FROH VOICE COLLECTION POIT\TS. 
Hospital board members 8re c d with represen 
the community in the on of ho tal care. Accordine1y 
I wro to me'TIbers them how many, if any, campl 
they received about public sector care and what thes6 
complai n I.vere c.bou t ~ even of the fourteen members 
repljed. Fro~ Table 40 below, it is clear that, overall, 
members receive few compI nts; on 8ve 
year, of ch approximately twenty four are r~ceived 
by one b member. formation from boardts 
ch:drman sU sted that letters of compl nt, 
are more often addressed either to Chief 
~r to the cal Superint ent-
ef, which is of C' ou rse the c orrec t 
Euch com;l ~ I doubt wouid number 
as ns one per ~ 
It i,8 clC:2.r t neither t 
lJS 33 
:..1-
1 
vine 
:J.ints 
v ceo 
1 -,;, 
2 
C) 
nor its of cers are 
c:int:::: lJer ;year 
S'+ tote·.l 
110t 
clea::, 
1 1 
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Three of tt,Jse rcplyn1~ COP'1:TI(?nted on the reluctance 
of their constttu ,'= to particulars of their 
evances and presumably, to make compl n~ at all. 
One "member (who received by far the 1~r5est number of 
complaints) re e6. that ople ted four to ten months 
fore 1 'C\. comrlcdnt j e noted, 
taTe ctant to rf\::;ister their complaint for 
feer of 111Nhiplash II should they require further 
to tal ca~e or are 80 erate011 for small mercies 
tha they pre r t,,] sui' 1n F3ilence when nun::;es 
seem ru d off their feet. The less effluent end 
articul e appear to fear the Medic Profe on more 
they fear God. ~s well the majo ty of my 
comr:lcdnants do not thetr names divulsed but 
eventually up in the hope that as a board 
member I ble to re 0 fro~ suffering 
Comp13,lnts to bO;3rd members covered a number of 
t c s; most co~mon (in terms of numbers of members 
reporting it) was the tin3 list. 
Similarly members of ament with electorates 
North Canterbury reCEived fevv complaints about public 
sec care. 1 ten members e that the percentage of 
complaints concernins public sec care is a very low 
proportion of the total cons tuent problems th de 8,1 wt th; 
the ghest re reported is of all probleTs (co~pared 
with, the 8a~e xember, 60Y for housi ). Three of the 
ten meBbers (including two out of the three National party 
members in regton) report receivine no compl nts at 
all in the last year. ~ost COMmon source of complaint 
is again waitin~ in ttitle; into a publtc hosptt 
In abso te terms it ap~ear that members of parliament 
handle a bigcer volnme of complecints about the public 
11 8 
sector than ho t board members. However, relative to the 
total number of c01nplaints they deal with, the number concerned 
wi th pu blic sector care is very low .Ilgain there is no 
evidence of even a moderate outburst of e. 
A third place I looked for evidence of voice was the 
Letters to the Editor columns of the and the 
those letters 
September 1 1972 to 
I.rable 41 : 
:s '.' 1'8 
l~un by tbe 
The results of a content analysis of 
VIi th hl1Spi tF,ll C 3.re for yeer 
gust 31 1973, is set out 
care. 
e 
~tened to close up; however Df r considerahle voice 
rnmellt acree,j. to prllvicie ttNi. th :3 srE'n-t s'lfficlr:: rd: 
for its wo t~ continue. 
c 
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The most important point to be eleaned from the Tabl~ 
is the absence of complaints abou t lonG wi,i tint; 
times for public sectQr care, the evunce most ofter1 
mentioned by thof3e interview-ecl (note however, three compl;o,-j nt:'" 
c tic ising the quality of public sector cere). As well, 
adding together the letters on Marylends and the letters 
prajs8 of private hospitals, 57~ of letters to the 
I 
editor for th,e yeaT were \'/ri tten in support or praise of t;'8 
})rivate sec tor. 
Jt~er traces of voice are equally fficult to BCQuer. 
The 197...; Labour rty Conference (Je t ':'vi th 8 resolution 
can t ad of we cal insurance; 8 
(2.11 of t ne ly int0 the c~te50ry i aloEue) c 
OIlS to govprmnent tnqu:i_ es rein 
t),.l t the or e t)f blie S8ctoc serv~ces and aT ing 
t DJrther expan en of the ~rivate sector. 
In two cases (~r Sutch an~ the r.~.~.) se i3ubmis onB 
have beenpu ished, in both cases resu] in little 
r: 
th inciCencc of vcir 
v:ic .lOE C)C cLlr, least inas~uch as it 
JF' '1:J1 
e : 
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its use. Presumably ideol E'S in ::.;enerC3l (who G9.rp no t 
only about tbe hospital ser'dces they personally receivp 
but so about the arrangements through which medic 
c!':'.re 1.8 tri ted) will continue to voice. wever thp 
eXfonenti jncre?se in the u p of t ever more quickly 
llqri ves therr} i~f a tenti :J.1J ence, a point de::tlt with 
more fully in the iJ8 cll er. 
OJ,,; : l~E EXIT IS NOT }';VLILARLE Tn 
'rhe bi ty of etas a remerly for ~i8 fc1.c t i on 
on the ready avail ljty of private sector 
ilities; feciljties which are non-existent many 
synaller Eev.; 7."PCllan d ci es cmd rrovinciaJ. towns. My 
argument sts (lissatis tion in such places will. 
result voice (except of course the unlikely situ on 
to ~2ke usp of it). 
own serve ons 8U~~E8t that with one exception 
(to be discussed later) lit e voice has issued from such 
cen ther no one is dis sfied (the absence of 
voice s not contradidt my ar ent) or people are 
s8C:tisfi.ed, voice is \v·:.thi n their re9.ch, hut for SOr:.~0 
re~son is .lot used, (myar.e;u is contradicted). 
FortuD sJy for the development of confidence the 
central merit,· there is L: rea.son. to believe that. th(" 
explanation applies; i.e. that people in such centres 
,9.'['e to he setiAfi with the rrovision of public 
S i? C tor c c~r e . Buse it fi.ts there more neatly, I present 
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the evidence bearing on this point in the neyt chapter. 
CR (~PTER SlTf'.1MARY. 
The evidence presented suppor~ the following contentjons: 
1. ll. 'Jt many New Z anders are dissatisfied with 
public sector care; in particular with its 
inadequ e supply. 
ere exit is available, those dissa ed 
overwhelmingly choose it rather than voice to reme 
their dissatisfaction, while those who find i use 
fficult are still unlikely to voice. 
consequences of this choice are explored in Chapter 4. 
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In this chapter evidence for two principal contentions 
is presented; first~ that exit, unlike vo~ce, stimulates 
no one to repair public sector lapses; second that exit, 
again unlike voice, works to deprive the public sector of 
the resources necessary for its recovery, thus setting in 
motion a cycle ~n which public sector services progressively 
deteriorate. 
EXIT AND THE REPAIR OF PUBLIC SE&TOR 
te the parti "socialization" of medicine, 
the members of the New Zealand medical profession continue 
to exercise a great d of control over the provi~ion of 
me c care. Ko government, no matter how great its 
mandate, nas attempted to implement any change in medic 
care policy without o~ consultation with the profe IS 
representatives. Whenever the views of government and the 
pro on have con cted, the pro on has been 
c stently successful in winning substantial conces ons 
from government. 1 
dividual doctors have a 1rge amount of In addition, 
control over the 0 isation and management of medi care, 
by virtue of their monopoly of "cl ical" decisions (i.e. 
those apparently requiring the use of medical expertise, 
of whicQ by definition, doctors have the most). Thus within 
hospitals it is up to a doctor to determine how long the 
patient should stay, how he should be treated and so on. 
If exit in anyway threatened their livelihoods, or 
offended against finer sentiments, doctrrs are clearly in a 
powerful posi on to halt it. But, at least for livelihood, 
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the opposite is true; for the reasons set out in Chapter 
1, the greater the incidence of exit, the richer (and 
perhaps the happier) many hospital specialists become. 
In fact, the medical profession has not used its 
strategic po tion to end exit. Instead it has sought 
to preserve the right of exit and encourage government 
subsidy of it. As the opening sentences of the profession's 
submissions to the Board of Health Committee on Private 
Hospitals state: 
-M.A.N.Z. wishes to stress the importance of 
continuing a dual method of Medical Servic~ 
for the Country, both Private and Public;:, 
The submission continues to argue the case for further 
government subsidy of exit: three out of the five 
recommendations made involve government 
subsidy of t. 3 
Exit so fails to encourage doctors to make more 
efficient use of the public sector. Hernia and varicose 
vein cases together account for a large proportion of the 
total general surgery waiting st; they are also conditions 
extensively treated in the private sector.' But 
Auckland (where the volume of exit is great ) increases 
in the rate of exit have not resulted in greater pub~ic 
sector efficiency in their treatment. Instead, for the 
five years 1965 to 1970, public sector efficiency (as 
measured by average days stayed by sufferers) in the 
treatment of varicose veins actually declined by 1.4 days 
(or 11~) (See Tables 42 and 43 below). At the same time) 
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public sector efficiency in the treatment of hernia 
increased only marginally from 1965-70 (0.4 days or 4 %).~. 
The much greater efficiency achieved by doctors dealing with 
the same conditions in the private sector makes it clear 
that the public sector works considerably below capacity 
(See .5 Overall, exit dOes not appear to 
encourage doctors, either individually or collectively to 
use their strategic po tions to bring about improved 
performance by the public sector. 
Tc3.ble 42: 
Hospital Hean Number of Days 
1955 1960 1965 1970 
Public 19.5 14.5 
Private 
1972 
6.0 
Adaptect from informati.on in G.L. Salmond and E.t1. O'Connor 
t1Genera6 Snrcic w:ti ting Lists and the Hanager'lent of Varicose 
Veins". 
1?9 
Table 43: Auckland 
Hospital Nean Number of days 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1972 
Public 11.0 9.2 
Private 
Adapted from information in G.L. Salmond and E.r1. O'Connor 
"General Surgical Waiting Lists and the Marrgement of Varicose 
Veins!! • 
Exit is no more effective as a stimulus to the efforts 
of hospital board members. ch~pter 1, I argued that, 
for a variety of reasons, hospital board members were far 
more likely to welcome, than be alarmed by, exit. 7 In the 
course of my research I wrote to each of the fourteen North 
Canterbury Hospital Board members asking whether they saw 
a conflict between the public and private sectors, whether 
they would like to see it made easier, or more difficult, 
for people to exit and how they felt about the present rapid 
growth in the numbers of people with medical insurance. 8 
The eight replies I received are set out in Table 44 
below. 
Table 44: Attitudes of hospital board members to exit. 
Conflict exists between public and private hospitals? 
yes no neither total 
1 7 o 8 
Use of private hospitals should be made easier or harder? 
t 
easier hard~r neither total 
2 5 8 
Favour or against the growth of medical insurance? 
favour against neither total 
5 3 o 8 
With one exception, board members replying see no 
conflict between the public and private sectors and would 
not like to see entry to the private sector made more 
difficult. They favour, five to three, the further growth 
of medical insurance. There is no evidence then to support 
the view that board members are alarmed by exit, or that it 
provides them with a pressing incentive to seek repairs to 
the public sector. 9 
Finally exit has'failed to stimulate government action 
to repair the public sector. The present dominance of 
doctors sharply reduces the number of ways of improving 
the public sector available to government (short of a 
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thorough-going reorganisation of hospital services). Most 
importantly, decisions about the disposition and utilisation 
of facilities within hospitals remain largely in the hands 
of individual doctors. Thus, governments anxious to bring 
about the more efficient use of facilities within hospitals 
can at present do little more than admonish the public 
sector to achieve greater efficiency. The Hon. R.J. 
Tizard, the plment Minister of Health, nicely illustrated 
the point in his address to the Medical Association of 
New Zealand, 12 June~ 1973: 
I am convinced however, that, as in any other large 
scale organisation, improved management technique will 
assist in reducing the size of waiting lists, provided 
there is the will and determination among all staff 
associated with patient care to seek better methods 
of management and put them into effect.' 
I am not referring to the professional care of a 
patient in relation tb his treatment. Rather I am 
referring to' the means by which care is delivered to 
the patient, and the optimum usage of hospital 
facilities and beds. The active co-operation of the 
medical profession both inside and outside the 
hospital is verO necessary for these aims to be 
accomplished. 
However governments retain direct control over the 
overall allocation of resources to the public sector and in 
particular over the provision of additional public hospital 
beds. Unable to directly affect the efficiency with which 
these beds are used, governments can, nevertheless, seek to 
increase the number of beds to the point where their 
inefficient use matters little. 11 Additionally, the 
provision of new beds serves as a tangible reminder to 
constituents that, in their locality, the government has 
acted decisively to bolster the public sector. Thus 
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building additional beds may not only be politically 
attractive, but is also one of the few ways that government 
can improve public sector performance, barring major 
reorganisation. 12 The resort to the use of this option by 
government is at the root of the frequently heard complaint 
that government has "an edifice· complex" or indulges in 
!lpolitical hospital building". 
From this argument it follows that governments 
anxious to take, and be seen to take, action to improve the 
public sector will seek to increase the number of public 
sector beds available. Thus, if exit stimulates governments 
to improve the public sector, then the more exit, the more 
public sector beds government should provide. In fact the 
opposite is true As Table 42 shows, the more exit per 
head of population (exit is calculated according to the 
number of surgical admissions to privat~ hospitals) the 
lower the number of public sector beds per head of population. 
(Note, health districts are arranged in Table 42 by the 
number of publiq hospital beds per 1,000: thus Auckland 
with the fewest beds is at the top, and Gisborne, with the 
most, at the bottom). 13 
The circumstances surrounding the setting up of the 
Royal Commission to Inquire Into and Report Upon Hospital 
and Related Matters provides further evidence of the 
failure of exit to stimulate government action. The 
Commission, now disbanded, constituted the only major 
review of government policy on hospital services attempted 
14· for more than a decade. 
Table 45: Rate of Exit and the Provision of Public 
Hospital Beds'''' 
Health District 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Wellington 
Hamilton & 
Rotorua 
Palmerston North 
Nelson 
Invercargill 
Dunedin 
New Plymouth 
Napier 
Wanganui 
Timaru 
Whangarei 
Gisborne 
Number public 
. hospi tal beds per 
1,000 people 1972 
6.2 
6.4 
6.8 
6.9 
7.2 
7.3 
8.7 
9.8 
Exit as percentage 
'of popUlation 
1972 
2.8 
2.2 
1.8 
2.5 
2. 1 
1.5 
1..5 
1.4 
1.3 
0.9 
1.3 
0.7 
0.6 
1.0 
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Its establishment was .prompted, not by exit, but by 
voice; in this case discontent with government policy on 
psychiatric hospitals (which culminated in strike action 
in 1971) felt by psychiatric and psychopaedic nurses. While 
the Commission's terms of reference gave it a warrant to 
inquire into and report on most aspects of hospital 
services in New Zealand, no mention is made of exit. 15 
In addition, the time-table set out for the Commission 
makes it clear that the impetus for the Commission was 
the "unrest in psychiatric hospitals". 16 
Thus the Commission was required to report to the Government: 
1. Not later than the 31st day of December your 
findings and opinions on the matters in clause 
9 of the aforesaid terms of reference;(Clause 
9 de with the question of psychiatrlc and 
psychopaedic pay scales-' 
. 2. Not later than the 30th day of June 1973 your 
findings and opinions on the matters aforesaid 
so as they relate to psychiatri~ services; 
3. Not later than the 30th day of June 1974 your 
findings and opinions on the other matters 
aforesaid. 17 
Additional evidence for the importance of voice 
(stemming frow dissatisfaction with psychiatric, not 
general hospital services) in the setting up of the Royal 
Commission is provided in a letter from the then Minister 
of Health, the Hon. L.R. Adams-Schneider. He writes: 
The main reason for the establishment of the Royal 
Commission to Inquire Into and Report upon Hospital 
and Related Services New Zealand, revolved around 
the problems associated with the increasing pressures 
on our hospital services recent years and the 
considerable changes which were in the process of 
being put into effect, such as the shifting of the 
control of psychiatric hospitals from the Health 
Department to Hospital Boards. 
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'This involved a considerable upheaval for staff at 
all levels and it also brought into its concept the 
desirability of introducing more psychiatric services 
in general hospitals; the scaling down of the number 
of psychiatric patients in the larger institutions, 
and the development of much more "community" 
treatment for psychiatric cases." 
In addition, a considerable amount of controversy 
amongst hospital boards and related agencies concerning 
the administration and financing of hospital services 
had become evident ••• : 
As far as the staff unrest ~n psychiatric hospitals 
was concerned; in all fairness I certainly felt this 
played~ some part in the timing of the setting up of 
the Royal Commission but quite aprt from this, it had 
become evident over the years that such an enquiry 
was desirable, having regard to the facts I have 
mentioned above.' 18 
Together the Minister's account of how and why the 
Commission was formed and the terms of reference and the 
time-table for the Commission point to two conclusions. 
First,the fact of rapidly accelerating exit raised no 
questions about the condition of the public sector, nor 
did it in any way lead to the setting up of the Commission. 
Second, the fact that the Commission was established in 
1972, rather than before or after, was associated with the 
use of "voice tl by psychiatric staff. Similarly, that the 
Commission's attention (at least in the short run) was 
focussed on the problems of psychiatric hospitals, is 
again attributable to the successful use of "voice". 
But the argument advanced in Chapter 1, is not simply 
that exit fails to stimulate government attempts at repair; 
rather that governments, regardless of ideology, have reason 
to actively encourage exit as an alternative to repair. 
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There is an abundance of evidence to support this contention. 
Since the Hospitals Act of 1957 it has been the, duty 
of the Minister of Health 
to encourage the provlslon and maintenance, to such 
extent as he considers necessary, of private hospitals 
wi thin the meaning of Part V of this Act..19. 
However, Government aid to the private sector began well 
before the passing of the Hospitals Act. A private hospital 
loan scheme (the terms of which have been increasingly 
liberalised) was begun by the National government in B52. 20 
Since then both National and Labour governments have used the 
scheme to subsidise the expansion and renovation of the 
private sector. The total amounts paid out each year under 
the scheme are shown in 
Table 46: Honey paid out each year under government loan 
schemes: 1922-1973. 
Year Amount 
1952-59 $947,448 
1959-60 $167,284 
1960-61 $225,098 
1961-62 ~t192, 302 
1962-63 
1965-64 ~t188, 14·2 
1964·-65 $307, LI-44 
1965-66 $122,814 
Year 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
Total 
1922-7.2 
Amount 
$37,820 
$30,630 
$300,043 
$801 ,405 
$390,105 
$378,859 
Source:information supplied by Department of Health. 
1.37 
As interesting as the total amount of loan money 
provided, is its distribution. The criteria for allocating 
loan money is "need ll : 
· ••• every application for a private hospital loan 
is examined on the basis of all available public 
and private beds and facilities in the area, plus 
known proposals, and only when the "need" is 
justified, is support given to the loan application •. 21 
As a consequence (See Table 47)loans tend to go to 
those areas where the public sector is _l_-,--t adequate (as 
a rough and ready measure of adequacy I have used the 
number of public hospital beds per thousand as of 1972).22 
Thus Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch which have the 
three lowest public bed to population ratio have received 
almost 70% of the total loan money available; Auckland 
with the worst bed ratio winning the greatest sha~e, 
Wellingtcrn with the third worst bed ratio the second 
greatest share and so on. Thus governments, (both National 
and Labour) have done most to bolster the private sector 
in those areas where the public sector is least adequate. 
Governments provide further subsidies to the private 
sector in the form of patient benefits (paid on a daily 
basis for each category of patient accomodated in a private 
hospital). Originally patient benefits were part of the 
package deal assembled by the first Labour Government to 
buy the medical profession's acquiescence to its health 
policy. Since then (see Tables 48 and 49 below) the subsidy 
rate and the total amount paid out has steadily increased. 
Table 1.~7: Allocation of Loan money by Heal th District 
1952-73. 
th District Total loan % share of loan No. public 
money paid money bern per 
1952-1973 1,000 
people 
1972-
Auckland $1,532,219 32% 4.3 
V1ellington ~~ 1 ,431 , 1 20 30,, 1 ' ib 5.7 
Dunedin ~t605, 926 12% 7.2 
Christchurch 1~356, 1 62 7°/ 10 4.7 
Hamilton $281,084 6% 6.2 
Napier ~~221 , 121 5)/ 10 7.3 
other $423,604 9:1/ ;0 7,,7(mean) 
Areas getting 10.2(mean) no loan money 
Source: information supplied by Department of Health 
~ote that the be~per thousand figure is for the hospital 
district as a whole, rather than just the centre to which 
loan money has been oc ed. 
Those making use of private hospitals also benefit 
from government es in less visible ways. Drugs, 
for example, are provided free of charge, the cost of 
laboratory services is met almost entirely by the state, 
and so on. 
Finally, vernment subsidires payments made for 
medical insurance. An amendment to the Land and Income 
Tax Act passed 1967, makes contributions for private 
medical insurance schemes tax deductible. In addition, 
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the then National government gave con~iderable symbolic 
encouragement to the fl'edglirg medical insurance industry; 
several National party Cabinet Ministers (including the 
Minister of Health) personally welcomed the ten thousandth, 
fty and one 'hundred thousandth member to the Southern 
Cross scheme. 
Table 48: Daily patient benefit paid to private hospitals 
1939-1973 
Date Surgical Patients Medical and Convalescent 
Patients 
1939 60c 60c 
1943 90c 90c' 
1950 90c + subsidy of 60c 90c + subsidy of 45c 
1951 90c + subsidy of 67.5c 90c + subsidy of 52 .. 5c 
1953 90c + subsidy of 99.16c 90c + subsidy of 84.16c 
1954 $2.10 $1 .80 
1956 $2.20 + subsidy o-f- 25c $1 .80 + subsidy of 25c 
1958 $2'.50 $2.05 
1959 $2.50 + subsidy of 30c $2,.05 + subsidy of 15c 
1961 $2.80 $2.20 
1963 $4.00 ~~2. 80 
1.4.1965 $5.00 $3.50 
1.8.1966 $5.90 $4.00 
1 • 10..1 969 $7.40 $4.50 
1 • 11.1 971 $9.00 $,5.50 
Source: Private Hospitals in New Zealand p.30. 
Table 49: Total amounts paid in patients benefits 1963-197,2. 
Year Payment Year Payment 
$ $ 
1963/64 2,410,660 1968/69 4, 139,561 
1964/65 2,604,948 1969/70 4,590,359 
1965/66 3,324,452 1970/71 5,290,965 
1966/67 3,776,284 1971/72 5,915,224 
1967/68 4,027,046 1972/73 7,015,604 
Source: p.31 • 
The actions of the present Labour government provide 
a crucial test of my argument that the logic of vote 
winning makes it likely that governments will subsidise 
t, irrespective of ideology.24 After ,it has 
always been National Party policy to extend II dom of 
choice" in medical care (i.e. subsidise exit) and the 
ac ons bf the National government in the last decade could 
as well have been predicted knowing this fact 25 
At first sight Labour's actions do appear to contradict 
my argument. In particular, the Labour government's 
refu to accept a number of key recommendations made by' 
the of Health Committee on Private Hospitals led 
to the su stion that the government is anxious to under-
mine private sector. Thus W.J. Pryor, who was 
re ble for preparing the Medical Association of New 
Zealand submission to the Committee, has argued, 
l'·1r 
ho 
ho 
seems determined to phase out the private 
system and force ev~ryone into gUblic 
whether they It or not •. 2 
Similar comments have been made by the President of the 
Private Association. 27 
But no such inference can be properly drawn from 
government actions, at least up un now. First, no. 
government dies of exit have en removed or.dimini 
Nor does it seem likely that they will be. In his speech 
at the opening of the government su dised Lister (private) 
Hospital extensions in Aucldand, October 1973, the Hon. 
N.J. King, Minister of Social Welfare, began: 
28 
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Let me say at the outset that the contribution made 
by the Lister Tru to Auckland's medical services 
is recognised) and greatly appreciated, by government. 
You have provided the only surgical hospital on the 
North Shore .•• -29 
It is government policy to continue the subsidy and 
loan schemes available to assist private hospitals. 
And it is essential that the government encourage 
the provision and maintenance of private 8ospitals, 
within the meaning of the Hospital Act. 3 
More recently the Hon. R.J. Tizard, Minister of 
Health. has noted, 
-The Labour party had pledged to improve the standard 
of the public health system, bu,t this would not be 
done to the detriment of private hospitals. The 
Government saw private hospttals filling a complementary 
role in medical services~) 
Second, the recommendations of the Board of Health 
Committee which l'1r .Tizard could not accept, Hat least for 
the forseeable future lt , all required a change in the present 
relationship between government and the private sector in 
the direc on of government recognition of and 
assistance b the private sector. Not accepting the 
Committee's recommendations would have simply meant the 
continuation of the present arrangements, under which the 
private sector has flourished. But, in fact, Mr Tizard did 
accept s-ome of the Committee's recommendations, including 
in principle the recommendation that, "appropriately - . 
designated - geriatric patients in private hospitals should 
qualify for a higher daily benefit", and, most cruci of all, 
"the committee's recommendation that the private hospital 
should be recognised as complementary to the public hospital~32 
Thus, the evidence available suggests that government 
subsidy of exit cannot be explained simply as a byproduct 
of tie governing party1s ideology. Instead it supports the 
conclusion that both National and Labour governments will 
continue to find compelling electoral reasons for continuing 
and sometimes expanding the exit subsidy. 
SUMMARY. 
The evidence supports the argument that exit fails 
to encourage doctors, hospital boards or governments to 
repair public sector es. In~tead, doctors, individually 
and collectively have worked to encourage exit; members 
of hospital boards perc ve no threat from exit and 
governments, both Labour and National have subsidised exit 
. as a parti alternative to the overhaul of public 
sector. 
VOICE AND THE REPAIR OF PUBLIC SECTOR LAPSES. 
Does voice work better to stimulate reform? It is 
obvious that voice holds no terrors for medical 
profession. Vv'hile I assume tm. t doctors collectively would 
prefer good public relations to bad, rising levels of 
voice impose no direct penalty on them. 
Matters stand otherwise for members of hospital boards 
and governments (because of the power and importance of 
government relative to hospi boards, I wili concentrate 
on the effects of voice on government). As I argued in 
chapter 1, insens1tivity to voice threatens politicians· 
chances of re-election; not surprisinely careful poli tici::u:.s 
r:peno. a. Good rJc~1l of their time r3imlJI~T kee.rinc their "earc' 
to the zroun:~I". But who'd f'vidence j.e; there thD.t voicp 
works to encouraee the repair of the public sector? 
In Il.:?ssinz I have shown that tbp. iml)lementation of rural 
·'i1e(1';.cal snbE'iclies and the estC1bli,slment of the Royal 
Co~~ission on Hospital 2nd ne12te~ Services stemmed from 
the successful use of voice. ITowever the key argument I 
have a~vanced, that potential voice ~et8 Gwallowed up 
by exit, Gueeests that examples of voice about hospital 
care will o~cur infrequently, if at all, excepLwhere exit 
:t.s not readily availRble to anyone. Such a si tuatj.on can 
be found in Temuka. 
Temuka is a small farmin~ centre (population 3,360 in 
1973) located on the Cante,rb:J.ry pl.C'tl ]~s, twelve miles from 
~i."!cl.rU. Until the end of 1 973 it was Eervic ed by a small 
mat srni ty hospi tal u:1d.er t!1e jurisrlic tion of the Sou th 
Canterbury Hospital Board. The ho~pitalls closu~e means 
th8 t Ter:r'.lk9. people needinG hospi t9.l tre2.tment for minor 
cilments now must GO to the b~se hospital in Tirnaru for 
it; thus "exit 11 is 1,)088i ble, b'--l t by local standRrds quite 
difficult. Strone local sentiment means that the costs of 
exj,t are considerably hi5her than the simple 2~ mile roun~ 
trip to TiYl':?cru. 
In March 1970 the South Canterbury Hospital Board made 
its first application to close its m~ternity hospital at 
Teouka. 33 Two 3rounrts were ~iven in the application: 
There '.'ms ona still is an RCU to shortat:;C? of 
exper:ienc ec1 mic11Ni ves. The base obstetrical unit 
1. If ~ 
wo.s ollly 12 ~niles away and this provided a hiGher 
standard of care and enabled the Board to make 
a better use of such midwives as it did have. 
b. Financial: 
Although this was the least important ansi deration 
the Board could not ignore the fact that it could 
save around $30,000 by closing,the hospital and use 
it to greater advantage on other Services. 34 
According to the local Member of Parliament, Mr R.L.G. 
Talbot, 
There was very strong opposition from all sectors of 
Temuka and the surrounding district to the suggested 
closing. ' 
·r was approached by the Temuka Borough CO"lll'Cil, 
Geraldine County Council, all Women's organisaiion, 
Service Clubs, st John's Ambulance, the local 
Hospital Board Member, and the two local doctors. 
The doctors expressed concern because of their 
desire to serve the total needs of the family and 
expressed the view that they may leave the town if 
the Hospi tal closed •. Public meetings were held at 
which expressions of opinion favoured retaining the 
Hospital. The Mayor 01' Temuka in conjunction with 
myself lead the campaign. 
I commenced working to retain the Hospital in 1970 
when it became obvious that the proposerl action of 
the South Canterbury Hospital would have a serious 
effect on adequate medical services in the town. 
Many representations were made by me to the Minister 
of Health, the Hon. D. McKay, together with having 
informal discussions with the Chairman of the 
Hospital Advisory Council. Numerous questions were 
asked in the House and press statements mad~ 
supporting the retention of the Hospital.'3) 
The Hospital Advisory Council's recommendation that 
the Hospital be kept open was upheld by the Minister 
who expressed his concern that adequate mediG~1 
services must be encouraged in rural areas.'J 
In short "voice" worked. As it happened, the hospital's 
reprieve was short lived. A'~econd application for closure 
was made l by the South Canterbury Hospital Board in August 
1973. Thf'J grounds' now were "that it was not possible 
to adequately staff it [the hospi tal_7 as required by the 
Obstetrical Regulations". 37 This time, under a new I.Jabour 
Minister, the Board was successful. However, one of the 
recommendations of the Hospitals Advisory Council was. 
"that the Board be Ilfu1vited to make an appraisal on the 
feasibility of using the building as a community hospital 
or some other suitable alternative". Thus the final 
closure of the hospital at Temuka may not yet have 
occurred. 38 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the Temuka 
case study. First, it provides concrete evidence that, 
in the right circumstances, voice appears and works as well 
in the area of the provision of hospital services as 
elsewhere. 
Second, that voice should occur in Temuka and not for 
example in Christchurch, is consistent with my argument 
that, where exit is difficult or impossible for 
then dissatisfied consumers are likely to resort to voi2e. 
Of course Temuka, unlike Christchurch, was threatened not 
with the 8radual run down of public sector services, but 
their abrupt curtailment. I have argued that it is easier 
to mobilise voice in such a tuation but I suspect that 
the fact of curtailment better explains the fury and .extent 
of the voice reaction, rather than its simple appearance. 
Third, the case study shows the considerable volume Qf 
voice that communi ties have at their disposal; "hell hc.th 
no fury like ~~emuka spurned" may well have been the local 
motto. Unlike Christchurch there was no need for me to 
hunt down voice with a questionnaire. Instead, voice was 
louct and public; it involvecl almost of the local 
oreanisations Dnd had as its chief a~ents, the two most 
important local poli cians; the Mayor and the Member of 
Farliament. 
Despi a diligent search of local (i.e. Canterbury) 
newspapers over the last year or so, I have been unable to find 
traces of any other "Temukas". This fact is ~onsistent with 
both of the following explanations: 
a. In those areas where exit difficult or impos 
consume~s have good reason to be satisfied with 
the p~avi on of public sector services; thuc 
no e occurs (t explanation consistent with 
my arzu:11ent). 
e 
b. In those areas where exit is difficult or imposs~hle, 
consumers refrcdn from voice even though they 
are dissatisfi with the provision of public 
sector services (~hich con~radicts my argument). 
There is good reason to believe the first explanation 
to correct. T3.ble 20 shows, "no exitll areas (i.e. 
those w~leTe no pri va tG sec tor f~ervices operate), enjoy 
propor onate 1~10re blic sector resources than areas 
~~ere exit i6 2vailatle. Thu , thc chances of consumers 
bel 13atis eci vd. th .public sector servic es 'Houl d appe3.r 
to he lluch higher in IIno exit!! 3.reas; the mo likely 
lack of voice ahout hospit s 
in such areas is that consumers are quite content with 
level of service ;rovided. 
ces 
More interestinB is the ~uestion of why the over-supply 
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of beds to "no exit" areas should occur at all. Three 
points from my previous discussion bear on this matter. 
First, for the seve reasons I outlined earlier this 
chapter, governments anxious to improve public sector 
services in an area will act to increase the number of 
beds available. Second, the extent of government anxiety 
to "do something" depends on the appearance. and volume of 
voice. Finally, voice is only likely to appear where 
exit is difficult or impossible (i.e. in this case in 
"no exi t" areas). 
Table 50: 
Area Nean no. public 
beds/l ,00()lt 
Hean no. all 
beds/1 ,000 * 
No exit possi e 
(11 areas) 
Exit possible 
(19 are8.'3) 
10.9 10.9 
8.6 
*Calculated from Hospital Statistics 1972. 
Thus, where consumers "no exit" areas have found 
public sector services inadequate I expect voice to have 
occurred; where voice has occurred I expect governments to 
have responded by increasi the number of hosptal beds 
available. Thus, "no exit" areas should be characterised 
by the "over-supplyll of public sector facilities relative 
to "exit" areas. The theory then, nicely anticipates the 
real world data presented in Table 50. That it does so, 
suggests that the past use of voice does t explain 
the present over-supply of beds to "no exit" areas. 40 
SUMMARY. 
I have shown how the successful use of voice lay 
behind the introduction of the rural doctor benefits scheme, 
the setting up of the Royal Commission on Hosptal and 
Related Related Services, the delay (perhaps permanent) in 
the closing of Temuka hospi , and appears to underlie 
the disproportionate share of public sector facilities in 
"no exit" areas. Thus the appearance of voice, unlike 
exit greatly increases the probability that governments 
will undertake the repair of the public sector. Because 
dissatisfaction with public sector services presently 
leads to exit and not to voice, I expect public sector 
deficiencies to go unremedied. 
WAITING LISTS AND REPAIR. 
But perhaps the conclusion is overly pessimistic. 
Instead it might be argued, the very·existence of the long 
waiting lists that lead people to exit is itself, a 
sufficient prod to encourage government efforts at repair. 
It is true, first of , that governments appear 
to be embarrassed by hospital waiting lists in a way that 
they are not by exit. Characteristically oppositions 
attack governments, not on the flight of con~umers from the 
public sector, but on the size of waiting 1~s.41 The 
present Hinister of Health, the Hon. R.J. zard, prefaces 
a good number o~ his speeches with the assertion that the 
government (amongst other medical care objectives) is 
determined to reduce the size of waiting lists. Governments, 
like it or not, are well aware of waiting lists. 
It is also true that both the past National 
administration and the present Labour one have devoted 
time and energy to the problem of how to reduce the size 
of the lists. (In general the favoured solution has been 
the reduction of list size by clerical fiat, rather than 
by repair of the public sector).42 
But it is not true that these efforts have been made 
simply because of the presence of long waiting lists. 
Instead they must be explained by what ttle voice does 
occur. Thus,a document published under the National 
government warns hospitals to regul,arly review their 
waiting lists, not because long waiting lists are themselves 
nee essarily bad, but because, IILong waiting times and 
growing waiting lists attract criticism •• 11.43 
THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE OF GOVERNNENTS TO VOICE. 
However, hope of remedy need not yet be abandoned. 
The argument might continue that, while it is true that 
waiting lists per se exert no pressure for reform, the 
small amount of voice now occurring is itself sufficient 
in the right circumstances to bring about reform. Chief 
among these circumstances the degree of sensitivit~ of 
governments to any given kind and level of voice. The 
constant references made by the present Minister of Health 
to the need to reduce waiting lists and the actions, aimed 
at improving the public sector, already taken by him 
suggest that the present Labour government extremely 
sensitive to voice in this matter~ Thus, despite massive 
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exit, the small amounts of voice occurring will be sufficient 
to encourage the repair of the public sector (at least for 
so long as Labour holds office).44 
It is true that the Labour party, in office and out, 
appears to have paid much more attention to voice concernin~ 
hospital care, than the last National government. The 
difference is neatly caught in Labour's decision to dissolve 
the Royal Commission on Hospital and Related Matters 
established by their predecessors. A Labour government, 
Mr Tizard argued, would not wait until the 30 June 1974 
(the Commission1s final date for presenting its submissions) 
to find out how best to repair the public sector; instead 
Labour, through the ~stablishment of the Caucus Committee 
on Health, would begin the task immediately. 
The reasons why Labour party politicians should be 
more sensitive to voice than their National party predecessors 
are not difficult to find. Traditional Labour party 
supporters have been the chief source of what voice has 
occurred. Thus, as I showed in Chapter 3, in Christchurch 
it is Labour party~ rather than National party, M.P. IS, who 
receive the majority of complaints about the public sector. 
Similarly the one hospital board member who reported many 
complaints was a Labour parliamentary candidate at the last 
election. And, using income as a rough guide to party 
allegiance, it is clear that those on waiting lists are 
overwhelmingly Labour voters. 
The same true of voice's more public manifestations. 
Dr Sutch and the P.S.A., for example, if ~ot formally 
associElted with the Labour party, are known to be sympathetic 
to its general aims. well it was Labour party activists 
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at a Labour party conference who passed remits calling for 
the urgent repair of the public sector and the removal 
(or the removal of the need for) medical insurance organisations. 
Tnus, the small amount of voice that has occurred, has been 
tightly focused on the Labour party. Not surprisingly the 
present Labour government appears to be a good deal more 
attentive to it than its predecessor. 45 
I 
But the question of whether the present volume of 
voice is, in the present circumstances, sufficient to 
bring about government repair of the public sector remains. 
At this stage of the argument the simplest answer that 
nothing that the Labour government has done so far, seems 
likely to improve the quality of public sector care more 
than marginally. 
er this chapter, I argued that barring a 
funde.mental re-organisation· of the supply of medical 
services (which the present Labour government has certainly 
ndt yet attempted) governments can themselves only improve 
·the public sector by· making more resources available to 
it. One such resource is medical personnel. The sent 
Labour government took office pledged to "immediat 
commence planning for a third medical schoOI Il • 46 So 
far there has been ttle evidence of such planning. 47 
A second resource is finance. On taking office,. the 
Labour government was faced with "bailing out" those ho tal 
boards (principally the Auckland hospital board), who had 
overspent their appropriations. 48 As a result, the 
government introduced the controversial Hospital Amendment 
Bi which aimed at osing up this source of extra finance, 
by making board members personally liable for spending 
1 
"without due regard ll for the provisions of the Hosptals 
Act .. 49 
At the same time, the governmen't increased the grant 
to hospital boards from the $214 million expended in 
1972-73 to $236 million for 1973-74, an increase of about 
10%. However, with inflation amounting to about the same 
figure for the period the real increase appears to be 
negligible. 50 
This year's (1974-75) appropriation for hospital 
boards of $281 million, an increase of about 20% appears 
considerably more generous9 However, as Mr Tizard pointed 
out, when the provision for increased costs of wag~s_ salaries 
and supplies is excluded, the additional amount is about 
$12.9 million, an effective increase in real resources of 
5 80/ 51 • /0" But this 5.8% has to cover the extra demands 
imposed by a population growing at- the rate of 2% a year, 
as well as meet a number of government, goals in the provision 
of hospital care. As a Press editorial correctly pointed 
out, 
The real increase in the means given to hospital 
boards is modest. At fuis rate it will be a long 
time before hospital services are expanded sufficiently 
to make good Hr Tizard's promise that lithe Government 
is deterrnined to improve the public hospital system 
and reduce waiting lists .,52 
SUMMARY: THE CFLII..NCES FOR REPAIR IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
So far in this chapter I have argued, detail by detail, 
that exit does not encourage the repair of the public 
sector, while voice does. Thus, the massive exit 
1 
characterising the present tuation has not, and will not, 
lead to the improvement of the public sector. At the same 
time the volume of voice QCCU 
little effect. 
ne at present seems to have ha0 
HOW EXIT DRlI.INS RESOURCES FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR: FINANCE 
AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL. 
Earlier this chapter I showed the ways which 
governments heavily subsidise exit. Because these subsidies 
are linked --to the volume of exit, the more exit, the 
greater the diversion of government medic care revenue 
from the pu c to the private sector: thus, the more 
t, the less money available to public sector. 
Public money used to subsi se the private sector is 
distributed according to ability to pay, rather than by 
medical ne (no person can take advantage of the t 
subsidy if he cannot first afford the cost of exit). 
Thus the diversion of public money from the public to 
the private sector, means that the taxes of those unable 
to afford exit, help to subsidise the fino waiting" and 
"personal attention" enjoyed by those who can fo:bd it. 
Exit also works to drain the public sector of its 
resources of lIed me cal personnel. Earlier I showed 
that doctors, for financial and other reasons, have g09d 
cause to prefer private to blic sector practice. But the 
possibility of private sector practice depends on the amount 
of demand for private sector services. 
When consumers are perfectly satisfied th free public 
sector services, they are unlikely to pay extra to secure 
private sector services. Thus (for any given cost level) 
demand for private sector services depends on the extent of 
dissatisfaction (for 1Jh3.tever reason) with the public sector. 
Consumer dissatisfac on with public, relative to 
private sector services can be divided into two kinds. 
First, dissatisfaction may arise because of "fixed" 
features of public -hospitals. For example, some people 
prefer private rooms to wards, wish for a bedside telephone, 
their own choice of surgeon and so on. (type 1 dis sfact-Lon) 
The ge~eral incidence of type 1 dissatisfaction is 
probably low. Thus, in the present study, the most 
important reason for exiting was the extent of waiting 
lists, rather than the inherent attractiveness of private 
sector services. Here I am not much concerned with type 
1 dissatisfaction except to note that where it exis 
some demand may exist for vate sector services, 
irrespective of public sector performance and that its 
incidence is unlikely to change much over timee (For it 
to do so, either the "fixed" features of the private 
sector or public sector would have to change, or people 
would have to reappraise them; both events appear unlikely 
in the short term.) 
The second, and most important source of dissatisfaction 
(type 2 dissatisfaction), is public sector performance; 
in particular the length of time people have to wait 
:")4 
to secure hospital caree Because there are wide variations 
public sector performance, the amount of type 2 
dissatisfaction (unlike type 1) will vary considerably over 
time and between localities. Because demand for private 
sector services is a function of the amount of dissatisfaction, 
155 
then in demand for private sector services are 
a function of variations 
, 
the amount of type 2 SSCI sfaction. 
Thus, the unsul'pri nt;· conclusion that variations in the 
demand for private sector servicE's are a function of public 
sector performance. 
Bu±: public sector performance not all of a piece; 
the public sector s a Good t of copine with road 
R6cident victims but has lone waiting lists for tonsils, 
copeR with the demands of c:.:>rone.ry p8,tients l')ut ",[,pear'" 
to ttin;::; rther behind in the trcatuent of varicose 
veins and c~ on. 
,similarly, re are reciom'll ti Oll.S public 
sector ce; while Ashbu on mey cope easily with 
the r routine ell 
[30 OE. Thu s T expec t 1tC sector services 
to v'J..ry c 'h~r rezion. 
To :cetu"n to !Joct~)~ .. s -i :Ls 110
'
,'1 cles,r t t,11e~r 11 , -
l1e.Y(1 t~-i(? " C't \.....,.0-) ,# cpntive t leave the l'ublic sector for 
8qu3.te. Thus exit w02ks selee vely, r1 nc off 
those Joctors t t the t'·l i.e ~3cct:"ir C;'.rl t ?fford to 
.;:;;.,.;..:..-:;;..,;.. 
The ,;) c 
(,'Frr,) 
,-... J·~'·"""$i'" t 1 t 
11 31, 1~J (the 12st date for 
en I totpl 
(I· 1,'71 foY' \ f' ~, I ..... ~ 
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Thus, on the basis of waiting list figures E.N.T. the 
specialty which public sector services are least 
to public demand. 55 
For sometime there been a shortage of E.N.T. 
sl)ecialists the public sector. A 1968 survey of the 
state of Sll cal special in New concluded, 
"The most ous shortages belong to the field of ear, 
nose and throat surgery ••• ,,56 Of the nine vacant E.N.T. 
positions in public hospitals (on the basis of the l22Q 
approving staf 
by November 1 
establishment) only two had been filled 
57 Clearly the public sector has had 
a great deal of difficulty in recruiting E.-N.T. staff, 
even to 1968 lev s. 
But not so the private sector. Unlike the public 
sector the private sector has had available enough staff 
to ensure that a "no waiting s ce" for all of those 
who can afford it continues. The tuation is nicely 
summarised in below. E.N.T. spe work 
fu time for the public sector (7% or less); instead most 
hold part-time appointments (93%) while a few more (not 
counted here) work onl~ in the private sector. 58 With the 
exceptions of general surgery and plastic surgery, 
a similar trend is apparent for each of the spec es 
making up the waiting list (Urology, Orthopaedics, OpthalmoloGY, 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology).59 each case the number of 
doctors working only part-time for public sector 
considerably higher than in most other specialties; thus, 
in general, the worse public BIi?ctor performance in a 
specialty, the more likely the members of that speci ty 
to work the private as well as the public sector. 
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Cle8.rly, the. ribution of doctors between public 8no 
private practice suggested by is consistent with 
the outcome to ex:recter1 if; in fact, the public sector 
tendert to lose those specialists whose services it is in 
most need of. However, from the d it is not possible 
to show the process actually at work; for this I ne 
adeU anal information .'3howing how much wo speciali s 
die for public sector at some previous time anti how 
much they do now. 
fore providing such a I should point out e 
difficul e in its interpretation. First, as I :previollsly 
ed, the real impact of Medical rance in increasing 
for private sector services is yet to he felt, except 
perhi:l in ,lucl::18.l1d. Thus, '.'lhatever changes are now 
should be seen as harbi of thin to conei by 
the same token sent chanees are likely to be quite 
Rmc~ll. 
A second and relat proble~ is posed bi the insensit-
-Lvity of the ce.tors on which I am forced to rely. I 
have ady suggested that there may be wi variations 
the efficiency 1:1i til eh specialists work at dif nt 
t s or in dif rent places; thus Auc d public ho ta1s 
treat hernia 2nd cose veinE with consi rably less 
efficiency than the e sector. Similarly, it has 
recently been ed that considerable variations 
efficiency are t within tbe public sector; at 1 
as beh'reen 11 and t 'r .,.' t t 0 60 lJle H.-:lpOJ.rJ men~,.::>. 
Table 51: 
Specialty Total no. 
employed 
Waitin~E.N.T. 40 
list (Obstetrics 83 
SpeciarOpthalmology 45 
Itieso(Orthopaedics 5
18
5 
Urolo<J'"\r ~ Gener~l Surgeons. 154 
Plastic Surgery 9 
General Physicians205 
Medical Physicians 11 
Cardiology 15 
Chest 14 
Diabetic 3 
Dermatology 15 
Infections and 
sterilizations 3 
Gastroenierology 6 
Neurology 10 
spiratory 3 
Venereology 3 
Renal 4 
. Casualty 13 
Cardiothoracic 9 
Keurosurgery 7 
Vascular 3 
Anaesthesia 133 
Paediatrics 46 
Pathology 62 
Radiotherapy 12 
Radiology 92 
Psychiatry 76 
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% employed 
part-time 
93% (37) 
89% (74) 
91% (41) 
89% (49) 
94% (17) 
62% (96) 
66% ( 6) 
62% (128) 
64% ( .. 7) 
47% ( 7) 
)6% (.'~) 
100% ( 3) 
100% (15) 
100% ( 3) 
50% ( 3) 
70}6 ( 7) 
33% ( 1) 
100% ( 3) 
0;,6 ( 0) 
6~% ( 9) 
44% ( 4) 
43% ( 3) 
100% ( 3) 
58% (77) 
83% (38) 
55% (34) 
50% ( 6) 
6:'% (56) 
73% (32) 
Source: Information supplied by Department of Health. 
*Note only those specialties with 3 or more practitioners 
listed. 
For such variation to appear there may be no need for 
the number of specialists employed by the public sector 
to fall or rise dramatically; some specialists may simply 
work much slower or much ter and quite easily make an 
appreciable difference to the amount of work performed in 
publ:i.c sector. However, the only inforrna on I have 
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access to concerns the number. of "sessions" specialists are 
employed for; i.e. a formal description of the amount ~f ti~e 
the specialist is employed by the public sector, but no record 
of how much he does within that time. (Each session countn 1/10 
of the time a full-time specialist would work in the publ:i.c 
sector; thus 10 sessions amount to one 1Ifull-time equivaler:.t" 
the summary measure I have used in Table 52 below). Thus, 
considerable chon,:ses in the amount of work done in the public 
sector,may occur, wit~out these changes being necessarily 
reflected in the number of sessions worked. 
Third, ~cthe data on specialist sessions in ~1968 
drawn from the survey done by the Dominion Committee, 
~oyal Au,stralasian College of Sur[,;80ns. reFly rate for tbt.:, 
survey 'No.S "82 percent and thi s was projec d to 100 perc ant ~I 61 
I am unsure as to exactly what is meant by the latter part of 
this statement. Nevertheless a warning is clearly implied; 
when examinine the differences between the numbers of ses 0ns 
in 1968 and 1973 small changes, taken on their own may riot 
1:18an very much. Luckily, my prtncilJEd concern is not wi tl: 
each i.ndi virlual chEmge, but the trends appearin['; over Et 
number:)f observations. For this purpose the data is perfectly 
edequElte. 
The data is presented below. Each cell 
contains the n~mber of full-time equivalents (one full-time 
equivalent = 10 se ons) Vlorked in each waitiYlC list· 
specialty each year (1968 or 1973), in each locality.62 
The loc ties are arranged from left to ght ~ccording to 
the amount of e t that occurred in 1973 (exjt is again 
measurer). by the lmmbp,r of· sur;::icn.l admis n8 to private 
Table 52: No. of full-time equivalents worked in waiting list specialties: 1968 and 1973. 
Specialty 
General 
Surgery 
Genito-
Urinary (Urology) 
Opthal-
mology 
Hospital District 
Auckland Waikato Ch.Ch. Palm. Nth Well. I 'cargill 
1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 
0 0 0 
11.6 10.9 11.6 10.4 6.0 7.6 4.4 5.2 9.2 11.5 5.9 5.8 
1.3 2.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.6 
o --" 0 0 
2.8 2.7 1.6 2.4 4:(5- 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.9" 2.4 
o O---U 
Nelson Dunedin 
1968 1973 1968 1973 
0 
2.9 ,}.6 5.0 4.3 
2.3 2.8 
E.N.T. 4.6 4.3 3.1 2.1 1.3 1. 0.6 0.7 2.6 2.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.5 
Plastic 
Surgery 3.1 2.7 1.1 2.2 .0 0.6 
Ortho- 0 0 
paedic " 
Surgery 10:~- 8.7 3.7 4.2 3.7 3.5 0.8 1.0 4.3 4.7 1.7 1.4 2.5 3.4 
N. Plym. Wanganui" Gisborne Napier 
1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 
0 
3.8 5.9 2.5 3.1 2.0 1.6 4.4 6.4 
0.2 0.4 
0.8 1.0 0.1 0.7 
1.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.1 
Timaru Whangarei 
1968 1973 1968 1973 
0 
7.5 6.4 
0.3 0.4 
1,0 1.0 0.7 1.5 
'" o 
1 61 
ho 8 h J_['tio~) • !];]ms :~.uc~danrl bad the 
e t nr:10'l 
r,::U3 OCC;l1rre/l t~e nu pn of G8csi0ns worke~ in ~ sppci~ ty 
I \love :1 t 
The is unmistakeable; t 
C 10s8:::' "I loc-j ty :~s to left of t:le table (i.e. the 
i tis t 0 '1 ::;. V e '3 1 1 f in the ilumher of 8ession~ 
Dee 19£2. For ex~~r]e, 
!~ '.1 c: 1.'] C:' 1.1 ,1 l~:::;~: esC? 011 nc'.' ~;: l;ll,lC of five srecial:i:::t 
t1:;(,,1 t 1 C O:tl 5 n 
f'.st t(' 
or 1;,. 
the sam8 levels of se cp as jn 19('(3, the Aud::l2.nd IJuhli.c 
ceo 
IJ 
:=-() (J'l. 
jn t 
i,e !1ector si.nce 
~n th030 speci~ltie8 ~here th~ -1 c ector rnost 
,"reCls 'shieh ha '1(' expex.'ienc ed the ,(l:rentest amount of e t. 
rst 
(IV! t';0 imp;ict of :ne;ii.c[),l ins'J.rance on d 
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for private sector services, other areas are likely to become 
more, rather than ss, like the "extreme" Auckland. case. 
Finally the evidence presented and the implications drawn 
from it, are clearly consistent with the key argument 
summarised below. 
,sUHHARY. 
1- have been arguinc; that exit works to drain the public 
sector of its personnel resources; in particul~r of those 
specialists whose services the public sector can t afford 
-..;......-
to lose. While the available evidence, as presented in 
supports the argument's validity, the 
applicability of the argument extends considerably further. 
For any speci ty, inasmuch as public sector performance 
leads to exit, demand for private sector services will 
increase and doctors will increasingly switch their effortS 
from the public to the private sector, of 
pu blic sec tor demand. 63 Thus what is today true of, for 
example, E.N.T., may soon be true of many other specialties 
as well. 64 
EXIT AND THE DEHAND FOR PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICES. 
But exit not only serves to reallocate medical services 
from the public to the private sector; at the same time it 
1Norlm to reduce demand for public sector medical services. 
Thus the consequences of exit are equivocal; if a great deal 
of demand is drawn off, but only a fc~ me c services, thoi:;e 
who continue as public sector consumers may actually do 
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better than if exit had not 9ccurred (even although there 
is an overall shift from the non-market toward the market 
provi on of medic care). Thus, the more exit occurs, 
the more resources are left to be distributed among fewer 
people, and the better public sector performance becomes. 
Unfortunately for public sector consumers, this is not 
the case. Instead, exit works to reduce the number of 
medical services available in the public sector, at a rate 
proportionately er than reduces demand. 65 
As the survey responses show, the key att~action of 
the private sector is !tno waiting". The cent paradox 
how there can be "no waiting" in the private sector 
and a good deal of waiting. the public. Waiting occurs 
whenever the su of medic services is exceeded hJ 
demand. The available supply of medical services is a 
function of the supply of physical facili s, in particular 
hospital beds, and-the supply of medical personnel and the 
number of services they perform~ Clearly the latter not 
the crucial supply bottleneck; I have already shown that 
public sector beds could be employed with a great deal more 
efficiency than at present. Thus, waiting stems in the 
first instance from an inadequate supply of the services 
performed by medical specialists. 
At anyone time both the number of medical services 
performed the demand for these se ce is finite. 66 
In the present context, the most important charact tic 
of the re onship between the number of services amount 
of demand is tho. t the ter is too II II • ; 1 .• e. total 
nUI:1ber of medical services demanded by consumers is greater 
than the total number of medical services being performed. 
Thus, as I 8u~3ested above, waiting occurs; like the amount 
of demand and t number of services, of whose ratio. it is 
a function, total tine time is 80 :1. te amount at any 
t · 67 one· lP.10. The important question is; how will total 
Viai tine tiTre (~1) be di ri bu tod a!TIons c onsu;ner 
~10 f~implify the arGument I aSSU!TI8 that e8.ch consumer 
requires same amount of medic .se ces. Thus, ina. 
,society """here available me~ al se ces are rits butel 
on basis of need, the t time will be sharert 
equ ly amonc all consumers; i.e. each consumer, requi ng 
the 8a:ne aI:1OUn t of se ce ::J.S each at r consuy:rer, wilJ 1'fEli.t 
the same amount of t to 
Tn such a society the exact laneth of ti;ne each person 
ts :Ls '3. func on of t 
time an N::: total nu 
ratio T N ( 
r of consumers). 
T ::: total t :Ln.:; 
impor :::.t 
property of the ratio is that for any civen amount of T., 
t arnount of t anyone COl1sumer wai ,depends on the 
nU~'lber of other COnSH!TIerS also vlai t , (i. e. the ze of 1''). 
Now a ~riv~te sector is added to the same soc ty; thus, 
those people who can affor rl to, can pu ..... chase a ffici 
nmount of the 2vailable medic services to meet th r medjc 
Teqil ants thou t h8Vj Hote thnt nJt e 
h'JS che i tion of the Ilrtvate Bec tor cloes not 
reuse the total number of medical ces Qv~ilable in 
Goci nor daes it reduce the tot 3ElOU of dem.and for 
Ell services. Consequently total waiting rne 80 
people, each of ~ho~) as a consequence, to ':r2i t 
proportion ely 1 er than previously. 
Thus, tte exact le~gth of tine each person left in tbe 
1='U bJ ic sec tor wpi t,g is now 8. fULC em of ttr; ratio 
, where T = total waitin~ time, N = total 
nu~ber of consum~r2 and. p = to number of c (l~.'3l)!1'C rs 
jointnz the private sector) 
Clearl;;r, the more exit (i.e. the le.rc;er. p), t 
t 
to each perso~ loft. 
intro~ucticn 0~ ~ 
t of ven the overall scarcity 
0f 1~1e eEl.1 sel.~vice.s, "n:) U. II is only ble -r.aT 
o~:tent . th:t obtains nore then: t:le 
.se:cvic (:,S 
::ector.: 'n!!) . ." ot.lch leo.vc::3 t 
.f:)l~ t!18 prj.v8.te (i.e. suhs tut.s "no HC'it e" for I!"!ai 
plblic sector by, ene, but re ces supply of services 
by ~ore th2n o~c (if me in the 
per 
e 
th~ public sector i~crea8es. 
cOllclusiOl1S can ~rqwn frnn this discus on. 
r1st, co-existence of "no t " in the priVEtte sector 
,'? a creat deal of wait in t 
t fr.1ct thE'.t c t _d __ via to rec.1uc e nurnb8r of medic 
se C8::3 :':lvai l.flble jn the l:,ublic sector et a rate llroportinYlCtt a 
ater t n it re~uce~ demand for public sector 8ervice~. 
,Second, if you 'lre lJ.bJe tu puch::lse "no waitinc;" 8 ce, 
while I am not, your privile~e is won at my expense. 
ausE: your IIl!O VIed tins" is won soley on the basis of 
purchasinG power, the fac t tha t my concH tion my be c der8bl;y 
more seriolls than yours, will m2,ke no difference to 
outcome. 
Finally, ':18 as an overall scarcity of ho t 
c~r8, 'oRBed on the ort9.ce 'of speci st services occurs, 
11 the terdency r the public sector to lose its 
of s cos at a ter rate than it loses consumers. 
plh C sector rerformance t~nds to rret worse 8S more and 
70 more e t occurs. s tendency es se to two 
rst, the worse rnblic .sec tor 
re 
become jissati2fied and t crectter the rate of exit, whic 11, 
jn turn, meRns th~t pu c sector service ts w9rse, and 
so on. 
Second, the worse sector per nce becomes, 
the worse the working condi ons of those doctors who, for 
one reason or ~nother, n in the public sector. BeCAuse 
the supply of medical services reduces 3.t EI. er rate 
than for the~, those doctors who are left find 
thernS8 s re8.sin::;I;'1 hart', 8Se(l. Thus public sec tor 
posi ons C or1? r:.ot only ially unrewarding, but as 
woll extremely costly in terms of personal wear tee.r. 71 
Dnctors are propelled into the privatp sector by oible 
conditions, as well as fin~nci reward; aeain the public 
53eC'tor is tr) cteterioro. te s further as a result. 
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SUMMAHY. 
The most eeneral point made in the last two sections 
is that exit works to shift the allocation of medical 
resources from non-market to market institu ons; the volume 
of resources distribut~d through the private sector is 
increasing while the volume of resources dist~ibuted throueh 
the public sector is decreasing. 
particular·I argued that, for any specialty» once 
a waiting st occurs in the public sector, together with 
no wai tine; list in the private sector,. then the use of 
private sector facilities in the specialty will increase. 
But because exit drains off more resources than demand from 
the public sector, public sector performance in that 
spec ty worsens and a vicious circle begins. 
Earlier I argued that the full impact of medical 
insurance on demand for private hospital services has yet 
to occur. To the extent that this contention is correct» 
then the cycle of public sector deterioration has just 
begun. 
HOW EXIT DHAINS RESOUHCES FHOH PUBLIC SECTOH: ENEHGY 
AND CONCEHN. 
Unlike its impact on demand for private hospital services 
the effects of exit draining off energy and concern occur 
at once. People anxious to "do something" to remedy their 
·di sfaction wi th the public sector gain immediate 
"peace of ndY! with the deci to take out medic 
insurance. 72 However long waiting lis may become, 
whatever else happens in the public sector, those with 
medical insurance can avoid public sector problems .. 
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They need no longer be concerned by public sector deficiencies; 
they have no personal reason to seek repair of the public 
sectO"r, In fact, as the examination of voice in the last 
chapter reveals, people who have exited do not plan to 
voice. 
Bu t of course not everyone exits. First, exit only 
claims those who do care about the quality of public sector 
care; people, who would otherwise be expected:to be 
voice's most activeagents& Those people who "are most 
concerned with public sector deficiencies, those who, in 
other words have the best reason to voice, are also those 
who exit. 
Second, some people who are dissatisfied with public 
sector care lack the resources, or choose not to exit. 
Dissatisfied waiting list stayers fell into the first 
category. The fact that they were not claimed by exit 
led to passivity rather than voice. The reason, as I 
argued in Chapter 3, was that of all of those people on 
the waiting list dissatisfied with; public sector care, 
exit worked to select out those who had more rather than less 
political resources and energy. Consequently, while exit 
fails to drain off all energy and concern, it leaves as its 
residue those people who have the greatest difficul Win 
using voice effectively. 
As well, some people who are dissatisfied and can exit, 
choose not to, or, if they should exit, continue to be 
concerned about public sector deficiencies. Such people put 
value on the provision of the best possible care through the 
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public sector as an end in itself. For them, while exit 
may secure them personally better medical care, it makes no 
difference to their concern that medical care be distributed 
through non~market arrangements. Earlier, I identified such 
people as i~eologues and showed how they appear to be the 
source of the little voice that has occurred. 
Ideologues who give public expression to felt discontents 
shared by a large number of people, can normally be expectcd 
to win a follov/ing of some lund. That ideologues, voicing 
dissatisfaction with public sector medical services in New 
Zealand, have not won such a following is a key part &f the 
general 'problem, IIwhy little or no voice" that I have been 
examining. So far I have couched the explanation simply in 
terms of the fact of exit: that t works to drain off 
those who, otherwise, would be voice's most active agents. 
'Also important, and as yet unexamined, is the way in 
which exit occurs. Exit involves many individual, uncbordinate~ 
decisions spread over time and space. How much inforElation 
people have about public sector defects, how much they care 
about them, what opportunities they see for remedy and so 
on, varies widely. Thus, at anyone tiG1C, relatively few 
individuals make the decision to exit; the rolls of medical 
insurance orcanisations grow as a result of the day to day 
trickle of new policy holders, rather: than by massive leaps 
and starts. 
That exit works as a "trickle" process has two important 
consequences. First, those who are dissatisfied with public 
sector services, remain unaware of the extent to which their 
dissatisfaction is shared; thus they remain unaware of the 
possibilitJof collective, rather than individual remedies. 
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A second and related consequence that, at any 2QQ 
time the potential audience for an ideologue advocating a 
collective soltion is relatively small, even although over 
time a great many people may have become dissatisfied with 
public sector services. Neither the medically insured 
(who after all, pay their premiums to assure themselves of 
"peace of mind lf ) nor those satisfied with public sector 
care are likely to pay much attention to the ideologue's 
advocacy_ Thus he must draw his audience from among those 
who, while dissatisfied, have not yet exited. 
The first group who fall into this category are those 
sufficiently dissatisfied to want to "do something" but 
who have not yet exited, even although they have the 
necessary re,sources. The problems posed by this group are 
small size and high turnover. For any given time period t 1 , 
only a tiny- fracti'on of those who (at present) eventually 
exit, will occur in this category; the rest will be found 
either among the "still satisfied" or the "already 
exited ll • 73 . Thus the ideologue's first potential audience 
has a rapidly changing, but always relatively .small, membership. 
A second possible audience is made up of the residue 
left by exit: all of those people who are sufficiently 
dissatisfied to want to ','do something" but who lack the 
resources to exit. To the extent that a cycle of progressive 
deterioration sets in, in the public sector, this audience 
may become quite large. 74 But this audience, too, poses 
problems for the ideologue. 
Because exit works to select ou t thos'e people with 
more political resources and energy, exit's residue comprises 
just those people who .. are most difficult to reach, most 
difficult to inform, and most fficult to organise in 
any way. IdeoloGues are likely to have trouble s:l.mply 
gaininG their attention. 
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Thus the fact that exit works to drain off energy and 
concern through a "trickle" process, still further reduces 
the possibility ,of effective ,voice. Those who are actively 
d sfied will generally nunaware of the possibility 
of collective, rather than individual remedies; those 
who might advocate collec ve remedies will find it difficult 
to the attention of their ~otential audience. 
But, like other resources drained off by exit, ene 
and concern does not simply disappear. Instead it becomes 
inves d in the private sector and some aspects of 
public sector. As long as those people who have exited 
can get better service from the public and private sectors 
in combination, than from the public se~tor alone, they 
will oppose government attempts to restrict exit and support 
those which promise to ease it. 
I have already shown that those who exit have more 
concern (i.e. are more quality conscious) than most others 
and as well include sproportionate numbers of those with 
poli tic enerGY and resourc es. Those who t shoul'l 
find it easier than others to wield poli cal clout. But 
it is dif cult to find situations in which such clout cbuld 
expec ted to appear; for example, e 1950 ther 
National or Labour e;overnments hEtve at te:npted to restric t 
exi t. 
30wever, the Marylands resi home for retarded 
boys Cnristchurch, provides a suggestiv case study of 
the 1Il0bili,sat:i.on of voice on b f of private sector 
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services. The home, it was argued, would be forced to close 
its doors unless the government provided sufficient money 
to allow its re-bu dine and subsequent operations. After 
a sustained (and continuing) campaign, the government 
agreed. In chapter 3 I showed how these efforts showed 
up at one of the voice collection points I examined; 50% 
of all letters to the editor dealing (even remotely) with 
hospital care, published in Christchurch for the year 
September 1) 1972 to August 31 J 1973 , dealt with Marylands; 
all of them protesting its closing. Marylands:, at least, 
could mobilise a great deal of voice energy its support. 
But those who have exit hardly need to voice on their 
own behalf; their interests have always been actively 
represented by others. Southern Cross opened their 
submissions m the Board of Health Committee's Inquiry into 
Private Hospitals by ]?ointing out that many of those making 
use of private hospitals had medical insurance; thus, 
The Health Insurance movement can therefore claim 
with some jEtification to speak on behalf of the 
patients L i.e. private hospital pati~pts:7 -
or a considerable number of them •••. j) 
They were correct. Southern Cross, the Medic Association 
of New Zealand, the Private Hospitals Association and others 
argued the need for increasing government support and' 
subsidy of the private sector before the Board of Health 
Committee. 76 The arguments were well documented and 
expertly presented; they served the interests of those who 
made them and the interests of those who have exited. 77 
In fact the interests of private hospital users have 
always been looked after by organisations such as M.A.N.Z., 
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the ~rivate Hospitals Association and of late, Southern 
C~oss. It has been their efforts which have encouraged 
and justified the increasing government subsidy of exit. 
However, the fact of massive exit gives their arguments 
new cogency. First~ they can claim, quite correctly to 
speak on behalf of many more people than previously. 
, 
Second, those who have exited themselves constitute an 
important political resource; they include those who care 
most about what sort of medical service they get, and who 
are most able to lido something" to get it. 
I have pointed out that, as long as the discrepancy 
in service between the public and private sectors remains, 
any government which seeks to restrict exit is likely to 
face widespread public outcry. Conversely, government 
action to make exit easier, will be welcomed by more and 
more people. Of par cular -interest here, is the 
s~i tuation in which exit increases sufficiently to overburden 
existing private sector facilities. Then it seems that 
governments, regardless of their stated policy, will be 
subje~t to heavy and increasing pressure to subsidise the 
building of additional facilities. Exit is unlikely to be 
ended by the inability of the private sector to provide beds. 
Both Labour and National governments have found in the 
past sufficient reason to subsidise exit. The swi tch- of 
energy and concern from the public to-the private sector 
means that they will have better reason in future. In 
particular, if a government decides that improvement of the 
public sector requires the restriction of exit, it will face 
the organised outrage, not only of doctors, private hospitals 
and medical insurance organisations, but as well, the 
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opposition of the large and increasing number of potentially 
articulate peo~le, who bene t by exit. 
But the publiC sector retains some of the energy and 
concern of those who exit. Private sector facilities remain 
limited; 8S the Chairman 'of the North Canterbury Hospital 
Board pointed out, "Private hospitals can't possibly provide 
the highly expensive equipment of the super-specialties euf.'.;' 
Radio Therapy or Nuc ar Hedicine ll • 78 Thus, those who exit 
may, nevertheless, continu'e to care a sreat deal abo'J t the 
provision of those public sectqr services for whicb no 
private sub~titute exists. 
I do not have available any ~ce that hears on this 
p0int. Neverthele it seems reasonable to assume t t those 
"1ho have ted, and those who have a vest interest in 
.sllst9..ining lar scale e t, will generally support efforts 
to reallocate p~blic hospi resources from specialties 
which the public and private. sector compete to .specialties in 
W1Jich the public sec tor has a monopoly. 
Doctors operating in those specialties in which the 
public sector has a monopoly, (i.e. in general, ·the "super 
special es") will wo hard to Cet their plans and ojects 
r :::tec ord.ed. hiE11 ority. On the other hand, 
doctors ~ho work time 
ci tiGs, will he raluc t to rllore ro ourc eE; 
located to t r ci3.1ties case the vate sector 
demand for' their services dimini es. 
Ho t h eire l:.LkE' to such re2110c 
tTl' lE'.ve ,. :) re[1J3 to ke _L~ley u ~e0 al staff happy, 
realloc~ti0~ in this ~2y ~oeg. ]fell, 
ct ,q.:.~e by defini tiOE "non ure;enttl casBs, while the 
needs of patie~t8 handled by Ilsuper specii]l ties" 
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usually appear more pressing. Again reallocation appears 
the "right" thing to do. 
And the public will apparently be happy as well. All 
of those ,people who exit can have their cake and eat it too: 
by switching judiciously between the public and private 
sectors, they guarantee themselves the best care and the 
shortest waiting times. All of those people who cannot 
exit and have to wait, will most likely remain quiet. (Note 
the converse point; those who exit are likely to bitterly 
oppose moves to reallocate resources toward the waiting 
list specialties; doctors, who publicly complain that their 
efforts to prolong life through the use of new and expensive 
techniques are being stymied by lack of resources, 
are likely to win sympathetic audiencesj the fact that they 
are likely to do so will undoubtedly influence administrators' 
decisions) • 
Thus, exit ends concern about the quality of only 
public sector services. If my argument is correct, this 
fact leads to the increasingly disproportionate allocation 
of resources within the public sector. "Waiting li'St" 
specialties tend to lose resources while Itsuper specialties" 
tend to gain them; this arrangement apparently leaves everyone 
happy. Unlike the move in the opposite direction, any 
attempt to change the allocation of resources in favour 
of "waiting list" specialties is likely to be resisted. 
Thus, over time, two standards of service should develop 
in the public sector; the very best standard of care and 
attention in each of the specialties in which the public 
sector has a monopoly, a somewhat lower standard of care and 
attention in those specialties in which public and private 
sec tor dompete. 
17( 
as I noted above I have no evidence availAble to t~st 
the arculDent's validity. However the arcument itself is 
pre ely analogous to one T presentpd earlier: that areas 
in which exit was impossible would win a disproportion~tely 
larGe share of public sector resourcE's, wlJile areas where 
exit was possible would win a disproportionately low share. 
1 O\'fsd :lOw,:in t, fino e til are:w h1d bed rntios (used 
here as a measure of allocation of resources) c0nGider~bly 
hiGher than "e t II area s. In the former argur:1en t the [1.ref1 i~ 
were eeographically defined; the p~e8ent arg~ment the 
areas ~re c ones but the 1 c of both is the same. 
t drains off Vlblic sector resources of energy and 
concern:imrnedi ely; the way which the process occurc 
considerably reduces the chances that effective voice 
strat es will be found. The ener~y and condern drained 
fr~m the blic sector reappears in the private sector, 
increasing the bargaining resources of those seeking 
S'0verm:Jen t stance to the private sector. well it 
remains attac d to those hospital services of vihich the 
public sector has a monopoly; over time th~.s may result in 
the disproportionate alloca on of publi_c sector resources. 
PUTTING IT TOGETHER: CONSEQUENCE EXIT AT'JI) VOTer. COHPARED. 
The dence presented in this chapter shows that it 
makes a 2,-reat c1eal of difference to the public sector whether 
those anxious Rnd able to lido somethinG" choose 
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exit, rather than voice. Exit encourages no one to repair 
public sector services; as well it drains off resources of 
personnel, finance, enere;y and concern on which public 
sector improvement depends. Consequently a vicious circle 
sets in: public mctor performance V[orsens, more people 
become dissatisfied and exit, public sector performance 
worsens further and so on. Here consumer efforts to remedy 
dissatisfaction lead to worse,) rather than better public 
sector performance, and more~rather than less exit. 
Voice has the opposite effect: it works to encourage 
repair of the public sector and it conserves public 
sector resources. The process set up by its adoption is 
exactly opposite to exit; dissatisfaction, which leads to 
voice, results in attempts to repair the public sector 
which 1 to ss dissatisfaction and less voice and so 
on. re, consumer effo~ts to remedy di~satisf~ction,-
lead to better, rather than· worse public sector performance 
and less, rather than more ~oice. 
Llthoue;h small amounts of voice have occurred, it 
clearly the exit process which dominates the public sector. 
In the final chapter I examine some of the implications of 
this fact. 
CHAPTER S mn·'IARY • 
The evidence presented supports the followi~e contentions: 
1 • t, unlike voice, does not stimulate efforts to 
bring about the repair of public sector lapses. 
2. Exit, unlike voice, works to drain olf l")ublic sector 
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resources of finqnce a.nd personne1 (nl i~h0U':'::!1 the 
effect wi be a.yed). 
3. t, unlike voice, drains off resources of rnrrcy 
and concern from the public sector, re~ucins t 
b:Llity of 
rep::tir. 
CB, and t~l~, puhlic sector 
NOTES. 
1 The st example remains. the experience of the first 
Labour government in its attempts to implement i 
election policy on the welfare state provision of 
medical care. For a blow by blow account of the 
negotiations between the government and the profession, 
See: J.B. Lovell-Smith, The New Zealand Doctor and the 
2Hedical Association of New and, "Submissions to the 
Board of th Committee on Private Hospitals!' 
(mimeo., 1972), p.l. 
3The Summary section of the submi on 
- 1 • most urgent need for Private Hosp1 is a 
realistic patient subsidy tied to a cost of 
living or salaries index. 
2. Most Private Ho tals shou Id be "Trust II or non-
profit making. 
3. There should be co-operative of expensive 
fac ties by Public and Pri Hospi s. 
L~. licenc of Pri va te Eo tals should remai.n 
with the Health Department. 
5. The Medical Bene t, shou be more, nearly the 
same as the Surgical Bene t. 
Ibid; p.3. 
Thus, all but Jwo of the recommendations ma.de, involve 
increasing government subsidy -of exit. 
4The ormation is from, G.C. Salmond and E.M. O'Connor, 
"General cal Waiting Lists and the f1anaze::1ent of 
ose 11 New Zealand 'Medical Journal, 78 (1973), 
391+-1+00. frhey report that, in 1970, patients \':Riting 
for treatment for varicose veins up 67~ of the total 
Auckland waiti list for general 17% of the 
overall Auc wai tine li.st. sed 
15/0 e.nd LJ),; of the Auc 
tins lists respee 
t is, of course, possible that t is some radic 
difference in type of patients treateJ or the type of 
treatment 3ive~ at private'hospi s; however there is 
no dene e to support this hypotheses my pr:l vatE 
iries SUSCest that it is implrolsible. 
the formation provi d I computed pu 
J.~ean st2~ figures as 
I multiplied the average len~th 
the eemajor ~ucklanrl public 
Gl'2Em Lane, t·1iddlemol'e) by 
3.',/ in ac II r:, f 
t:?,l_ s ( c::~l :',1". J ) 
n'lrJbGl:' of l:;ot-:.S'lb; 
tre ed, and added the three tctals together. I 
then divided this total by the number of patients 
treated for each condition to determine the mean 
day stay. 
The mean length of stay for the three lIunnamed".private 
hospi tals for which information is [;i ven is compu ted. by 
Salmond and O'Connor, pp.397-398. Unfbrtunately there is 
18n 
no information available for private hospit s before 1972. 
7It seems to me unlikely that e~ch board member has thou 
deeply about the questions involved, made a quick 
calculation of where his/her self interest as a board 
member lies and replied accordingly. No such claim is 
being made here. Instead, whatever the source of a 
rson's original attitu ,the logic of a board member's 
po tion is such that existing pr6-exit at tudes are 
unlikely to be contradicted. 
88 ~ < • -r ee rlppenC.tlX :J. 
9Some hospital board members not only approve of ex:i.t but 
also actively seek to promote it. Thus, for example, 
some members of the North Canterbury hospital board so 
serve on the boards of Christchurch private hospit s. 
10Bon • H.J. Tiznrd, "Address to the Hedical Association of 
New Zealand, II (mimeo; 1973). The recent publication of 
two stud:Les, providing quantitative data on the comparative 
efficiency of public hospitals, allows the government to 
substantiate its claim on the need 'for better management, 
but provides no new means· to implement government vdshes. 
See: G.C. Salmond, "A Comparative study of Disease Speci c 
Leneths of Stay in Hew Zealand Hospitals. 1f Occasional 
Paper, Number 1, (Wellington: The Department of Health, 
1972); G.C. Salmond and E.H. O'Connor, "General Surgical 
tine Lists and the Hanac;ement of Varicose Veinsll. 
11 The strategy is to some extent self feating> By a variant 
of Parkinson's Law, the supply of hospital beds tends to 
determine the der-land for them. As Professor B. Abel-Smith 
a.rgues, 
lIn general it can be said that areas which already 
have fewer beds seem still to need fewer beds, while 
those having more beds seem to need all the beds they 
have ••• within limits supply can create its own demand ••• 
(quoted :Ln G. C. Salmond, II A Comparative stu d;;r of Disease 
Specific Length of ay in New Zealand Hospi tals '1 ) • 
Nevertheless real differences j_n the 1:'/ai ting stlg. size 
as a percentnGe of populatton occur between Ilover" And 
IlundE::r 1l . "bedded II areas. 'rhus Ashburton (whj.ch has O!1e 
of the hi3;hest public bed to population ratio(:l) O.2,~~ of thp 
porml on are on the 1'1ai tins list, vJhile :Ln Auckland the 
prorortion i.31. or six tLn8s as high (Auckland t 
v/orst public hospital bed to population ratio).· See; 
Department of Health, HosJital Statistics of New 
Zealand Year Ended 1 March 10 72. Wellington, 
Department of Health, 972. 
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12The other major option open to eovernment is to increase 
the supply of medic p~actitioners available, which, of 
late, both onal and Labour govern~ents have 8ou~ht to 
do. Eowever, unlike the provision of public hospi tC.l 
beds these efforts do not constitute a I1seful indicD.tor 
of t;overmnent ety to improve the public sector: 
'-:'.. because changes the provi on of hespi b3.1 
be occur in a cj. c locality, prefJUrr~ably 
in response to pressures from that loc ty, 
whereas increasing the supply of docturs eives 
~o clus as to where the pressure for the change 
orit:inated 
h. beds provided are a cain speci cally to tj,e 
public sector while doctbrs can, do, work 
in both sectors. 
for:'18.tion 
1 
nmnber of public 
each ho ta.l 
o 
:"1 ,~Hl((]i sions pri vate hospi 
strict (from information supplied by the Department of 
de,-'tl ) by the population of the c orresIJonding hos:pi tal 
board Jist ct and recorded the answers as a percentage. 
14 The noyal Commission was established. in March, 1972, c1 
ssolved by the new Labour government in February, 1973. 
Before its d:i.ssolution, the,={oyal COl?lmi,ssioE reported or 
the 8SttOrl of the justific on of a sc,lary advantage 
in favour of psychiatric and pschopaedic nurSes over 
ot of nurses. It also completed two inte 
so arisinc out of its inve tiona into 
c servie es. 
15The pre8.i?1hle to the Commission I s terms of reference states 
that the Gommissj.on is to, 
receive representations upon, inquire to 
ticate and report upon the sting facilities 
the future requirements for hospital and 
related services for New Zealand and the resciurces 
to provide such services, and to recommend such 
measures as you believe will ensure ad e provision 
of such services... tte, March 
? , 1 972 . p. LJ·40 • 
following: 
As a direct consequence of the unrest in psychiatric 
h tal&.~. the Royal Commission was set the difficult 
task of reporting on an integrated service in 
three distinct and time separated stages • 
Department 
17The New Zealand Gazette, March 2, 1972. p.441. 
l8The quotations given are from a letter to me from the 
Hon. L.l~. Adams-Schneider, dated September 20,1973. I 
had written to Adams-Schneider on August 29,1973, askinG: 
I' \llRt reasons did the National Government set up 
the Royal Commission to Inquire Into and Report 
Upon tal and Related Services in Kev" Zealand 
(i.e. '-vhy not have it earlier or later etc.)? ]ow 
important in determining the scope and timing of 
the £ommission was the staff unrest in psychiatric 
hospitals? What other factors were involved in 
clecidinz to set up the Commission?' 
19section 3(b) of the 
the Department of Health, 
coc;nising the importat part played by private 
hospitals in the overall provi on of hospit 
in New Zealand, the Government introduc~da 
private hospital loan scheme in OctOber 1952, and 
this was later extended in 1954, followinG 
recommendations made in the Barro'Nclou[h Report, 
to provtde sUspensory loans, the terl:1s of which 
were further liberalis in 1956.' 
21 1 - l"'h Boaro, 0 f ;.rea \... , 
The: D':\.tter W[l2 pu 
clocm;:en tIc ;::-,,:re ac ross, 
'In c ring applications for louns close attention 
j,G l)aic~ to essenti ty of the type 'Jf be 
bein;:; the extent to ',',fliich the provi on 
of by hospital is thereby 
avoi 
~,..., 
~~FiLures on t~e number 
l,ation 
(l.eU) 1!l 0] 11 e J 
1);';/ the Deparbler: 
18;;' 
Speciali Consul bJtion Benefi and the General Yfedi cal 
Services Benefi t efr8 likewise available to those uoin::: 
the private sector. In itG submis ons to the Royal 
CommiGsion on Hospital and Related Services, the P.S~A. 
arcues that the state paid training of nurses and doctors 
Ghould also be counted as an additional and very expensive 
subsidy provided by the state to the private sectoI'e The 
submission estimates toot 
Total cost to the State of having trained the 
doctors and nurses at present workine full-time 
or the equivalent of full-time in private hosrit 
:}13,992,300. ' 
Public Service Association. 
241n the t k" ; f" t A I " presen lno 0 Clrcums ances. s ar~u 1n 
,~ . 
. , ,. 
Chapter. 1, from time to time extraordinary circumstances 
D.rise '.-'/hen laree groups of people unused teJ the 
experienc e find themselves medic "paupers", all C.1t the 
Game time. In such circumstances the best strateey for 
government will be the implementation in whole or 
part of welfare state medicine. 
ch an explanation does not work for the continuation of 
subsidies under the Nash covernment at the end of the 
fifties. But perhaps ad hoc explanations could be thou;~ht 
up; for example the difficult economic circumstances facine 
tpe 11:os11 tLovernE'le.nt, together with its ,short term of, 
office, expl why the subsi esmntinued even thou~ 
the Government would have seemed ideologically opposed 
to the OL of 1he private sec tor. 
f.'larch 28, 1974. 
-=..;;;;..;:....~:...:::.....;;;.,.;.;., April 1,' 19711_ 
23It is, of course, possible that the actu amounts pai~ 
out under the loan schemes has diminished even if the 
rates of subsidy have not been changed. At the time of 
wr]. 'Clng no figures OIl payments made by the new IJabour 
cove~nGent are available. 
29From the Minister's speech it appears that tho total 
cost of the extensions was l220,000. Of t~is the 
government approved loan money to the extent of 
~130,000 at 5% interest. But part of this 10Pll is 
suspensory; 20% of the approved cost of equipment and 
10% of the approved cost of the buildings. Suspensory 
loans are free of interest and written off after 10 years. 
30 Hon • N.J. King, "Speech at the opening of the Lister 
Hospital extensions, Auckland, Saturday, October 13, 
1973 11 • (mimeo) In the same speech the :'!j.nister st8ted, 
31 
IIl,et ne commend the trust too for its policy of '11'3ki 11::.': 
a free bed ilvailable for needy patie'lts" ,n,~",(·'thing 
it ~:;pems unlikely that members of the first L:d'l:JIJ" 
Government would have done. 
J~nuary 26, 1974. 
32rr · p 
.cneress March 27, 1 97Lt. As well Hr zarn, 
favoureri the recommendation t t local hospital 
hoards meet the cost of transferring a pFltipntfrom 
a tB hospital to a public ho t~l. 
In an earljer statement (The Press, Janu 
the iJ[iniE~ter d) 
Con deration was bei 
privRte ho tals the 
this would not boards ( 
on 118 YIY items. 
given to exten~ine to 
lk-buyi system but 
c) to save Ci)8~tS 
,sarti ",n r.,~) nf t.he , 'i'Jrovidas t}lElt 
l)"Jarl~::n clo·c:e ~111 th nthe C) 1""> 
cnnsent 0f the Minister the recommen~ irr 
~)D the rec()f!)'npJvlati.:)n of the tal s I Lldvi,c;C'Y'Y 
';ol)l'cil l.' il. (' 2 br)p·rd m0Y close ;;1"1 jrst-iJuti"l1 fnr 
"? c:d no·f. exceecJ:i. three :nonths et '1 IJ.ne ttnl II 
,Jith:JUt su:::h consent. 'l'he ,Sonth +erbury srit81 
B()Cl.r·'~ t ce j'l!Jde unp of s clau8e tn thp od 
197G-l ~-S. 
';:,/ 1 , 
""'-"Tn 
,'if 
23 
a letter, to roe, 
50uth r;ante·nbury Hosl.:dtal 
by t. he 8i l'ITPr. 
arri, Mr R.H. Kerr, 
1 
llrl e,-~ thE" 
Hle Chain.'}''''.n n f t h"" S011 tl~ (;'3 'lte 
~vrites, 
rs of 81th were ir.valv 
I'm e r 1'J at. i ':m Ell ~l. ',-1 
ry 
t]1 l',rp'?er"t 
pvir'pnce ,)f 
On ht)t ,:.,v:,ca 
hour' 
tarve l 
y~ p l -:,' !.' 1 
the r ;. :" 'Y' ~ F;I: f 1:' • 
cl the 
t,:"ls I lI.c1v1f:'JY'Y 
.... -
-i 1'1 tl~'? :'~r t. rile 1'1 
11:"Ve '~ 
'"--tL n i ,':) t p r • 
ster 'l1pre 
Q)'lcq;l (1 f' t 
f;uun:::-2 l "'OJ 
pvel' 
pf.:C'~t 
1 :~; l'l'b~/ ~ 'l"j W 1" ~l~r 11 ~\ \"' ~.\ (,ll-\ 01 F; ~; 
IYli:.;ht hc-~\r-:::: >.r.>pTI p J'nqt.'~_~}j'::: 
administrative 
moment. 
ision, into one of considerable 
tter to me from Mr R.L.G. Talbot, Member of Pa nt 
South Canterbury, February 15, 1974. 
37Mr H.ll. Kerr, January 23, 1974. Mr Kerr also argues: 
Otie of the n reasons which influenced the 
thinkins of the Advisory Council inSeptelI1ber, 1970, 
when it dec ned the applic on of the board to 
the permanent closure, was the evidence pres ad 
to it on the submission that lack of any 
obstetric iIi ties would make the town very 
llnattractive to doctors wantine to practice there. 
Since then s aspect has undergone a change 
that it is d young doc tors now-a-days" do not 
want~t0 prac ce obstetrics ferrin~to e 
this to spec sts in this fi d. This was 
,supported by a doctor recently commenc 
practice in without any spects of, 
or indeed any re for obstet c work~ . 
38Mr rr wrote that 
recommendation and 
board was bound to carry out t 
·it is to ask the Department to de 
what is expect of a community 
in a location su as. Temuka. 
it 
In meantime, Hr R.L.G. fl,lalbot writes, February 15, 
.1 971/:, 
I e.m making representations to the nister of 
th asking him to recommend to South 
erbury Hospi (sic) that t Temuka 
ernity Home be loped as a Community 
tal. .Such a proposal \'Jould be aCCeptable to 
people of Temuka and would be of some 
as stance to doc in the distrj"ct~ 
ona.te number 0 f beds found in "no exit n 
s even more , once it is sed that 
bospi such areas provide consid fewer 
services to their clients than most 
areas. Thus, to take the most obvious e 
only 8S the Auckland tal board 
of se ces that ~est hospitals do 
heart 8U ry etc., it provides 
people allover New Zeclland, inclu 
the Coast. Thus, asse the diet 
s in "exit ll 
e, not 
B. number 
n0t, for eXf3i nple 
services to 
those from 
tion of 
population 
un':l.ersta teG 
resources by public sector ds per head of 
in each tal board area, systematicallY 
the disc cy between "exit ll and "nr) til areas. 
40 The divi on into "exit" Clnd "no exit" 8t'qE.lS a very 
crudE: one, in that it fEdlc t:) all 0',',1' rli:"t,inctioDs 
within ho tal districts. Thus, the analy s 
Temuka (.for example) is treated as part of the 
South Canterbury hospital board area. Even so, the 
data supports my argument. 
41See R.J. Latimer, "Introduction", in R.tT. Latimer (ed), 
Health Administration in New ZJealand, p. 11 • 
42In A Review of Hospital and Related Services in New ~ea12nd 
prepared by the Department of Health, under the last 
National a~ninistration, hospitals are advised; 
Li1''11 t surveys of waiting lis have shown thEi,t 
there is considerable scope for improvement in the:i l:' 
operation. In ceneral too ttle regard is had for 
the personal and economic responsibilities c e~ , 
by tb)'38 em the Vlai ting sts. Hnch more can 'be 
done to~ard chancing orientation fro~ allwaitin~ 
Ij_stll c',:::mc to that of l1arran[:;ed admission ll • LOlle 
waitinc times and growing waiting sts tract 
c cism and among other things hospitals should 
ensure that people on waitine Ii are still alive, 
moved ,":!,way c:md are still in of 
sation. A quarterly check by every cenerel 
hosr j , t c;,ppears an alJpropriate requirerr:ent of 
cement, and a cl fication by "aver&ge 
" by categories of diB,5nosis, is probably 
n fie ant than the S2 totals of the list. 
Labour rnment I s 15 pointplcm to reduce wai ti.ng 
sts, announced by the Minister of th April 1973, 
has 8 lar flavour. As well as recommendine that wore 
eff:icient use be rr12.de of outpatient facilitiec~ to deal. 
wi th ','/8i is. list cases, that full-time ojrectors of 
surcery 2ppointed, and so on, it sug~ests: 
1. That urcent patients should not be t on the 
wai ting list but be rmly boo};:,ed an 
operating session 'Hithin 10 days. 
,2. That no one be put on the waittng list without 
first beint:; examined at outpatients clinic 
of a public hospi • (Thus lIu!1nec II cases 
are screened out; meanwhile three months 
or more, that paLients in some centres typically 
wait to be seen at outpatients, no longer appears 
on the Wed tine st) .. 
3. That hospital bo should incre<::;se their 
clerical reviews of waiting lists by the 
diGtri bu tion of questionnaires ('l,t'hree-monthl;y 
intervals. Patients whose sYI7',1,to"1.s 'l.r(' 2USCert': bly 
to spontRneous remission, who are classi d as 
routine who have been on the waitine list for 
~onths or more should subject to medic 
scyeening. 
The Press) 1 '21., 1 973. 
18'7 , 
43Department of Health, A Review of Hospital and Related 
Serviges in New Zealand,p.74. 
44Hirschman points out that in tuations like the present 
one characterised by the massive resort to the option 
least ef ctive stimulating reform, any use of the 
alternate option works to increase the chances of repair. 
A.O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty, p.35. 
45perhaps Labour's politicians are also ideologically 
predisposed to pay close attention to such voice. 
However the point that I wish to make here is, that 
even if Labour party politicians were i ologically 
identi to their National party counterparts, 
I would ,still expect Labour to be more likely to 
repair the public sector than National, simply 
because of the focus of the voice that has occurred. 
46The New Zealand Labour Party, ('.'J e lLL ngt on: ~itandard Pre.s s ) 1 ~ r;~--:---=.......------'---'---
lf7The main vote to hospital boards was overspent by roughly 
~;3 million, of v!hich the Auckland hospital bt")"'T']' "l~rJrr:: 
was about n1.8 million. ) October 25 and October 
29,,1973. 
~-8Tues 27 February 1973, richt after the Labour party 
had assllY!1ed offic e, the Hinister of Eduation was as~'\:ed 
by the Han. L.R. Adams-Schneider, 
What action has he' taken to carry mit the policy 
of the Labour party that planning for a meQ1C 
school 1,1'[oulo. begin the day the Hinister assumed_ 
po folio?' 
The Hinis r ed, 
Planning for the third medic school for New 
Zealand is de tely underway, b'J. tit became 
ickly apparent in our planning that nee 
(1 the country, and the need to have an uninterrupb:d 
supply of doctors, would best achieved by 
enlar~ing the existine schools r~ther than 
dev olJin[; immediately the third. med 31 Achool. 
planning, which ~one a lone way towards the 
preparation of plans and esti;-n)::'ctes, be.s been 
ject of a number of discussions he en myself 
and ter of Health and s of ers, and 
the Department been direct to obt2in informat~on 
on a 111FJber of aspec ts. Eu tit j_s':'f our 
planninc at options should be 
ew s by my colle e, t FeD.l th 
c) us to just that ••• 
First 2ession, 'rlli 
18C 
Parlia~ent, 1973, No 2. The most optimistic assessment 
of the present si tuation (that I have hearlJ) is thDt 
the }Y(':i.nd.Ir.~l option, that there may be a third 
Inedical school, may still be open. 
If9 In i tE3 first reading the relevant clause read that 
board members would be liable for sl:endine, 'lin reckles::; 
disreGard" of the provisions of the Hospitals Act. 
'fhe c to "wi thou t due regard" was the result of 
strenuous protest by hospital boards and others (the 
chanze, as the j'1j.nister .of Health adm:i t ted at the 
bill's second readinz, still did not satisfy the 
Hospital ards' Association.) October 25, 1973. 
50 The PI' , April 3, 1974, 
51 IvLHrch 30, 1974. 
-----
) April 3, 1974. 
£::7. 
./.-I1Lssuni ,of course, that money not spent on the private 
sector wou eo to the provision of health rather than 
other [;overnment services. 
C::lf-
-' Some 0 I' kinds of type 2 dissatisfaction inclu 
dissatisfac on abou t hOSl)i tal location, the repu tation 
for sss of a particular superintendent, and SO on. 
On the basis of my survey-results none seem very important 
compared with t problem of waiting time. 
55In comparison, 7,992 people were reported waiting for 
general su ) 5,672 for Orthopaedic surtjery, 1,253 for 
Genito-Urinary surgery, 1,701 for Opthalmolo~y, 2,475 
for GynHecology and 2,380 for Plastic Gu t 
of He8.1 th 
56Details of survey are given in Joint Committee on 
Medic Graduate eds, Report on IvIedical GY'3.,:1.U3. te 
Needs in New Zealand for the Years 1968-2000 (Wellincton: 
Department of Health, 1970), pp.2D-41. 
57Figures on t 1968 situation are from Ibid, p.31. In an 
interview th one of the people in the Department of 
Heal concerned with deciding W~lC:l.t is the "approved. 
e,stablishment", I tried to find ou t how the DlFllBrs were 
arrived • It appears that the procedure, while ciso 
in the sense that other people th similar trai are 
likely to reach the same conclu on, is reached intuitively 
by t~1e application of a number of rules that p,:tJ:r-a.rently . 
only experienc e teaches. One of these rules llas to with 
the number of people potentially available to fill v9.cancies; 
clearly if there is ttle or no likelihood of present 
V0cancies being filled in a specialist areC?,. it makes 
1i tt18 sense t', (,ther i~~C' -",ee.se the 88 sh~rtent. 
Thus it is likely that the "approved establishment" 
figures for E.N.T. understate (I have no idea how much) 
what would be a desirable fi~ure, en an adequate 
supply of potential recruits. 
Informatj_on on the present tuation is from a list 
drawn up by the Department of th (for me) of 
specialists in hospital service, November 1973. Clearly 
it would have been most useful to have such a st 
for 1968 ( other years) as well. However, the Depart~ent 
was reluctant to do more cause of tk consider8.ble ti!'tE 
ef fort involved in drm'Ying up the st for one 
year. Having ultimat~been persuasive enou to get the 
figures for 1973, knowing pressure people 
concerneJ were wo under, I d not press the matter 
further. 
58For e}':aaple, The Joint Committee, Report, lists three 
doctors j ~1 l'i:ockland who 'Nork only in privo.te·prDctice. 
C1 
Thus ficures ven in this e for each specialty 
may Uncte.t';3 e the of the private sec tor in the 
distribution of doc 11.0 I have no 11. to e 
forma.tion on the number in each slJec ty who v:o 
te tice only, I have made no attenpt to 
e te the'); the table. ver to the ch 
:P8 e st, then central rEunent i~3 
SUIJ})ortoc1. 
tine l ' 
for ~ene surgery is probably expleine~ 
ion; thus Auckl ,':[ellinCton Bncl 
the bulk of the nation ceneral 
st is drawn the rercent e of 
i,3 much !1i.sher ( 72/ ami 
~-io· .. .'ever, because even the? s'n~,llest 
l:L t tIe or no wai tin.'::: Fe,t) E?ve ceneral 
'_) a::c'e employed -time, cver211 1 
e~t~~e is nonetheless lo~. 
~2-, 
- :-,eC:':-,:J.Sf: T ve no a on 0 to 
'7 
1 ~<.o, =: been fore eJ to 
incL.:.·'(:u C'[!.ch of tho ot 
tt~l~ ]_j_:~~t ~ 
. Eo~evpr t8blo 
11e 
.- ~'~~:--, ]. ~~; :::"i,:['fj_cient priv;,te 0C't r ,r l:C:'" 
:: ~)C t '~.Ct3 
tlU'l t "OG tor::: 
"::oct:))'. ,;\n~T 
~~8 ) but 
.-_: 11:.~ >~~ t () t~ }-l e c .~: '=: c to 
snali;3 es.s :::f f
'
-l i_'li!: :?f'C tor (~e:·n::'-l·v~. 
(~s I ore in SP88 ~etail n~) 
(; coect r)!' '1E~Y'18.n(i. it eve:: lec'3 li!,cly 
shj.ft tho priVett tr-'; i.·~:e ~IU 
';octol' who dop,s so Buffers not o:'lly fi 1. 
f::O likel.'} to 1'Iorle·1 of' f s f(-let a 
Thus, SO lone as private sector demand continue, traffic 
from the public to the private sector will be one way only. 
94r]1he carica tureof doctors as a species of "economic man If 
is based on expected outcomes, over time. Thus for all 
kinils of re8Bons (including personality fferences 
between doctors, the cost of setting up in private 
l'ractice, doubt:s about the amount of demand and so on) 
at anyone point in time there may be a gap between 
private sector supply and demand (althou~h privat~ 
:hospi tals have so far maintained a "no wEd tin::::" serv:Lce). 
However il1y. argument is that, over time, the au tcame will 
resemble that which would occur if, in fact, doctors 
acteu as a c s of "economic man". 
651 s~spect that this outcome is the one found everywhere 
that public :::mu private sec tor me(Ucine c o-ex:L<t; the 
extreme exainple is of course the Uni ted ,3tates where 
some of the st Bnd some of the worst medica.l CB.re 
faci ties st 8i by side, the one in the private 
sector, the other in the public (more accurately the 
"charit'ylf) sector. aowever, the oUtCO'Yl8 is not 
necessary; it would not occur, for example, -Ni thou 
scarci ty of resources, or where the buying I,ower of 
public sector was greater than that of the private. 
66ThlI.S exac tly so mahy medical services were, in fac t) 
perfoI'med_ ye erday; similarly th:re vms, in fac t, so 
much deil1S1.nd yesterday. 
t? ), ']\)t<''.ll ~aiting time is a function of the ratio of the 
far medical services and their supply. Thus 
cal 
r13lland 
sym bi) 
T is proportional to ~ for every value of D ~ 
("f'llere 'Tl = total WOl'tWnf.T tl' WlA T) = lls'Yn'''Yl'; r .... , 1. u. 1. (..., _1: ..... ,._ .. ~(A __ 
lrlEuW.I ,c;ervices and;3 supply of se ce,(3). 
'Il~n118 the ler,5er the ciemand for the f;a,ne e"I'.·'tmt '::f 
resources, the lar the amount of to ~8itint ~e. 
(0 
'c"rhree '.lbjections may be raised at trl1.s l)"int. l'st, 
it mi~ht be areued that the provision of the vate 
sectl)p, it: tiJ.e long run, wod;;:s to inCI'8 c'lSe' e SUl'1.I]Y 
of.!:€: cal ~3ervice8 Available by t118kinj'bcto:':::-:: I 
CR-~ee~'B .nl'~)~l0 9.ttr,!)(;tj,ve as :::1. reslll t IJf X'P::l~tY2 ':' the.; 
a1'li)Ln,t ·')f(l,:m doctors cal] expect to p(.'.rn .~.;":8vpr, 
~.~ Ire-=-:. re are '(~lAny rnore 8 wh:> CIlJ 1/ 1 i t;-, 
be'.:: Or~8 drlC to ps thaI.! there :clre es 8V2 i.l IIp i n 
lYle cc',l ~;c '·12; ~)S well, rl') matte::.' 11 ()';! 'Tl1JC'-:' ,loe 
inco'lie:::; j l'.C r'e:'.sed, no liDre iioctC1I'S tb'3.Yi 2t ~.Tet-'r~~~t cc.!J1 
Iced 1,,), the medic scho 3. 
". sAcon6 IJbjection tha.t the introduc 'JIl:..:f t'l:'.;' rriv.,:'.p 
::::e·:'tc'J:' es, in ct,) '!JOI',,- to tncre8.l3€' 1:;1'8 t.i~·.::".~ L,F!'i;er 
f .i1(,lic?1 ~rvj_ce8 8.ve.iL:',ble mply blcc:S;:'tl!':-2 (::,e: 'r~' 2.t 
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8UG,CestS) doc t,)l's:!<ppear t,] workrnuch harete.:' in theil' 
:pr:L VDc te 
'Jbjec on 
dist.!.'ibu 
n their public sector capacities. "::ut this 
be~s the ques aD; the key point s the 
on of t1.e services bein;?: performed Cit any 
time; if more services beco~e aVDilable ODe nt 
for v·,hatevel' reason (more ialists appear, the 
ciolists perform more services) then, 
ent that the private sector DS a 
onate share, the public sec or are jf~ 
It tIli ,an'} related objection, is that the nnmber 
()f rne :':-l<?rvic es aVfti would decrease 1,vi thou t-
the r te sector, cause fewer doctors would be 
D ted as iwmicran to New Zlealand or 3.U se m(ll'e 
New speci ists woulrl leave. The argument referR 
tv ~'e l'a tl1e r present event; it so depE:11 j s 
on 3.SSur'l]Jtion that no effee ti ve counterlflec.Hmres fell' 
l)roc ess will nd (for e e 11 drastic 
n specialif3t salaries and era:1 improvelflsnt 
1" working can tions). Thus e a.rf.:ument nwy 
not be valirl; but it hEl.s little to Jo with the 
11istribu tion of medical se ces between the 
c :mc!. l'ri va te sec tors. 
s cssertion is a restatement, soci science terms, 
of na tursl sd.enc es most fun(8)"aen theorum, "ene 
is ne:L U\f--:r created nor destroyed 11. Soc scientists 
such as myself have tended to shun such a rigorous 
18tion.-Hy ()wn preference 1" the form, II 's 
110 such thins a'3 8. free lunch", but treader shQuld be 
warned that 0 fer, "you c9.n I t get sO:'1lethinl 
Hothing~' 
t deteriora on may be on ve; i.e. of 
rformed will the private 
sec t::n- and Hr)t to e public; thus Ie pri vc:te sector 
c l. ty to cope wi tll increasel oJ ri ses, pub c 
sector capacity the same. In such 8 situ 
ting lists 1 not rise. However, once Epeci 
E.re 'liorkine; at r::3.tes in the vEde sector 
itif)rlal can be met only by s'Nitciri.ns 'ons" 
the public to the private sector; at thts 
tinE lists (or tine times) 11 berin to rise. 
I;.['e sen t on 
sec t02.~, in 
br1 nt of the 
V[OU 1 ci be PI' 
concl:i. tions t 
those people who cannot escape t 
icular house su eons~ bear the 
t of tuo many es to be pe 
e. I would e th3t few 
d to spend El time workin~ u 
hou se su rgeons tu p 'si th. 
bllc 
sts 
r the 
72 . Tne phrase) e of :'tlind", is from a pamphlet 
()ther phrases 
vertisinG 
the virtues of Southern Cross. th Milar 
meaning can found in most me C 8_1 i 1,,} <-:'l_l':"~~_~- r" (; 
73The more cient medical insurance salesmen are, the 
smFl.ller tbe number occurrj this category. The 
salesman's tash is first to reach, Bnd then 1, his 
co:nr1any's policy to all of those dissattsfied. well 
salesmen seek to convince doubtful prospects thB.t the 
public sector really is "that bad ll , awl that the spect 
is very s sfied with the service it offers. As part 
of the dwork on this project 1 accepted the adverti,,~ed 
offers of two medical insurance companies to have th l' 
salesman c and tell me about their product. both 
cases, after 1 had hin teet tbo. t 1 VJasn I t sure Elbon t the 
need for me to have medical insurance at all, I was 
stories ut people who had ted a lone time, in 
considerable n for public sector treatment. I ct 
the stories were true (althoueh, perhaps at~pic ). 
741f everyone who could, exited (as in the Un:Lted S eL,» , 
then the ze of the residue would probably be about 
20" of t on. 
75Sou the en Cro~;s Medtcal Care ,30cie ty, ll,'3u byr,issions 19 11 
76Those !'lakin.e: such ,3rglLnente included the New Zealand 
fursee' Assoc on, the Trust8es of the L2vineton 
i-lOSlJi tal ,aoyal Austral Collee;e of 
SUrceOYls. 
77The Pri.v~.te 
proj8ct ('n 
by f:r'ofe881Jl' 
Uni ve:C~3i ty, fl 
extenGi VB su 11:rtis 
tte," t;J Jle 
s Association commissione1 a researG~ 
of Private t use 2nd 
~lyth, Professor of Econ0mics ~nrt 
sented his report as rart of 
L.C. '-1. Averill, 

1 (~f. '. 
- . 
In the last two chapters I have tried to show, detail 
by detail, how the model I developed, does in fact, neatly 
fit with and explain events going on in the real world. 
Now I want to examine, more carefully, the consequences 
of the processes I have identified; in particular, what 
happens when th~ exit process continues to dominate the 
public sector. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTINUING D01'1INANCE OF EXIT. 
The first and most obvious consequence is a ourishing 
private sector; doctors get richer, the reserves of medical 
insurance companies rise satisfactorily, and private 
hospitals make plans for expansion. 1 ause superior 
market power allows it to buy as many doctor services 
as it requires arid market pressures lead to their 
efficient use, the private sector continues to 0 er 
better services than the public sector in of those 
areas where they compete. Consequently, those who can 
afford exit are anxious to guard their privileged position; 
if governments should wish to diminish or end th r present 
subsidy of exit they are likely to incur widespread 
public outcry. The more the private sector floUJishes, the 
more difficult it is to restrict its activities. 
The limits of private sector expansion remain unclear. 
The key ques on is: will expansion be confined to those 
specialties in which the public and private sectors 
currently compete ("vertical" expansion), or will it 
involve, as well, expansion into specialties in which the 
public sector now has a near or. total monopoly ("horizontal" 
expansion)? 
Earlier I argued that private sector expansion depends 
on the existence of public sector de ciencies. well, 
I showed how the exit process works to enlarge any, 
de ency that appears. Thus, any quality lapse, 
any public sector specialty, is likely to be translated 
into new business for the private sector. Small, perhaps 
random, quality lapses in those speci ties in which 
the public sector currently has a monopoly or near 
monopoly, immediatelY open up the pos ty of 
"horizontal" private sector expansion. Overtime, if such 
lapses should occur, private sector expansion may penetrate 
all spec ties up to the limits of th~ private sector's 
ability to buy and use effidently the necessary equipment. 
The second consequence of contmuing t is the 
deterio on of the pu c sector. In each of the 
special es in which the public and private sectors compe 
lapses in public sector quality will not lead to ~onsumer 
pressure for remedy. , consumer ac ons will work 
to worsen public sector quality by draining of its 
resources. Thus, for any given level of resources in the 
public sector, vihatever inef ciencies, ocations 
or other bureacratic pathol es that appear are likely 
to go uncorrected. 
As well, rhaps in part because of the he essness 
of the victims, an extremely unsubtl~ change in atmosphere 
accompanies s fts from the provi on of service for the 
general public to the provision of services to the medically 
indigent only. Charity care, where ever it occurs, not 
only almost always second rate (and sometimes dangerous) 
care, but as well is demeaning to the recipient. 2 
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Public sector deterioration thus results from both 
the constant erosion of resources and the continuing 
uncorrected misuse of those resources that are available. 
Its human conssequences include the likely humiliation 
of its users. How many public sector specialties will 
suffer this kind of malaise depends on the extent of 
"horizontal" private sector expansion; those specialties 
in which the public sector continues to enjoy a monopoly 
are likely to provide satisfactory service. 
Overall, continuing exit works to increase the 
proportion of medical services distributed through the 
market and diminish the proportion distributed through the 
welfare state" the market need is not a relevant 
criterion. Instead, access to medical care is determined 
by purchasing power; those able to pay more secure larger 
quantities of care, of better quality. than those paying 
less, regardless of medical need. 3 The resulting distribution 
of medical ,care follows 'closely the inverse care law: "The 
av~ability of good medical care tends to vary inversely 
with the need for it in the population served .. " 4 
Thus, the exit process is the mechanism which is 
currently, very quietly, revolutionising our arrangements 
for the allocation of medical care. It may still be true 
that, 
Unlike overseas people self respecting freedom loving 
New Zealanders will never respect or tolerate a service 
which gives one type of s~rvice to the poor and another 
type to the well-to-do. Land that-1 Any scheme which 
savours of a poor man service, of charity which 
divides the people into two groups, those able 
to pay private fees and those unable to 
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do so; which differentiates in the mind of the 
doctor ther consciously or unconsciously between 
patients, would be foreign to the ideals and 
aspirations of the government in particular and 
the people of New Zealand general. 5 
Nevertheless, just such ~ system is being nstituted 
in New Zealand. 
WILL EXIT CONTINUE? 
t will exit, in fact, continue? In Chapter 3, I 
set out the reasons for believing that it would. Thus, 
I are;ued that the potential for exit remains only partially 
tapped; that even if public sector performance got no 
worse, the development of new ins~rance schemes, the spread 
of employer subsidies and so on, would be enough to 
gl.la,ran tee more t in fact public sector performance 
likely to get worse; thus a much larger number of people 
will have reason to exit. As well, I argued, exit will 
not halted by lack of private sector fac ties; the 
existence of I'slack" in the private sector, and the ready 
avatlability, ther from government or prtvate sources 
(especially the medic insurance industry), of sufficient 
funds for expansion, means that private sector waiting Ii s 
are unlikely to develop.6 
But perhaps exit may still come to an end, for reasons 
other than those I have examtned so far. Because continutng 
exit (regardless of whatever else happens), spells the ruin 
of the public sector, such a posstbility deserves further 
examination. 7 I showed earlier that those who can both 
exit and voice will choose exit when both of the following 
conditions occur: 
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1. the private sector provides su ently better 
care than the public sector to make t 
worthwhile. 
2. the cost/effectiveness of exit is superior to the 
cost/ef tiveness of voice. 
If exit is to end, either or both of these conditions 
must no longer hold. 
For of the reasons outlined Chapter 3, I have 
no doubt that the private sector will continue to offer 
"no waiting" service, in what are likely to become 
increasingly pleasant and well staffed surroundings. Thus, 
the pre gap between public and private sector service 
which makes t "worthwhile", wi not be closed by 
private sector decline. But perhaps improvement of the 
public sector will occur instead. ter all, tpe p~esent 
government, while continuing to dise exit, is also 
committed to, 
upgrade the public hospital system to a tua on 
where a comprehensive e is availabla to 
irrespective of financial circumstances. ~ 
For the public sector to be "upgraded" enou to stem 
t, the very least requ t is that it 0 "no 
waiting", or nearly "no waiting", service. 9 No ng the 
ent government has done, or has promised to do, will 
bring about such an outcome. I have already shown that, 
te the recent government spending on hospitals, 
the real increase in amount spent per capita is small. Even 
if all of this increase were spent in attempting to improve 
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service in "wai tine; list" speciali ti'es (clearly it will 
not be), not much difference would occur. This is not 
simply because the amount of money is ,small compared with 
the problem it has to solve. 
In fact, flooding the public sector with extra finance, 
a tactic not yet tried by New Zealand ~overnments, may still 
not make much difference to public sector performance. 
long as resources are allocated and used inefficiently, 0 
great deal of money will be required to make quite small 
difference~ in performance. 
The prea::nt Hinister of Health recognises the conflict 
of interest, besetting doctors who operate in both the 
public and private sectors, as a major cause of inef ciency 
IIwaiti listll spec ties. 10 A key passage in the 
Minister's 15 point plan to_reduce ~aiting lists required 
that, 
, In general hospitals of 250 beds or more, boards 
should develop full-time surgic units and appoint 
a full-time direc tor of surgery. Until' this is done 
no more part-time appointments of surgeons are to 
be made exc ept wi th my approval,,·ll 
A year later the Minister still believes, 
there should be more full-time medical appointments 
j,l1 hospi s. He intends to explore ways of 
strengthening the relative positions of these 
doctors with their parb-time counterparts .. 12 
That such a policy should be needed all, reflects 
the fact that, at present, doctors in "wai st" 
spec ties find full-time appointments unattractive. As 
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inflates the private sector demand for their services, 
they are likely to find them even more so. At the same 
time, in any trial of strength over the tlfull-time" issue, 
d~ctors appear in an enviable ng position. The 
point is nicely made in this report of a meeting of the 
North Canterbury Hospital Board in February, 1974: 
The Minister of Health (Mr Tizard) received 
some ntle criticism for his policy on par time 
s • The Board employs many surgeons part-time, 
but the Minister preferred appointments to be full-
time, Dr Berry said .. ' LDr Berry the dical 
Superintendent-in-Chief of the North Canterbury 
BoardJ !IAn example of the need for this was in 
tic surgery~1 he said e "Cases involving ,cleft 
es and hare lips have not been through the 
ou ents for many years. These are through 
private referral 0 Without this field private 
prac ce there is not enough work for a plastic 
on to do full-time, and so some of them leave. 
We need a plastic surgeon, but he needs s private 
prac ce to be fully occupied. If we can't take 
him on a part-time basis, we might miss out together,!! 
said Dr Berry. The Board agreed to press for 
continuation of the part-time appointment tem. 13 
Thus, even ifMr Tizard should find, "ways of 
strengthening 
doctors" (and 
relative positio~s of these (fu time) 
not, so far), full-time posi ons are 
unlikely to attract "waiting list" specialists. 14In t, 
in the face of rising private sector demand, f·1r 
Tizard's immediate problem is simply to retain' the 
1 I f ' 'd d b t t' , l' t '15 eve 0 serVlces prOVl e y par - lme speCla ~s s. 
The logic of argument rests on two assumptions. 
The first, that private sector demand for specialist 
services will rapidly rease, I have given a great deal 
of evidence for. A second and equally crucial assumption, 
is that the number of t services available will 
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continue to be too few to satisfy demand for them. That 
this is presently so is attested by the absence of 
unemployment among specialists~ together with the occurrence 
of long waiting lists in the public sector. But such 
circumstances may not always prevail. The first class of 
the Auckland Medical School graduated in 1973; the student 
intake at Auckland is to be raised from the present 60 to 
128 in 1977 and 200· in 1981. At the same time the intake 
at Otago has been increased from 120 in 1971 to 150 in 1972 
and then, it is planned, to 200 in 1975. And currently, 
migration is adding to the numbers of doctors available 
(for the years ending 31 March 1971, 1972, and 1973, 
respectively net gains of 87, 90 and 79 doctors were 
recorded).16 Although such estimates are fraught with 
uncertainty, the New Zealand doctor to population ratio 
should steadily diminish over time.'7 
In such circumstances, will my second assumption still 
hold? It seems to me that it will" First, it takes a good 
deal 6f time to translate an increasing number of doctors 
into an increasing number of specialists; while the training 
of doctors takes five years, the training of specialists 
takes considerably longer than this again. Whatever happens, 
neither the private nor public sectors are likely to be 
quickly swamped with the services of specialists. 18 
Second, the crucial question is not the number of 
specialist services available, but their allocation 
between the public and private sectors. As long as the 
private sector can get all of the services it requires and, 
as well, there is rapidly rising private sector demand, any 
increase in specialist services is likely to be absorbed by 
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the private sector. Only when private sector de~and 
had been satisfied will specialists seek public sector 
work e 
Finally, while it. is easy to imaGine what a [-;Ur-ril~) 
of speci ist services would be like, it is di cult to 
find real world cases. The United States, for example, 
has a heavy emphasis on "specialism" and a doctor to 
IJulation ratio , ,r r 19 considerably lower toan 1ew Zealand. 
At the same time it makes no pretehce of providine cond 
medic care for everyone; instead 9.vailable lr~edic8.1 
resources are heavily concentrated on those who can affnr~ 
them, leav:ini3 still unsatisfi.ed demand amonG the poor. ~\ren 
so, ClB the hi pric es A1118 can doc tors cOYI:'ll1ancl anO thai r 
ability to avoid such niceties as house calls shows, it 
. 11 I . 1 t 20 remalllS a se_~ers marKe • It seems difficult to 
. sa tia te3 .. society \'/i th medical services. 
For all three reasons, it appears that my second 
as.sump on, tnat the number of speci st services avai ble 
y:ill c ont:Lnue to too few to satisfy demand for them, II 
con nue to hold in the forseeable fu reo Thus, the 
}Jll blic ::3ec tnr 1 Dot be bailed out, ei e1' hy the presert 
sh to make only full-time appoin en~s, 
nor by the decision of the previous government to increas0 
t of "nedic grac1ua tes. 
~'Jle present Government In 13;3t \::nOVIYl c8rd rera2tns 
unpJ. cd; >~r ]'i proposes to publi 
tG l)aper in July or Aucust of 1 S; ,set tilv:r out 
Exactly t is b proposed reoains unclear. 
(-,ne) 
has suggested that, 
We would like to see the country divided into 14 
or 15 regional health authorities, serving a 
minimum population of around 100,000 and a 
maximum of 450,000. L-The authorities~ would 
be something totally new and would cover all 
aspects of health services. We mu~t break down 
the rigid barriers between hospital care, community 
care, public health, preventative medicine, and 
health education. 
The main administration would be done by a quartet 
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of the chief medical superintendent, chief nursing of eer, 
board secretary and the medical officer of health. The 
authority itself would be made up of elected and appointed 
members (the Department of Health suggesting that the 
authority have 13 members, seven elected on a ward system 
and the other six appointed).21 
that, 
As well, Mr Tizard has made it clear that he envisages 
many of the func ons of the Health Department 
will devolve on the new authorities L-and that_7 
responsibilites in health at present administered 
by local authorities would also be brought within 
the gambit of the regional bodies. 22 
Just what will happen to hospital boards remains unclear. 
Dr Hiddlestone suggested that, 
Hospital Boards would probably remain as they were 
now, and would not conflict with the regional 
au thori ties, 
while another, later story, suggests that, 
•• e in recent speeches they (Mr Tizard and Dr 
Hiddlestone) have been talking about a wide~ 
ranging reform which could replace hospital 
boards with all-embracing regional health 
authori ,,23 
Whatever final form regional authori es may take, 
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it already clear that their introduction is designed to 
implement two important changes. The first is the 
devolhtion of power from the national to the regional 
level; the amount of power over the allocation and 
administration of medical resources enjoyed at the local 
level will increase, while that held at the national leve' 
will decrease. The second is the concentration of 
ad~inistrative power within regions; ently rsed 
responsibilities for the administration of health care 
will be brought together under the regional authori 
Will regional health authorities improve public 
sector performance? Whatever happens, the effects of their 
introduction will be considerably delayed; I4r Tizard 
anticipates a year od from the introduc on of 
the white paper to the final draftin~ of legi 
the most marked effect of reo sation on public sector 
performance me'S come abou t indirectly through its t on 
voice (a point I discuss below). Other than that, if the 
authori successfully co-ordinate community 1]eal th 
services, public sector performance may improved by 
the more effic recruitment of hospital pati Si as 
well, rative de-centrali on may better 
monitoring of local performance, increase the possibility 
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of innovation and so on. However, without more fundament 
changes, regional authorities will make no difference to 
private sector erosion of publj.c sector resources. 
Thus, in the meantime it remains unclear what effects 
re-organisation will have on public sector performance. 
While everyone would like to think that re-organisation 
will work to improve the public sector, i benefits (Guct 
as they may be) will not be felt for some time. 
For all these reasons, it seems most unlikely that 
public sector rf6rmance will su~ficiently improve in the 
next few ye-ars to makeexi t no longer worthwhile. If exit 
is to be t . it will have to be because the second 
condition (that the cost/effectiveness of exit is supe or 
to the cost/effectiveness of voice) no longer holds. 
The first possibility is a rapid increase in the 
cost of we cal insurance to a level where no more people 
can afford exit. Such an increase seems most unlikely; 
while the costs of hospital care have increased a great 
deal over the last decade, the cost of medical insurance 
has remained fairly 10w. 24 Competi on between rival 
insurance organisations, government subsidy of the private 
sector and government and employer subsidy of in.surance 
premiums should all contribute to keeping exit's price 
down. However, even if the price of medical insurance 
should se substantially, the evidence provided in Ch~pter 
3 suggests that few people would stop paying their premiums. 
Thll.s, exit is unlikely to be halt because of sharp 
increases in its cost. 
The second possibility is a change in the cost/effective-
ness of voice relative to exit; if voice should become 
increasingly effective then some of those anxious to 
lido something", who presently choose to exit (or remain 
passive), may voice instead. To the extent that voice 
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does work, then improvements in public sector performance 
should diminish the benefits of exit and so on. 
In the absence of a major break through by a voice 
entrepreneur, it is clear that some change in institutional 
arran~ements will be required to increase the effec vene~s 
of voice. Kew Zealand governments, seeki to solicit 
and strengthen voice have often made such changes; in fact, 
the present Labour governmeni has been particularly 
innovative in this regard. Its decision to set up the 
"Guardians of the Lakes" built the voice process into the 
heart of fu ture deci on making abou t Hanapouri. ~Sven 
more innovative, especiallY in its attempt to involve all 
members of the community, rather than simply the representatives 
of pressure groups in its deliberations, has been ~he 
bducational Development Conference. 
Three years or more from August of 1974, if Labour 
should continue in office and if nothing else happens in 
the meantimg, the creation of regional health authorities 
may do for voice something of what medical Burance is 
currently doing for exit. As New Left theorists and others 
have pointed Qut, the decentralisation of political power 
increases the probability of genuinely participatory 
2'~ democracy; i.e. it lowers the cost of vojce. 7 At the 
same time, the concentration of administrative power at the 
regional lev means that successful attempts to influence 
the regional authority will make real differences to the 
allocation ani use of medical resources. Thus setting up 
regional au thori ties should wor.!:\: to encourage voic e by 
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making it both easier and more effective. 
But whose voice? Without knowing more about the 
details of the authorities' structure, still less its 
actual operation, only best guesses can be made. Mine is 
that the voice elicited will come predominantly from those 
who have exited, of have ~ vested interest in others 
exi ting 6 Jrhus, the decisions made by the au thori ty will 
come to reflect the needs and wishes of those who have 
exited, even more closely than would deci ons made by a 
national government. 
This guess rests on two observations. The first is 
the fact, that, for any set of people, exit harves 
disproportionate numbers of those who both care most about 
the quality of medical care and have the most political 
resources. Or, to put it _another way, those people most 
likely to be concerned that a regional authority "properly1! 
allocate me cal resources, and most able to influence this 
allocation, are also those who have the least personal 
reason to care about some public sector services. If 
voice is made ea er and more effective by the settinG up 
of regional authorities, it is voice that will bA 
most enconra.c;pd, and, if ef ctive, their int8TG s that 
vd.ll prevail. 
mhe second observation rests on the central role 
doctors ay in any deci on about the provi on of IDpdical 
ca.re. Doc tors have good reason to care abou t w}lat decisl.ons 
are made; it is their incomes and conditions of work that 
are most affected by the outcomes. At the same time, the 
<liffidence most laymen· el in maki judgements about thp 
provi on of medical care, means that they rely ~eavily 01 
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"expert" opinion; at present it is usually doctors who advise 
and often decide about medical matters in New Zealand. 
Thus the profe on's power to influence the allocation of 
medical resources rests on a unique combination of interest 
and ascribed expertise. 
The lobbying of the Medical Association of New Zealanrl 
makes it clear that the majority of doctors favour the 
expansion of the private sector and are not overly concerre~ 
with the consequences for the public secto~. Defence of 
public sector interests rests explicitly with the Minister 
of ~ealth and his Department, riot with the medical profes on 
as a whole. In the present context administrative 
decentralisation, as in the creation of regional authorities, 
is likely to further strengthen the hand of those favourable 
to private sector expansion (i.e. M.A.N.Z.) at the expense 
of those defending the public sector. 
Decentralisation makes effective voice at the local 
level much easier for doctors as well as others. At the 
same time, it results in the fragmentation of Health 
Department expertise which, at present, acts as an important 
counterweight to the profession's considered jUdgements. 
As well, increasing the number of decisions ta~en at the 
local rather than the national level, makes it e er for 
an intense minority (which doctors in this situation 
c ainly are) to "hamstring" decisions that run counter 
t t ' . . t t 26 o nelr ln eres s. 
Happily for the private sector, the interests of the 
medical professio~ and those who have exited, nicely 
coincide in defence of private .sector interests. 11hus 
those who are likely to feel least diffident about 
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challenging the profession's opions are also likely to be 
most in harmony with them. 
All of this is, of course, pure guess-wo • How'ever, 
its pIau lity suggests that the introduction of regional 
authori es may, in the present context, lead to 
consequences which are cl not desired by the" Minister 
of He th~ particular, strengthening voice may lead to 
decisions which hasten rather than slow public sector 
deterio on. 
So far I have concentrated almost en rely on the 
possi ty of consumer voice defending t public sector 
t deterioration. t other voices may perform the 
same function. In education, for example, employees) 
ass ons, the New Zealand Educational Institute end 
the st Primary Teac rs Association, have been in the 
forefront of attempts to win more resources from government •. 
well, they have fended public sector education tooth 
and 1 against pri e sector encroachment; slogans such 
as, "no state aid private sch II have long been. 
rallying cries teachers. Perhaps such voices may be 
heard in defence of public sector medical mre as 
;I'he two most obviou s sources are doctors and nurses. 
t the interes of doctors, in ral favour the 
expansion of the private sector, as I have shown. The 
offici~l voice of the medical pro on has never been 
used in defence of public over against private sector 
interests. I dual doctors are of course another 
matter. Some of them clea~ly stand to gain nothing from 
pri vate sec expansion (for example those in 1 r" 
specialties those employ Medical Schools; these 
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two categories often overlap) and some are less enamoured 
than others of the vTIXues of the free market distribu on 
of medical care. Nevertheless, individual doctors have 
not generally been a source of voice; the ogan "no stab::· 
aid to the private sector" apparently stirs only private 
sector fenders among the medical profession. 
~\urses consti tu te a second. possible, non-consumer 
source of voice, in the defence of the public sector. Such 
voice is not without precedent. I have already shown how 
the use of,voice by psychiatric nurses encouraged the 
settine up of the Royal Commission on Hospital d ~~elated 
Services. As well, the position of nurses would appear 
to be more closely analogous to that of teachers than the 
position doctors appears to be. rses, like teachers, 
do not stand to gain anything from private sector expanston. 
But in fact, for whatever reason, nurses have not used their 
voices in defence of the public sector. Nor do they seem 
likely to. 27 
now it should be obvious why the issue of 
voice has been the crucial focus of the study. If 
fail to fend the public sector against private sector 
encroachment; if fail to press for the remedyin~ 
of public sector defects, then no one else will. But even 
if institutional changes (such as the introduction of 
regional au thori ties) make voice 'easier and more effec ti ve, 
the prospects for consumer voice, seeking to defend and 
improve the public sector, rem n poor. 
First, however much easier and more effective voice 
may become, it will still lack the immediate, 
effectiveness that exit now provides. It is probable t t 
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for as long as exit is available in its present form, 
attempts to encourage voice will make little fference to 
the choices consumers make between the two options. 
Second, in the present context, making voice easier 
may most encourage the voices of those who have already 
e ted, or, as in the case of doctora, who bene t by 
exit. Their use of voice unlikely to have the overall 
defence and improvement of the public sector as its first 
objective. Instead, voice wi most likely be used to win 
increasing protection for, and subsidy of, the. private 
sector services those who exit use, as well as ensuring 
generous public sector provi on for those services not 
provided for by the private sector. Thus, arrangements 
that make voice eaSel' and more effective may, in fact, 
encourage further exit by depressing public sector 
. -
performance in all of those areas where it competes with 
the private sector. 
Overall, the chances that exit will be halted by a 
change in its cost/effectiveness relative to voice seem slim. 
-
Heavy increases in the cost of t are unlikely; if 
increases should occur few of those who have ted, or 
plan exit will be scouraged. At the same time, even if 
institutional changes should make voice easier and more 
effective, consumers are still likely to prefer e t to 
voice. Such changes, far from diminiSling exit, mey instead 
lead to decisions that hasten public sector deterioration. 
Finally, if consumers fail to use voice to defend and improve 
the pu ic sector, no one else seems likely to. 
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SuMMARY. 
If t continues, our present arrangements for the 
distribution of medical care will be quietly revolutionised; 
medi care will be increasingly distributed on the basis 
of ability to pay, rather than need. That exit will, in 
t, continue seems likely; neither present attempts to 
close the quality gap between the private and public 
sectors, nor institutional innovations that make voice 
er and more effec ve seem likely to diminish it. 
Thus,-unless some new factor intervenes,the le 
providinG for the welfare state distribution of medical 
care is, facto, being repealed. In the present 
circumstarices repeal raises no great clamour; the passi 
of a key welfare state provi on is marked only by the 
voices of some few i ogues. 
WILL ANYONE CARE? 
tion 
At present, the accumulation of indi dual, unco-
ordinated decisions to exit is bringing about a qualitative 
change in the provi on of me cal care. This fact does 
not mean that those who have or will exit efer the 
replacement of the welfare state by the market distribu on 
of medic care. ead the very oppo te may be true; 
everyone who exits may prefer a properly nctioning welfare 
state tern to a market system, yet paradoxically they 
choose the crti.on 'Nhich leads to the resti tutior: of the 
:narket. can this be? 
The answer was au ted in a slightly fferent 
context in the first chapter. I showed that even if 
consumers knew the consequences of e t for the public 
sector and believed these consequences to be undesirable, 
they are still lnely to exit. 
Thus, if I ~ecide not to exit, I forgo the benefits 
of private sector. At the same time my deci not 
to exit, even if I voice, is unlikely to make any di erence 
to public sector performance. The public sector collapses, 
if it does, not because of my decision, but because many 
people cide to e t and nlany people decide not to VOiCE. 
Thus, if I stay and everyone exits, the public 
sector will s collapse. Alternatively, if everyone 
else and I leave, th~ public sector improves, a fact 
from which I benefi t, as much 8.8 those '/[ho stayed. 'rhu [;, 
the decision not to exit means that I foreo the enjoyment 
of private sector care, but still contribute unappreciably 
to the improv6[,lent of the public sector. ause the 10 c 
the same for each other consumer, my best st!ategy is 
always to exit, even althou 
welfare state and the market 
care, I pre the lat r. 
given the choice .between the 
tribution of medical 
This ~enewed excursion into the logic of the commons' 
dilemma immediately raises an empirical question of crucial 
importaQce: how many New Zealanders, in fact, desire 
replacement of the welfare state provision of me cal care by 
a market stem? Knowine that exit and a preference for 
non-market arrangeme can logic "hang together", raises 
the possibility that the sent revolution in the provi on 
of medic 
The 
care may be de d by few, arm, 
dence lable is omplete. 
New anders. 
No nCl.tional 
referenda have been held on the question, no ections 
have been foueht over it (at least since 1938, n the 
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proponents of the market solution were decisively defeated), 
nor, to my knowledge, have any surveys been conducted 
locally or nationally to ·sample public opinion on the issue. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that some people will be 
unhappy with the change. rst, and most obviously, all 
of those people who will directly suffer from the free 
operation of the inverse law of medic care, (lithe 
availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely 
with the need for it in the population served'~ i.e. the 
poor, old and chronically sick. 28 The increasing encroachment 
of the market means that those groups of people (about 20% 
or more of the population) needing medical care the most, 
will tend to get the least and worst available. They 
clearly will not be happy with an institutional change 
which dramatically compounds their present disadvantage. 
well, for one-reason or another, a great many New 
Zealanders care about what _happens to others worse off than 
themselves. Although equality, in the sense of giving every-
one a "fair go", is not formally enshrined in a constitution., 
it remains-a powerful community sentiment. The active 
component of the New Zealand egalitarian ideal, is the 
widespread belief that, whether or not Jack is as good as 
his master, he is at least entitled to decent housing, 
decent education, decent medic services and a decent 
income. rrhus, unhappiness abou t the inequitable distribution 
of medical care through the market will not be confined to 
those who directly suffer from it. 
More evidence is provided by a survey of public 
attitu s toward the provision of me cal care conducted 
by xon and his associates in Dunedin and Auckmd. 29 
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(Although only a partial analysis of the Dunedin reDults 
has been reported so far, the Auckland results are 
apparently very similar).30 Their questions did not bear 
directly on the issue of market versus non-marh:et arranG'elneJ;.ts 
for the provision of medical care. Nevertheless they 
asked a number of questions of interest in the present 
context: first, whether those interviewed favoured 
private [walth insurance: 10;(, did, 79;~ did not and 11;'j n!!:'1':e 
no comment. ,Second, about the degree oJ satisfactj_cr; w:tt~! 
public hospital care: 53% reported complete satisfaction, 
20: that they were well satisfied, 11% that they were fajrly 
satisfied, Lt. that they were a little dissatisfied and 
1.0~ that they were most dissatisfied (5.5~ no comment). 
Third, the results of two questions dealin~ wtth where 
fhe respondents would like to be treated if they needed 
an operation for varicose veins or had a child with acute 
appendicitis are reported; for varicose veins 69% reported 
that they preferred public hospital treatment i 18% private 
and 12;; had no preference: for appendicitis, 83% preferreri 
31 public, 7~ private and 10% made no comment. 
The question on medical insurance comes closest to 
asking people whether or not tiwy favour mad;:et encroe.c 
ment in the provj,sion of medical care; quite clearly the 
overwhelming majority of those who have an opinion do not. 
well, the questions dealing with pUblic/private 
preference again show a widespread preference for public 
sector care; even for varicose vein operations which Dixon 
thought, 
should ve those wanting their tea on a silver 
tray a good opportunity for expressing their 
belief in this type of service~32 
Thus, even if the bulk of New Zealanders cared not at 
all about those the markt fails to provide for, these 
results suggest that they would prefer non-market to 
market arrangements. 
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Experience from other countries sugges . that 
familiarity with the market is unlikely to increase public 
affection for it. For example, the huge and increasing 
volume of tigation over medical care in the United States 
(usually argued to be the pre-eminent example·of free 
market medical care) suggests a high level of consumer 
dissatisfaction. Similarly, legislation planned, and 
in some cases already passed by Congress, se to t 
and fwmetimes supplant existing marh:et arrangements, 
apparently in respon~e to wi spread consumer dissatisfaction. 
And of course it was New Zealanders own dj.rect expe ence 
of the working of market arrangements that led to the 
existing welfare state legislation. Thus, ople not now 
persuaded of the virtues of market distribution of medical 
care, are unlikely to change their minds after experience 
of its ration. 
Finally, there is the key fact that no New Zealand 
political ~arty has gone to the ectorate pledged to 
dismantle, piece by ece, the welfare state provision of 
medical care. Despite government subsidY of the private 
sector (which has in fact worked to undermine the publ 
sector), the e of market vers U;l non-market provision 
of care has been dead since at least the 1940's. 
Clearly no politic party has felt that public advocacy of 
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a return to free market arrangements would win them votes. 
Thu~ the available evidence suggests that the ereat 
majority of· New Zealanders do not desire the replacement of 
the welfare state provision of medi care by a market 
system. Instead, if it was in their power to bring it about, 
they would choose an efficiently operating public sector, 
of ng high quality care without waiting Ii s. Lackin[.~ 
such power they continue to exit. 
It is now apparent that we are, all of us, locked 
into a tragedy: 
of the 
the essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. 
It re des in the solemnity of the remorseless 
\'lorking of things .". This inevitableness of 
destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human 
life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. 
For it is only by them that the futility of escape 
can be made dent in the drama.35 
':(lhe see of the pre tragedy lie in the decision 
stLabour government to allow the private 
sector to ~ontinue and to subsidise its operation. As lone 
as the private sector existed, di sfaction with pu 
sector services and the logic of incremental dec on-
nc led Labour and National governments to encourage 
exj.t; from the early fif es the private sec began to 
flouri Finally, the introduction continuing success 
of medic insurance, raised the real pos bility that 
almost 211 of us could t. Paradoxically, preservation 
of II erJ.orn of choice l1 in tal care impells ~s to ac 
wnose collac ti ve ou tcome fe\'l of us would. choose. 
In the world, scripts are always ally 
lihbed. T}1U:3, spelling out the nature of the 
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actions bring about, is not necessarily a cruel intellectu 
affectation, addinG foreknowledge to inevitability. Instf'gri 
it raises the possibility that men can and will act 
collectively to avoid outcomes that none of them desire. 
Knowlaige provides both a reason to search for social 
innovations promising solutions and a reason for their 
acceptance. 
Already it is clear that any successful solution to 
the problem posed by the dissolution of welfare state 
medical care will have two characteristics; first it will 
be a collective solution, collectively decided and 
collectively imposed. If individu ac ons, spurred by en 
inch vidual calculus of value, result in tragedy, only 
all of us agre ng to de st from the ac on will prevent it. 
Because a solution requires the co-ordination of the actions 
. of all New Zealanders, only the national government can 
arrange its implementation. 
corrd, the solution chosen will have to promise 
that the public sector will, in fact, operate efficiently, 
offering hi5_h quality medical care without waitins lists. 
Otherwise it will be politically untenable, raising the 
outrage of those increasing numbers of people whose 
sac fice of present privileges it demands. 
WHAT KIND OF SOLUTIOK? 
By now the answer to the ques on, ":ihat kind of 
solution? II, should be fairly obvious. Exit spells the 
ruin of the public sector. Eventually it drains the public 
sector of its resources of finance personnel; in the 
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meantime it ensures that public sector resources remain 
inadequate, mi located, and inefficiently used. Attempts 
to prop up the public sector without halting exit are, I 
have argued, doomed to failure; either they make little 
or no difference or they work to make things worse. 
At the same time, it is clear that attempts to halt 
t without changing the context in which it occurs will 
prove equally fruitless~ For example, the use of policies 
that dramatically increase the cost of exit by removing 
private sector subsidies, taxing medical insurance 
organisations, or by other means, is unlikely to benefit t 
public sector. Those newly denied the privil s exi t 
brought them will be outraged. Their likely resort to 
voice will be aimed, not at improving the publ sector, 
but at the much er task of re-instituting thei~ access 
to the private sector benefits they- previously enjoyed .. 
They will be supported, obviously, by the medical 
insu~ance orgahisations Bnd the bulk of the medical 
pro on" They also be supported by the plain lo~ic 
of the tu~tion; denying a substantial number of people 
exit, the absence of other changes, will result in the 
further overloading of public sector facilities. At the 
same time, private sector facilities, from whose efficient 
use the whole community could bene t, vd.ll be inc,reasingly 
under-uti edo No government is likely to r;ursue such a 
policy. 
to hal t e xi t , ther by Incremental changes which se 
bolstering the public sector, or by extt more 
difficult, will provide no one with an efficient blic 
sector of high quality care without waiting ts. 
Halting public sector decay requires a single, simple, 
poli~y innovation that makes a qualitative change in· 
arrangements for the provis~on of hospital care: the 
introduction of a "responsive" public sector monopoly. 
WHY MONOPOLY? 
Three questions immediately arise: why monopoly, 
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what kind of monopoly, and how can monopoly be responsive? 
The answer to the first is straight~forward. The creation 
of a public sector monopoly in hospital care bu ds 
voice and prevents the loss of personnel and finance. For 
consumers anxious to "do something" about the care they 
receive, the absence of a private sector means ther that 
they voice or remain passive; the t option disappears. 
,similarly doctors sink or swim with the public sector. 
ther they remain pa,ssi ve, or they channel their considel'(l.ble 
voice, energy and, most important, expertise, into get tine. 
more of what they want from the public sector. 
Thus creating a public sector monopoly sets up t 
possibility thG.t thines going wrong in the public cector 
will trie[er off a process that lea 
than, the exit process, their further exacerhation. 
in (loctors I voice is of cruci importance in thi~ 
process; unlike consumers, doctors are in constant contact 
with the institutions responsible for ~e cal care; they 
deal of expertise with 1;'!hich to jw1.Ce what 
,soine; on; and because thejr livelihood and professional 
l· ~, ., 
responsibility is at stake, they have the most pressing reasons 
to voice. Usually the terests of doctors coinci 
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with those of quality conscious consumers, especially given 
the concept of professional responsibility that is likely 
to arise in the absence of a private sector. Thus, just 
as the burden of monitoring educational developments is 
borne largely by teachers' brganisations, so doctors are 
likely to alert quality conscious consumers to unsatisfactory 
occurrences in the public sector. The case for public sector 
monopoly rests threfore ,. on the fact that monopoly 
arrangements guarantee the two minimal requirements of 
an efficient, high quality, public sector: that public 
sector resources remain.intact and that errors in public 
sector operation lead to processes likely to bring about 
their correction. 
~mAT KIND OF IvIONOPOLY? 
The second question is, what kind of monopoly? My 
proposal is that the public sector be extended (minimally) 
to include all those private hospitals providing medical 
and surgic· ds. Thus all New Zealanders requiring medical 
care have equal access to all of the community's available 
hospital beds" 
This ension does not involve any change in the 
ownership or ~dministration of private hospitals; instead. 
the public E,ec tor undertakes to pay the full amount ·of 
private hospital patients'fees; at the same time, private 
hospitals give up the right to, themselves, recruit patients. 
The resulting variety in styles of managing and owning 
the public sector now becomes part of a care~lly controlled 
experiment aimed at testing the most efficient and medically 
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satisfactory way of arranging hospital administration. Is 
it better to centre administration on larger units or on 
smaller ones and so on? The best practices should obviously 
be extended throughout the public sector. 
As well no change is made in the present arrangements 
for providing medi.cal services, except that the public 
sector now pays the bill. Patients still make their own 
arrangements with doctors of their choice, and doctors still 
receive the same fees in the same circumstances as formerly. 
Again the practice becomes part of an experiment whereby 
different ways of arranging doctor payments and the 
doctor-patient relationship are compared. If the private 
sector practice results in large savings in the number 
of days patients spend in hospital (as it appears to) and/or 
a large increase in the satisfaction of both consumers 
doctors (as it ~pp~ars to)Jthen the scheme should obviously 
be extended right. throu-gh the public sec tor" 
The benefits, both in the short and the long term, 
of this kind of public sector monopoly are obvious. In 
the short terril, all New Zealanders gain access to the 
extremely efficient and still under-utilised beds provided 
in what is, at present, the private sector. At the same 
time a major source of organisational IIs l ack" in the publlc 
sec tor, the pUblic-private split, is elir'linated by simple 
fiat; public sector efficiency should soon approach present 
private sector levels. Waiting lists should show real 
decline within a very short period of time. In the long 
term, building in voice and experimentation with different 
methods of providing hospital services should lead to a 
110spital systeo increasinely satisfactory to doctors, 
223 
administrators and patients. 
But these are collective benefits accruine equally to 
all New Zealanders. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the 
political feasibility of proposals is determined not by the 
collective benefits they provide, but by the s ective costs 
and benefi accruing to interested groups. The first 
such croup are those who own and administer private hospit21s, 
either for profit, or as a community c ty. Those who 
provide hospital care for pro t shoul'd, accordine; to the 
ethics of the market ace, be quiteindif rent to the 
move, .'30 Ion:::; as they can be sure ths.t their inc on:e w:Lll lJ(}t 
6imini,sh in future. That s not difficult to arrange, Those 
providing private hospitals as a charitable endeavour should 
posi ti v,:::ly orne the move; now their c ty can be 
ext d to' those who need it, as well as those who CRn 
afford Thus pleasing private ho tal o'.vners ;sJ1ol11eJ l;p 
The second interested group are doctors. The propos 
does not olve any immediate change in the way they orcanise 
their medic practice, nor in their reI onship with 
clients, save that in the "priVate" sector, .the ultimate 
smrce of omes the state. However, it is conSUGer 
choice that s 11 decides alloc on of fees bet~een 
doctors. Thus, the ~stem would work just as pres 
medical insurance arrangements do, except ,that the state wou16 
meet all of the patients I medical costs, rather than ju a 
percenta~e of them. 
arrangements involvin~ essentially 
"no chance II for doc tors should not antagoni.<:'8 the lneciic 
prafes on. ITowever, doctors are likely to have quite 
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legitimate fears about the future consequences of public 
sec tor monopoly; any feasible proposal for change must inclurle 
provisions for allaying their anxiety. Minimally, doctors 
must be able to expect that the arraneements for making 
monopoly "responsive" will grant them a powerful voice 
any future decisions about the provision of -medic care. 
As well some other provisions, for example, a guarantee 
that fees will ke pace with in,flation, may be needed to 
win doctors' acquiescence. Nevertheless the task does not 
seem too difficult. 
The third erested group are consumers. Consumers 
are of two kinds; those who would normally escape public 
sec tor l,vai tine sts by going to a private hospital and 
those who would normally wait. The latter group, which 
still comprises the great majority of New Zealanders, should 
-
welcome the proposal enthusiastically; the benefi of 
better public sector performance accrue directly to them.-
The reactions of the former group, those who at present 
are users or tential users of private hospital facilities, 
are likely to be ambivalent. Under the present proposal 
they will rean, I imagine for eood, their present right 
to choose which hospital they go to and who their doctor 
Vlill be.. Thus the principal of, "freedom of choice", will 
not be impinged on.. As well, most of them are likely to 
vlelcome a thorough going improvement in public sector 
performance .. 
On the other hand, if some waiting lists remain, 
·despite public sector improvement, priVate hospital users 
may object to Ising their previous right to buy in at the 
t of the list.. I suspect that such objections wi not 
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win a sympathetic audience; the defence of nalwd market 
privilege sounds much less attractive than the present 
defence based on· the principle of, "freedom of choice". rrhuG 
I expect that the overwhelming majority of consumers will 
welcome the proposal; including many of those who noV! have, 
or plan to take out, medic insurance. 
The last interested group are the employees of medical 
insurance organisations. Seeing that the proposal's 
adoption means tha-end of their livelihood, it is dif cult 
to imagine how they could be pleased with it •. However, 
there is every reason to minimise the personal costs 
involved; employees should be ven help in finding new 
jobs and compen~ated generously for any loss of income that 
they should suffer. The assets of the organisations can 
easily be returned to the policy holders who provided them. 
~verall, the proposal is likely to be generally 
acceptablB to all of the groups affected, except, of course, 
those who work for medical insurance organisations. However, 
one possible further bar to its adoption is cost. How much 
is such a ~roposal likely to cost tax payers? 
The answer appears to be not very much more, if any 
more than at present. The state, quite apart from other 
subsidies to the private sector, currently provides between 
40/& and of the jncome of private me cal and Burgic 
hospitals the form of patient benefits: for the year 
endins 51 ~arch ~972) patient benefits amounted to S2,814,000 
or 43,;u of the total income of these hospitals. 36 For an 
ad~i anal 33,747,000 (approximatelY 1~ of the location 
to ho tal boards for 1973-74 and c derably less than 
Ilion that hospital boards were unable to spend 
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from their allocation for 1972-73) the state could have 
provided the entire income of all the country's private 
medical and surgical hospitals in 1972. Such a reform is 
unlikely to burden the tax-payer. 
But this leaves doctors' fees unpaid. It is impo ble 
to estimate exactly how much such fees will amount to: 
assuming that the average operation in a private hospital 
costs $200 in doctors' fees, then the total for 1972-73 
amounted to about $10.3 million (or about 4% of the 1973-4 
allocation to hospital boards).37 
Against this relatively small amount must be set 
the gains expected in public sector efficiency in the 
absence ot a private sector; in particular government dollars 
spent in future to repair public sector defect.s can be 
expected to provide a maximum return. However, even if the 
amount required was large and no great increase in 
efficiency could be expected, it is still unlikely that" the 
proposal Would be barred because of its Gost; the ~ontinuj"ng 
exponential growth in the medically insured suggests that 
a large number of New Zealanders are prepared to pay more, 
if they are guaranteed prompt, high quality hospi 
treatment. 
Overall the proposal should result in immediate 
collective benefits accruing, at little or no cost, to the 
whole community. It is flexible enough to accomodate the 
requirements of all of those groups who might be able to 
veto its adoption, and is likely to be welcomed by the 
overwhelming majority of medical care ansumers. 
HOW CAN NONOPOLY BE HADE RESPONSIVE? 
The last question is how monopoly can be made 
responsive; in other words how to arrange public sector 
services so that they provide the maximum consumer 
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satisfaction at the minimum cost. The answer is essentially 
pragmatic: the best arrangement is the one that works the 
best (by their fruits, you shall know them). Because any 
set of arrangements aimed at encouraging efficiency tends 
to lose itJ? "bite" over time, no formula likely to provide 
a permanent solution to the problem. 38 Ny concern here is 
not to spell out what kinds of arrangements should be made, 
but to outline how the concepts of exit and voice can 
suggest some ways of approaching the problem. 39 
A major sub-plot in the present drama has been the 
ar5ument that the appearance of voice in the public sector 
will work to get things "fixed up".. Creating a public sector 
monopoly has the effect of locldng in the potential agents 
of vOice; the remaining problem is how to encourage its 
use and make it more effective. I have argued that political 
and administrative decentralisation, as implied in the 
idea of regional medical authorities) is a key mechanism 
for promoting voice. Administrative decentralisation opens 
up the possibility of adapting services to local needs; 
political decentralisation opens up the possibility of 
local groups making considerable differences to local 
services throu the use of voice. At the same time, the 
introduction of real political accountability of the members 
of regional authorities to the wards they represent, 
encourages members to solicit and listen to their constituents' 
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voices .. 
A'second, parallel mechanism for encouraging voice, 
the introduction of a regional medical ombudsman, 
whose task it would be to investigate the complaints of 
individuals about poor medical service. But, whatever 
arrangements are decided on,monopoly can be made more 
responsive by strengthening voice. 
Voice remains the only mechanism available to ensure 
that medical care gets its share of resources, "vis a vis, 
other community needs; it is also the mechanism likely to 
be used most in determining the allocation of avilable 
resource~ within the different sectors of the medical care 
em.. However, it remains a messy way for cmsumer[3 and 
others to get what they want; it requires those concerned 
to pay close attention to the service they receive, and 
o en requires conside~able co-ordination of effort if it 
is to work. It seems least useful dealing with situa ons 
like the following: first, the need of individual consumers 
to make some immediate difference to the service they 
personally are receiving; second, the collective need of 
tax-payers to ensure the most efficient day to day use of 
the resources alloc ed to each sector of the me cal care 
sy em. 
re the introduction of market mechanisms" (including 
exit in new guise) can be used to supplement voice, and further 
increase the responsiveness of monopoly. Two examples of 
such arrangements are the introduc on of consumer vouchers 
for the payment of doctors and the use of "performance!! 
contracts. Writing about public schools, Nilton Friedman 
has ed that their sloppy performance is hroucht out by 
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the difficulty consumers have in rewarding them for good 
performance and punishing them for bad" He suggests that 
if consumers were issued with vouchers redeemable for 
education at any school, and that schools depended on 
these vouchers for funding, then competition between schools 
for custom would ensure the 40 t use of available resources. 
A similar arrangement could be made with regard to the 
employment of doctor~ by patients; if the choices patients 
make determine doctors' incomes, doctors may best cater 
for patients I needs. 
Another kind of market arrangement, this time aimed 
at bringing about administrative efficienc~ is the 
introduction of performance contracts. Here an admini r 
undertakes to pro vi a service of a specified quality 
wi thin specified co ts; his success earns him bon'H>Os 
while failure Ie the diminishment of his salary.41 
Thus consumers are not dependent on voice alone for 
monopoly responsive. 
Voice and t provide two basic mechanisms 
bringing ssure for improvement to bear on those 
responsible for public sector service. They can be combined 
in a variety of ways by the use of different tu onal 
arrangements; exactly what arraneements are used to make 
monopoly re ve will depend on the results of pragmatic 
experimentation. 
CONCLUSION. 
r by tracing the consequences for the welfare 
state provi on of medical care of the introduction of 
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medical insurance. The key conclusions that I reached 
were first, that medical insurance was bringing about the 
de facto repeal of welfare state arrangements and second, 
that t.his OUTcome wa~ desired by few New Zealanders.. I 
then considered ways in which welfare state arrangements 
could be restored and improved, so as to reinstate the 
principle of~ "to each according to his needs", as the 
central rule for the distribution of medical care. However 
the major thrust of my analysis lies not with the specific 
solution suggested here, but in the argument that unless 
some such solution is soon adopted, a major human 
achievement, will be Hac dentlyH wiped out by the 
exigencies of the market. 
NOTES. 
11 have no information on doctorsl incomes. However 
Southern Cross almo doubled their reserves for the 
financial year ending 31 December 1973, 
Southern Cross of course a non-profit making 
organisation in that there are no shareholders 
and members are the only beneficiaries. But 
we do have to ensure that there are adequate 
reserves available to maintain the strong 
foundation I have mentioned, and that is why 
the entire surplus on the year's operations, 
a;J1ounting to $239,525 has been added to the 
reserves which now to $545,240. 
(From the Report of the Chairman, Hr L.H.I. Wf:ltson, 
to the Annual General Heeting of the Southern Cross 
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Medical Society on April 8 1974. April 13, 
1974)@ As well I wrote to Sec es 0 the two 
major private hospitals in Christchurc,h, asking them 
(among other things), "Are your ties currently 
under pressure? Do you anticipate any major expansion 
in the next few years?lI. The one reply I got read: 
Yes. Daily bed occupancy 
level. In the not too dis 
hoped to provide additional 
- 30 geriatric patients. 
res are at a high 
future it is 
accomo on for 20 
2See for example, Raymond S. Duff and Augu B. Hollingshead, 
.sic~{ne!3s and Society (New York: r & Row, 1968); 
Alonzo S. Yerby, "Public l"Iedical Care for :0Teedy in tile 
uni ted ,states", in M. W. Susser and i,V. son eds., Sociol!)CY 
in Xedicine 2nd edition (London: Oxford Uni ty Press, 
1971 ); pp~j82-401; and David Hec c, 
and Health Care, particularly pp.80-101 • 
30 ;.:), 'Y .,tln ". 
service 
Anderson identifies two polar 
systems. In the first: 
All health services would be complet 
s of h th-
supported according to a graduated income tax so 
that the higher income families would more 
than the lower income families; he se~vices 
would be provided at no direct ,charge to anyone; 
I facilities would be ~ned by the government; 1 
health personnel would be salaried; and 1 curative 
and preventative services, including on, 
riodic physician examinations and so on would be 
lable. ' 
In the second, health services are: 
tely supported by p~i :r8,~e funds ~n open 
t •••••• All the facllltles, serVlces and-
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personnel are established on a profit basis for 
those who wish to invest in them. There are no 
gifts or subsidies. Service is "sold" only to those 
who can and wish to pay for it at the going rates. 
There is no free care. The government could 
conceivably purchase care for its wards on an open-
bid system. The hospitals need not be open all 
night or on weekends unless they consider it of 
competitive advantage to have a stand-by service 
like an all night filling station. Physicians 
can tailor their services to the market re~ardless 
of need or even type of disease that may be 
unprofitable to treat •. 
In New Zealand'we are moving from a system more like the 
first type to a system more like the second. Odin W. 
Anderson, "Health-Service Systems in the United States 
and other Countries - Critical Comparisons" in H.W. Susser 
and W. Watson, Sociology in Medicine, 2nd edition, 
pp.213-233~ 
4The Inverse Care Law was formulated by Julian Tudor Hart. 
It neatly summarises a large amount of data accumulated 
from societies ~ere medical care is distributed through 
the market (principally the United States) and where it 
is distributed through other mechanisms. Julian Tudor 
Hart, "The Inverse Care Law", Lancet. 
5From the "Report of the National Health Insurance 
Investigation Committee", 4 September·193'1, pp.l1-12. 
In W.B. Sutch, The Res onsible Societ in New Zealand 
(Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, 1971 p.51. 
6Those who have praised the market as a means of allocatins 
medical care have noted particularly its responsiveness 
to consumer demands; the New Zealand private sector is 
unlike)y to prove an exception. For example see, Ja.mes 
N. Buchanan, "The Inconsistencies of the National 
Health Service", in James M. Buchanan and Robert D. 
Tollison, eds., Theory of Public Choice (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1972) pp.27-95; Michael 
H. Cooper and Anthony J. Culyer, The Price of Blood; D. 
S. Lees, Health Through Choice. Already private hospitals 
have approached Southern Cross about financing expansion; 
so far Southern Crass has refused, arguing that the matter 
is a government responsibility. (See, Southern Cross, 
Submissions to the Board of Health Committees Inquiry; p.l0). 
However, in the absence of government assistance, it is 
likely that the medical insurance companies would give 
assistance to the private sector; their very existence 
depends on the continued satisfactory functionine of 
private hospitals. In this regard Southern Cross's 
rapidly mounting reserves are of special interest. 
7Unless no scarcity of resources existed; in this utopian 
situation, unlimited exit is perfectly compatible with 
hi5h quality public sector care. 
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8press Statement by the Minister of Health Hon. RaJ. 
Tizard, on Report on Private gospitals, 26/3/74 (mimeo.) 
p.l. Other, like statements, can be found in most of 
Mr Tizard's speeches. 
9Cf • Chapter 3 where I show the major reason for dissatisfaction 
with the public sector is the fact of having to wait. 
lOIn reply to a question in the House from Mr C.R. Marshall 
(Labour, Wanganui), the Minister of Health, Mr Tizard 
.stated, that he, 
'l'he 
11 The 
12The 
13The 
was aware of the conflict of interest where a 
consultant with a part-time appointment to a 
public hospital was also engaged in private 
practice, particularly where he had access to a 
private hospital. It was for this reason that the 
government committee on health recommended as part 
of the policy to reduce hospital waiting lists, 
that there should be full-time directors of surgery 
at hospitals with more than 250 beds and that no more 
part-time surgical appointments should be made to 
public hospitals. There was evidence from at least 
three areas - Wanganui, Auckland and Taranaki - to 
support M~ Latimer1s contention ~that-1 so long 
as consultants are employed in public hospitals on 
a part-time basis, they are unlikely to pursue 
policies in their 'salaried hospital role which could 
jeopodise that part of their living they derive from 
fees in private practice. 
Press, November 16, 1973. 
Otago Dail~ Times, April 26, 1973 .. 
Christchurch Star, April 27, 1974 .. 
Press, February 28, 1974. 
l4The only possible way would seem to be for the public 
sector to pay better than private sector salaries. 
However this is likely to be difficult. First, private 
sector work allows specialists heavy tax deductions; thus 
the salary paid by the public sector would have to be 
considerably higher than in the private sector, because of 
the difference in net income after tax. But even 80 the 
deal is likely to be unattractive. One of the principal 
attractions of the private sector is that doctors can 
raise fees as they wish; whereas government approval is 
required in the public sector. 
15Cf • the information given in Cha.pter 4, showing the loss 
of services that the public sector is currently experiencing, 
in areas where the most exit occurs. 
16Department of Health, "Projection of Medical Manpower 
17 
Needs to the Year 2000", (Department of Health 1973, 
mimeo ) .. 
'It is notoriously difficult to make predictions 
about medical manpower requirements. The main 
prognostic difficulties are: 
1.1 Changes in the level of demand for items of 
service by the public. 
1.2 Changes in the incidence of disease. 
1.3 New techniques and therapeutic methods. 
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1.4. Changes in the organisation of health services, 
e.g. the division of labour between the 
allied health professions. 
1.5 The economic situation. 
1.6 Changes in attitude to immigration and emigraU.on. 
1.7 Changes in teaching methods and a.ttitudes to 
post-graduate education. This affects the 
cnumber of medical teachers required as well as 
the produc ti ve time ·of those being taught. 
1 .8 Changes in at ti tude to the normal hOUl1S e,nd. 
conditions of. work, holidays, study leave and 
the like. 
1.9 Unreliability of popUlation projections. 
Against this background of uncertainty we must plan for 
the future. Ibid. 
181 have ignored the possibility of emigration; if New 
Zealand's most skilled doctors find it difficult t6 
find employment here, they are likely to leave the 
country long before the prospect of "swamping" occurs .. 
19The ~orld Health Organisation, World Health Statistics 
Annual 1969 (published 1973) gives the doctor to 
population ratio of the United States as 1 :650 (cf. 
Israel 1 :410, U.S.S .. R. 1 :430, Federe.l Hepublic of 
Germany 1 :590) and that of New Zealand as 1 :870. 
20D . - 'T h . 
. aVlci l'~ec al1lC, 
21 . From a report of the address given by Dr H.J.H. lliddlectone, 
to the Jv1edicc.1~ ntendents Associe. tion, Gisborne, 
March 7, 1~74. March 8, 1974. 
April 27, 197Lj .• 
23The Press~ March 8, 1974, and the Christchurch Star, 
April 27, 1974. 
24Cf . Report of the Chairman, Mr L.R.I. ~atson, to 
the Annual General Meeting of the Southern Cross Medic 
Care Society. 1974. 
25For a thouehtful account of Gome of the is~ueG involved 
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in decentralisation see A.A. Altshuler, Community Control 
(New York: Pegasus, 1970). 
26See J. Margolis, "Decentralisation and Urban Programs" 
in A.H. Pascal ed., Thinking About Cities (Belmont, 
Calif.: Dickenson, 1970). 
271 wrote to the New Zealand Nurses' Association askinG 
about the Association's policy toward the private sector. 
The National Secretary replied (letter dated, 24 December, 
1973) : 
1. The Nurses Association does not have a written 
policy but our National Executive would agree 
that persons should have the right to choose 
whether they wish to enter a Public Hospital 
or pay for the additional benefits to be receivert 
from Private Hospital Care. 
2. Again the Nurses Association does not have a 
written policy but generally it is not opposed 
to Private Medical Insurance Schemes. 
3. The Nurse,s Association would agree that both 
part-time and full-time hospital specialists 
be employed by Public Hospitals. 
28Julian T. Hart, "The Inverse Care Law". 
29C•W• Dixon, "Public-Attitudes Towards Medical Care in 
Dunedin", in J.S. Dodge ed., The Organisation and . 
Evaluation of Hedical Care (Dunedin: Dept., of Preventative 
and Social Medicine, University of Otago Medical School, 
1970). pp.73-84 0 
30Interview with ProfessorC.W. Dixon, Dunedin, 26 April, 
1973 ... 
31Ibid. 
33See for example, Richard H. Titmus, The Gift Relationship 
(London, George Allen & Unwin-Ltd, 1970). pp.158-172. 
7.[ \ 
J+S ee , for example, Theodore R. Marmor with Jan S. Marmor, 
The Politics of Medicare, Library of Social Policy and 
Ad~il1istration, (London: Routledee & Kegan Paul, 1970). 
35A•N• Whitehead, quoted in G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, p.l 11" 
36Reports by C.A. Blyth, New Zealand Private Hospital 
Association (Inc.), "Submissions to the Board of Health 
Committee on Private Hospitals, Part Three". p.28. 
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37The figure is arrived at by multiplying $200 by 52,000 
(approximately the number of surgical admissipns to 
private hospitals in 1972-73. See Table 38, Chapter 3.). 
38I-lirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, pp.120-126 .. 
39Cf • the excellent article by Dennis R. Young, "J.nsti tu tional 
Change and the Delivery of Urban Public Services", 
2, (1971), pp.425-438. 
40Milton Friedman, "The Bole of Government in-Education". 
4'Cf. the proposal for the reorganisation of the New 
Zealand Heqlth Services made by J .S. Werry.. See J .3. ';,'e 
"Time for a Change?lI New Zealand Hedical Journal, October 
10 (1973) pp.303-306" 
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APPENDIX 1: HOW THE SAMPLES WERE 
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DRAWING THE WAITING LIST BAMPLE, 11 and 12 JULY 1973. 
The Sampling Frame .. 
The Lindex file at Christchurch Hospi tal was, used as 
the sampling frame.. It lists the names of all those on the 
North Canterbury .hospi tal board waiting list except for 
gynaecological and plastic surgery cases whose names are 
held elsewhere .. 
Getting on the waiting list: Requests for patients to be 
put on the waiting list are received from 3 sources: 
a. Outpatient clinics 
be Consultants rooms 
c. General Practitioners (only in the case of patients 
requiring general surgery or treatment for varicose 
veins can G.P.'s put patients names directly on the 
waiting list; otherwise patients are given an 
appointment at the relevant outpatient clinic)3 
Patients are divided i~to urgent and general cases" 
Urgent cases (Hany patient requiring surgery within 4 
weeks" and similar medical cases) are "placed" immediately 
and given the earliest possible vacancy" They are not 
listed on the Lindex File. 
. Gener~l cases are sfibdivided into 4 groups and a 
different coloured Lindex strip typed for each: 
a.. routine cases 
be semi-urgent 
c.. urgent 
d. readmissions (Those who have been discharged 
from hospital within the last 18 months; readmissions 
are also classified as routine, semi-urgent and 
urgent, a note being added to the strip if they 
fall into the latter two categories). 
The strips are then placed in strict chronological order 
on the appropriate Lindex frame. The Lindex frames are 
sub-divided as follows: 
1. Vascular and arterial surgery 
2. General surgery (subdivided by surgeon concerned) 
3. Varicose veins (subdivided by male/female) 
4. Genito-urinary (subdivided by adUlts/children) 
5. Ophthalmic (subdivided by surgeon) 
6. Ear Nose and Throat (subdivided by male/female/ 
child and by surgeon. 
7.. Orthopaedic (subdivided by male/female/child and 
by surgeon) .. 
The sampling Method. 
I hoped to obtain 150 usable interviews. I drew a 
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sample of 200 names, deciding to err on the generous side 
because I expected: 
a. that some people would be too frail to be interviewed 
b. some people to have entered hospital before the 
interviewing was completed 
c. that the s~ling frame would be imperfect. 
I proceeded as follows: 
1. Using the June 30 Waiting List Report, I calculated 
the number of names held on the Lindex File by 
subtracting Gynaecological (461) and Plastic 
Surgery (174) cases from the case total (3,569) 
to give the llndex File total (Total A) of 2,934. 
2. I stratified the sample by specialty, calculating 
the number required in the sample for each 
specialty from the % of cases in Total A that each 
specialty represented.. Thus: 
i) Vascular and arterial surgery represented less 
than half of 1% and was not represented in the 
sample at all 
ii) General surgery represented 2% of Total A and 
thus 4 names in the sample 
iii)Varicose veins represented 28% of Total A and 
thus 56 names in the sample 
iv) Genito-urinary cases represented 3% of Total A 
and thus 6 names in the sample 
v) Ophthalmic represented 4% of Total A and thus 
8 names in the sample. 
vi) Ear nose and throat represented 44% of Total 
A and thus 88 names in the sample 
vii)Orthopaedic represented 19% of Total A 
and thus 38 names in the sample. 
3. By dividing Total A by the number of names in the 
sample (200) I calculated a sample interval of 
14. I then drew at random a number between 
0~and14(8) .. 
4. Using the Lindex frames of each specialty in turn, 
I recorded the 8th name and then every 14th name 
thereafter until I had the required number of 
names from that specialty. 
Points to note .. 
1. Where the person sampled did not have a Christchurch 
address I then took the name of the first person 
after him on the list who did have a Christchurch 
address .. 
2. A few people had specified that they wished to be 
admitted to hospital after July 1973. Because 
these people were not waiting at the time the 
sample was drawn, they were disregarded for sampling. 
On the three occasions when such a name was drawn 
the procedure outlined in 1. was followed. 
DRAWING THE SOUTHERN CROSS SAMPLE, 30 and 31 JULY 1973. 
At the time the sample was drawn, Southern Cross 
had transfered the names of all individual and some 
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group members (excluding company groups and some national 
. associations) to a computer file. The remaining names 
were stored in a card index system, filed by the name of 
the company or association concerned and then listed 
alphabetically within this classification. (Some companies 
were however fUrther subdivided by branch, and then the 
names arranged alphabetically within this classification). 
The Computer file. 
The computer file held 86,709 names (as of 31 May 1973). 
The estimated total membership was then 217,000: thus 
40% of the total membership was listed on the computer file. 
The number_sampled from the file was 'therefore 40% of the 
total sample number required (72). 
, Of the names on the f;Lle 11,220 are from Canterbury 
(excludes South Canterbury). Southern Cross uses 3.2 to 1 
as an estimate of the ratio of the number of insured per 
policy for the names on this file. Thus the estimated 
number of polic;x:.~holders from whom a sample of 72 names 
was to be drawn = 3,500. The sampling interval was then 
calculated by dividing 3,500 by 72 to give 48. I then 
took every 48th name until I reached the end of the file. 
,The Card Index file. 
Because policy holders are not listed on this file 
by locality ~ome difficulties arose •. I proceeded as 
follows: the person in charge of the card file index room 
made up a list of all those organisations and companies 
whose Canterbury membership he estimated (after inspection) 
to be more ~han 100, (listing all organisations with a 
Canterbury membership would have required searching every 
card on the file). These organisations were divided into 
the following groups: 
a. National organisations 
In this category the Southern Cross employee 
provided the national membership figures of the 
organisation concerned. These were divided by 8, 
and then by 3, in each case. Dividing by 8, 
provided an estimate of the total Canterbury 
membership of the group concerned. (The ratio of 
1 in 8 was taken from the percentage of Canterbury 
members on the computer file. The society's 
general manager, expected this ratio to provide an 
accurate estimate, because Canterbury is a 
"typical" area (i.e .. like Wellington and Auckland) 
in its membership distribution). The ratio of 
1 to 3 (cf. 1 to 3.2., the rule of thumb used for 
the computer file) is used bY,the society to, 
estimate the number of those lnsured per POllCY 
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for the card file index. On this basis a polic~ 
holders total was estimated as follows: 
Organisation 
P.S .. I .. S. 
N .. Z.E.I. 
N.Z .. I"E. 
Dental Assoc. 
Arch .. Assoc .. 
Police 
Ancient Foresters 
Total 
b. Canterbury Companies 
Estimated number of 
Canterbury policy holders 
500 
208 
113 
46 
38 
46 
~ 
The estimates p~ovided by the Southern Cross employee 
were divided by 3 to give the following: 
Company 
C.F"M" 
Int .. Harv .. 
Firestone 
A .. H .. I .. 
Ballins 
Ballantynes 
Blackwell M ..
Cant .. Sub Contract 
Borthwicks· 
Cant. Building Soc .. 
Chemist Guild 
D.I .. C. 
G.U .. S .. 
Insure Instit .. 
Mosgiel Kaiapoi 
N.Z. Refrig. 
P.D.L. 
P .. G.G .. 
SoI.M.U. 
Press' 
C.F.C .. A .. 
Christ College 
Farmers Gr. Disc .. 
M.A.N .. Z. 
Hamilton Perry 
Haywrights 
Lichfield 
Millers 
NeZ. Farmers Co-op .. 
Total 
c" National companies. 
Estimated number of Canterbl 
E'Olicy holders 
367 
100 
167 
233 
333 
100 
85 
133 
17 
40 
100 
83 
40 
67 
133 
117 
67 
900 
83 
67 
83 
50 
600 
133 
100 
100 
50 
50 
100 
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Southern Cross provided estimates of the total 
Canterbury membership for each company which 
were then divided by 3 to estimate the number 
of policy holders .. 
Company 
U.E.B. 
NeZ. News 
Whitcon1:es 
Gen .. Foods 
Est. Total 
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Estimated number of 
Canterbury policy holders 
100 
100 
67 
100 
M 
The estimated total number of Canterbury policy holders 
from the companies selected from the card index was thus 
estimated to be 5,852. Of this total I estimated, 
a. National Organisations to account for 17% 
b.. Canterbury Companies .to account for 77% 
c. National Companies to account for 6%. 
Hence of the portion of the sample (108 names) to be 
selected from the card index: 
a. 18 to be drawn from the National Organisations cards 
b.. 83 to be drawn from the Canterbury Companies cards 
c. 7 to be drawn from the National Companies cards. 
A sampling interval was calculated of 1 :54. I then 
proceeded to draw every 54th Canterbury name from each of 
the groups in turn.. If the 54th name was not a Christchurch 
city address (e.g. Belfast) I took the next name back (53, 
52, etc) until I found a Christchurch city address" This 
procedure yielded the following: 
a. for National Organisations 16 names were drafn 
b. for Canterbury Companies 43 names were drawn 
c" for National Companies 8 names were drawn •. 
By multiplying the number of names drawn by the 
sampling interval I then accurately estimated the total 
Canterbury policy holders in each group as follows: 
ae National Organisations ::: 864 
b .. Canterbury Companies ::: 2322 
c .. National Companies ::: 432 
d .. total l1li. 3618 .. 
Hence the numbers required from each group can now 
be accurately calculated to be: 
a .. National Organisations ::: 24% ::: 26 
b .. Canterbury Companies ::: 64% ::: 69 
c" National Companies ::: 12% ::: 13. 
To make up the required number from National Organisations 
the first Christchurch name in each organisation was taken 
and in the case of the 3 largest organisation, the second 
Christchurch name as well .. 
To make up the reqUired number from Canterbury Companies 
the first name in each company group was taken (excluding 
~ichfield and Millers; see note) 
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To make up the required number from National Companies 
the first Christchurch name in each 'company group was 
taken and the second name also taken in the case of U.E.B. 
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NOTES. 
lLichfield names could not be included as they had not yet 
been entered on the card index. Millers cards did not have 
Christchurch home addresses. The one Millers card that 
was drawn was (following my standard procedure) traced back 
to a Christchurch home actress card. 
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES, INSTRUCTIONS TO 
INTERVIEWERS AND LE1:TER SENX TO j;HOSE 
Th'TERVIEWED" 
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EVERYONE IS CONCERNED ABOUT GOOD MEDICAL CARE. WE WANT TO FIND OUT 
WHAT PEOPLE THINK ABOUT THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND WOULD LIKE YOUR HELP. 
THIS IS A SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE AND WILL NOT TAKE VERY LONG. 
1a. FIRST ...• ARE YOU (IS YOUR CHILD) PRESENTLY ON A PUBLIC HOSPITAL 
WAITING LIST? 
yes no 
1b. HOW. SOON WOULD YOU LIKE (YOUR CHILD) TO GO TO HOSPITAL? 
1c. HOW LONG HAVE YOU (YOUR CHILD) BEEN ON THE WAITING LIST 
FOR? (YEARS AND MONTHS) 
1d. HOW MUCH LONGER DO YOU THINK IT WILL BE? 
(YEARS AND MONTHS) 
2a. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS WAIT? ARE YOU FULLY SATISFIED, REASONABLY 
SATISFIED, SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED, VERY DISSATISFIED OR DON'T YOU CARE? 
Fully Satisfied 
Reasonably Satisfied 
Somewhat Dissatisfied 
Very Dissatisfi~d 
Don't Care 
2b. WHY IS THIS? ____________________________________________ __ 
3a. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT PEOPLE LIKE yOU CAN DO TO INCREASE THE CHANCES 
THAT THEY GET INTO A PUBLIC HOSPITAL WHEN THEY WANT TO? 
yes no 
3b. (IF NO TO 3a.) WHY IS THAT? 
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3c. (IF YES 'ro 3a.) WHAT IS THAT? 
3d. (IF YES TO 3a.) HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF THESE THINGS OR DO YOU 
PLAN TO DO THEM? 
;---? Have done some of these things. 
(SPECIFY) 
Plan to do some of these things. 
(SPECIFY) 
Have done none and plan to do none. 
4. HAVE YOU OR ANYONE YOU KNOW WELL HAD ANY EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC OR 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS? 
Public only 
Private only 
Both 
5a. IN GENERAL DO YOU THINK THAT PUBLIC HOSPITALS PROVIDE BETTER CARE 
THAN PRIVATE HOSPITALS, PRIVATE HOSPITALS PROVIDE BETTER CARE 
THAN PUBLIC, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OR THAT IT DEPENDS? 
Public better than private 
Private better than public 
No difference 
It depends 
5b. WHY IS THAT? 
6a. IN GENERAL HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE STANDARD OF MEDICAL CARE IN 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS ONCE YOU GET INTO THEM? ARE YOU FULLX SATISFIED, 
REASONABLY SATISFIED, SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED, VERY DISSATISFIED, OR 
DON'T YOU CARE? 
~ Fully satisfied 
Reasonably sat fied 
Somewhat dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
~ Don't care 
6b. WHY IS THAT? 
7a. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT PEOPLE·LIKE YOU CAN DO TO IMPROVE THE STANDARD 
OF MEDICAL CARE IN PUBLIC HOSPITALS? 
yes no 
7b. (IF NO TO 7a.) WHY IS THAT? 
7c. (IF YES TO 7a;) WHAT IS THAT? 
7d. (IF YES TO 7a.) HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF THESE THINGS OR DO YOU PLAN 
TO DO ANY OF THEM? 
Have done some of these things 
(SPECIFY) 
Plan to do some of these things 
(SPECIFY) 
~ Have done none and plan to do none 
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8a. DO YOU INTEND GOING TO A PRIVATE HOSPITAL FOR THE TREATMENT OF YOUR 
(CHILD'S) PRESENT MEDICAL PROBLEM? 
yes no 
8b. WHY IS THAT? 
9a. DO YOU HAVE MEDICAL INSURANCE OR DO YOU PLAN TO TAKE IT OUT? 
No in~ur •• ce and no plans to take out 
No insurance but plans to take out 
Yes 
9b. WHY IS TKAT? 
10a. WOULD DOING ANY OF THE FOLLOWING THINGS MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE 
SERVICE YOU GET FROM PUBLIC HOSPITALS? COULD YOU TELL US IF YOU 
THINK IT WOULD MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE, SOME DIFFERENCE, NOT 
MUCH DIFFERENCE, NO DIFFERENCE AT ALL? (HAND CARD.) 
10b. COMPLAINING TO THE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT? 
~ Great deal of difference 
17 SORle difference 
/ 7 Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10c. WHY IS THAT? 
10d. COMPLAINING TO THE HOSPITAL BOARD? 
Great deal of difference 
SORle difference 
Net much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
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10e. WHY IS THAT? 
10f. COMPLAINING TO YOUR FAMILY DOCTOR? 
CJ Great deal of difference 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
/ 7 Don't know 
10,. WHY IS THAT? 
10h. COMPLAINING TO THE OMBUDSMAN? 
Great deal of difference 
SOlie difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10i. WHY IS THAT? 
10j. WORKING THROUGH AN ORGANIZATION (e.g. CHURCHES, UNIONS, 
PLUNKET ETC.) TO IMPROVE HOSPITAL SERVICES? 
Great deal of difference 
SOlle difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10k. WHY IS THAT? 
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101. WORKING THROUGH A POLITICAL PARTY TO IMPROVE HOSPITAL SERVICES? 
Great deal of difference' 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10m. WHY IS THAT? 
10n. DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES OR OTHER KINDS OF DIRECT ACTION? 
Great deal of difference 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
100. WHY IS 1~AT? 
10p. COMPLAINING TO THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT? 
Great deal of difference 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10q. WHY IS THAT? 
10r. COMPLAINING TO YOUR MP? 
Great deal of difference 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
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10s. WHY IS THAT? 
10t. COMPLAINING TO A CABINET MINISTER OR PRIME MINISTER? 
Great deal of difference 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10u. WHY IS THAT? 
10v. WRITING TO THE NEWSPAPERS? 
Great deal of difference 
Some difference 
Not much difference 
No difference at all 
Don't know 
10w. WHY IS THAT? 
11a. SUPPOSE THERE WAS NO WAITING LIST AND THAT THE STANDARD OF MEDICAL 
CARE AND THE COST WERE THE SAME, WOULD YOU PREFER TO BE IN A 
PRIVATE HOSPI~AL OR IN A PUBLIC HOSPITAL, YOU WOULDN'T MIND, OR IT 
. WOULD DEPEND? 
Private 
Public 
Wouldn I t mind 
It would depend 
11b. WHY IS THAT? 
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12. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME WAYS THAT PEOPLE CAN TRY AND INFLUENCE THINGS 
IN GENERAL (RATHER THAN JUST HOSPITAL MATTERS). HAVE YOU DONE ANY 
OF THE FOLLOWING THINGS IN THE LAST 2 OR 3 YEARS? 
12&. WRITTEN A LETTER TO A NEWSPAPER OR A MAGAZINE? 
17 no 
12b. (IF YES TO 12a.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12c. CONTACTED A LAWYER ABOUT SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes no 
12d. (IF YES TO 12c.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12e. CONTACTED YOUR M.P. ABOUT SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes no 
12f. (IF YES TO 12e.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12,. CONTACTED A CABINET MINISTER OR THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT 
SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes no 
12h. (IF YES TO 12G.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12i. HAVE YOU WORKED THROUGH ANY ORGANIZATION (FOR EXAMPLE,A 
CHURCH GROUP, A UNION,PLUNKET ETC;) TO ~RY AND INFLUENCE 
PUBLIC POLICY IN SOME AREA? 
yes no 
12j. (IF YES TO 12i.) CAN YOU PLEASE SPECIFY? 
12k. CONTACTED THE OMBUDSMAN ABOUT SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes no 
121. (IF YES TO 12k.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
------
12m. HAVE YOU TAKEN PART IN ANY DIRECT ACTION LIKE PROTESTS OR 
STRIKES? 
yes no 
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12n. (IF YES TO 12m~) CAN YOU PLEASE SPECIFY? 
13. DID YOU VOTE AT THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION? 
/ 7 yes 'no 
14. DID YOU GO TO ANY CAMPAIGN MEETINGS AT THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION? 
yes I 7 no 
15. DID YOU VOTE AT THE LAST LOCAL BODY ELECTIONS? 
yes no 
16a. ARE YOU A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY? 
yes no 
16b. (IF YES TO 16a.) WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS A VERY 
ACTIVE MEMBER, AN ACTIVE MEMBER, A FAIRLY INACTIVE MEMBER 
OR AN INACTIVE MEMBER? 
A very active member 
An active member 
;---J A fairly active member 
An inactive member 
17a. DO YOU BELONG TO ANY CLUBS OR ORGANISATIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, A TRADE 
UNION, A CHURCH GROUP, SOCIAL CLUB, P.T.A. ETC.) 
yes no 
17b. (IF YES TO 17a.) CAN YOU PLEASE LIST ALL THOSE THAT YOU 
BELONG TO? 
18. WOuLD YOU SAY THAT YOU WERE MORE, LESS, OR AS LIKELY AS OTHERS IN YOUR 
CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO BE ASKED YOUR OPINION ABOUT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
, ISSUES? 
more likely 
less likely 
as likely 
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19a. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? 
19b. AND (IF A MARRIED WOMAN) THE OCCUPATION OF YOUR HUSBAND? 
19c. CAN YOU PLEASE TELL ME YOUR AGE? (YEARS) 
19d. AT WHAT AGE DID YOU FINISH YOUR FULL-TIME EDUCATION? 
(YEARS) 
1ge. DO YOU HAVE ANY FORMAL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS (FOR 
EXAMPLE, MATRICULATION, A UNIVERSITY pEGREE; AN ACCOUNTANCY 
QUALIFICATION, A TRADE CERTIFICATE ETC.)? 
yes no 
19f. (IF YES TO 1ge.) WHAT ARE THEY? 
Family 
199. FINALLY, CAN YOU TELl, ME WHETHER YOUR/INCOME THIS YEAR WILL BE 
less than $2,000 
less than $3,000 but more than $2,000 
less than $4,000 but more than $3.000 
less than $5,000 but more than $4,000 
less than $6,000 but more than $5,000 
less than $7,000 but more than $6,000 
less than $8,000 but more than $7,000 
/ 7 more than $8,000 (specify) 
no answer/don't know (delete wrong one) 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP. 
Interviewer 
Date 
Length of interview in minutes 
Please write here any comments which you feel could help with the 
interpretation of the interview 
--------------------------------------------
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERbURY PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMEN1 
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EVERYONE IS CONCERNED ABOUT GOOD MEDICAL CARE. WE WANT TO, 
FIND OUT WHAT PEOPLE THINK ABOUT THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND WOULD LIKE 
YOUR HELP. THIS IS A SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE AND WILL NOT TAKE VERY 
LONG. PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE (USE THE 
BACK OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE IF THERE IS NOT ENOUGH ROOM UNDER THE 
QUESTION) . 
1a. FIRST, DO YOU HAVE MEDICAL INSURANCE? 
~ yes /7 no 
1b. (IF YES) HOW LONG HAVE YOU HAD IT? 
Years M(mths 
---
1c. DOES YOUR POLICY COVER SURGICAL AND MEDICAL BENEFITS OR SURGICAL 
BENEFITS ONLY? 
'1m I surgical and medical benefits 
I I surgical benefit only 
1d. DO YOU BELONG AS AN INDIVIDUAL OR AS A MEMBER OF A GROUP? 
/7 individual 
/ / group 
1e. HOW MUCH DO YOU PAY FOR THIS INSURANCE? 
____ ~ ___ Dollars per annum 
1f. ARE YOUR-PAYMENTS SUBSIDISED BY YOUR EMPLOYER? 
/ / yes /7 no 
19. (IF YES TO 1f.) WHAT PROPORTION DOES HE PAY? 
per cent 
1h. DOES THIS INSURANCE COVER OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY? 
/7 yes /7 no 
2.' WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE ADVANTAGES TO YOU OF HAVING MEDICAL INSURANCE? 
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3. SOME PEOPLE CHOOSE TO HAVE MEDICAL INSURANCE BECAUSE IT MEANS THA'I' 
THEY CAN GET INTO A HOSPITAL WHEN THEY NEED TO; OTHERS DO SO BECAUSE 
THEY FEEL THE STANDARD OF MEDICAL CARE IS BETTER IN PRIVATE HOSPITALS 
OR BECAUSE THEY WANT TO BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN SURGEON. IN 
MAKING YOUR OWN CHOICE HOW IMPORTANT WERE THESE THINGS TO YOU? 
3a. BEING SURE OF GETTING INTO A HOSPITAL? 
not important at all 
not very important 
quite important 
very important 
3b. BECAUSE OF THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE? 
not important at all 
not very important 
quite important 
very important 
3c. BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE MY OWN SURGEON. 
not important at all 
not very important 
quite important 
very important 
4a. AS YOU KNOW, SOME YEARS BACK MEDICAL INSURANCE DID NOT EXIST IN 
NEW ZEALAND AND MOST PEOPLE HAD TO RELY ON THE PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
(OR PAY IN FULL FOR PRIVATE TREATMENT). SUPPOSE THAT WERE STILL 
THE CASE, IS THERE ANYTHING THAT PEOPLE LIKE YOU COULD DO TO 
INCREASE THE CHANCES THAT THEY GOT INTO A PUBLIC HOSP!TAL WHEN 
THEY WANTED TO? 
17 yes no 
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4b. (IF NO TO 4a.) WHY IS THAT? 
4c. (IF YES TO 4a.) WHAT IS THAT? 
4d. (IF YES TO 4a.)' HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF THESE THINGS OR DO YOU PLAN 
TO DO THEM? 
have done some of these things 
(SPECIFY) 
plan to do some of these things 
(SPECIFY) 
have done none and plan to do none 
5a. UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES (HAVING TO RELY ON PUBLIC HOSPITALS) 
IS THERE ANYTHING THAT PEOPLE LIKE YOU COULD DO TO IMPROVE THE 
STANDARD OF CARE IN PUBLIC HOSPITALS? 
yes I / no 
5b. (IF NO TO .) WHY IS THAT? 
5c. (IF YES TO 5a.) WHAT IS THAT? 
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5d. (IF YES TO 5a.) HAVE YOU DONE ANY OF THESE THINGS OR DO YOU PLAN 
TO DO ANY OF THEM? 
have done some of these things 
(SPECIFY) 
;---? plan to do some of these things 
(SPECIFY) 
have done none and pI-an to do none. 
6. HAVE YOU OR ANYONE YOU KNOW WELL HAD ANY EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC OR 
PRIVATE HOSPITALS? 
Public only 
Private only 
both 
7a. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT PUBLIC HOSPITALS PROVIDE BETTER CARE 
THAN PRIVATE HOSPITALS, PRIVATE HOSPITALS PROVIDE BETTER CARE THAN 
PUBLIC,THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE, OR THAT IT DEPENDS? 
Private better than public 
Public bette~ than private 
no difference 
it depends 
7b. WHY IS THAT? 
8a. IF YOU DID NOT HAVE MEDICAL INSURANCE AND NEEDED TO GO TO HOSPITAL, 
WOULD YOU GO TO A PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR A PRIVATE HOSPITAL OR WOULD IT 
DEPEND? 
Public 
Private 
it would depend 
8b. WHY IS THAT? 
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9. WOULD DOING ANY OF THE FOLLOWING THINGS MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE 
SERVICE YOU GET FROM PUBLIC HOSPITALS? COULD YOU TELL US IF YOU 
THINK IT WOULD MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE, SOME DIFFERENCE, NOT 
MUCH DIFFERENCE, NO DIFFERENCE AT ALL? 
9a. COMPLAINING TO THE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT? 
great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
9b. WHY IS THAT? 
9c. COMPLAINING TO THE HOSPITAL BOARD? 
great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
9d, WHY IS THAT? 
ge •. COMPLAINING TO YOUR FAMILY DOCTOR? 
17 great deal of difference 
17 some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
9f. WHY IS THAT? 
9g. COMPLAINING TO THE OMBUDSMAN? 
great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
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9h. WHY IS THAT? 
9i. WORKING THROUGH AN ORGANIZATION (e.g. CHURCHES, UNIONS, PLUNKET ETC 
TO IMPROVE HOSPITAL SERVICES? 
great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
9j. WHY IS THAT? 
9k. WORKING THROUGH A POLITICAL PARTY TO IMPROVE HOSPITAL SERVICES? 
great deal of. difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
91. WHY IS THAT? 
9m. DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES OR OTHER KINDS OF DIRECT ACTION? 
great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much Qifference 
no difference at all 
9n. WHY IS THAT? 
90. COMPLAINING TO THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT? 
great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
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9p. WHY IS THAT? 
9q. COMPLAINING TO YOUR M.P.? 
17 great deal of difference 
17 some difference 
not much difference 
17 no difference at all 
9r. WHY IS THAT? 
98. COMPLAINING TO A CABINET MINISTER OR PRIME MINISTER? 
17 great deal of difference 
some difference 
not much difference 
no difference at all 
9t. WHY IS THAT? 
9u. WRITING TO THE NEWSPAPERS? 
great deal of difference 
17 some difference 
/ 7 not much difference 
no difference at all 
9v. WHY IS THAT? 
10. PEOPLE OVERSEAS PAY CONSIDERABLY MORE FOR THEIR MEDICAL INSURANCE THAN 
PEOPLE IN NEW ZEALAND. IMAGINE THAT AN OVERSEAS COMPANY, CHARGING 
OVERSEAS SIZED PREMIUMS CAME TO DOMINATE THE NEW ZEALAND MEDICAL 
INSURANCE MARKET. WOULD YOU CONTINUE TO PAY YOUR PREMIUMS IF THE 
COST TO. YOU INCREASED BY: 
10a. UP TO ~ AS MUCH AGAIN? 
yes no 
10b. UP TO ~ AS MUCH AGAIN? 263 
17 yes c:J no 
10c. UP TO DOUBLE YOUR PRESENT PREMIUM? 
17 yes 17 no 
11a. SUPPOSE THERE WAS NO WAITING LIST AND THAT THE STANDARD OF MEDICAL 
CARE AND THE COST WERE THE SAME, WOULD YOU PREFER TO BE IN A 
PRIVATE HOSPITAL OR IN A PUBLIC HOSPITAL, YOU WOULDN'T MIND, OR IT 
WOULD DEPEND? 
17 Private 
17 Public 
17 wouldn't mind 
17 it would depend 
11b. WHY IS THAT? 
12. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME WAYS THAT PEOPLE CAN TRY AND INFLUENCE THINGS 
IN GENERAL (RATHER THAN JUST HOSPITAL MATTERS). HAVE YOU DONE ANY 
OF THE FOLLOWING THINGS IN THE LAST 2 OR 3 YEARS? 
I 
12a. WRITTEN A LETTER TO A NEWSPAPER OR A MAGAZINE? 
/ /yes . c:J no 
12b. (IF YES TO 12a.) HOW MANY? 
12c. CONTACTED A LAWYER ABOUT SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes /~ no 
12d. (IF YES TO 12c.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12e. CONTACTED YOUR M.P. ABOUT SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes 17 no 
12f. (IF YES TO 12e.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12g. CONTACTED A CABINET MINISTER OR THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT 
SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
yes / I no 
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12h. (IF YES TO 12g.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12i. CONTACTED THE OMBUDSMAN ABOUT SOMETHING YOU WANTED DONE? 
CJ yes CJ no 
12j. (IF YES TO 12i.) HOW MANY TIMES? 
12k. HAVE YOU WORKED THROUGH ANY ORGANISATION (FOR EXAMPLE, A CHURCH 
GROUP, A UNION, PLUNKET ETC.), TO TRY AND INFLUENCE PUBLIC 
POLICY IN SOME AREA? 
yes I I no 
121. (IF YES .TO 12k.) CAN YOU PLEASE SPECIFY? 
12m. HAVE YOU-TAKEN PART IN ANY DIRECT ACTION LIKE PROTESTS OR STRIKES? 
yes I I no 
12n. (IF YES TO 12m.) CAN YOU SPECIFY? 
13. DID YOU VOTE AT THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION? 
yes CJ no 
14. DID YOU GO TO ANY CAMPAIGN MEETINGS AT THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION? 
yes no 
15. DID YOU VOTE AT THE LAST LOCAL BODY ELECTIONS? 
yes no 
16a. ARE YOU A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY? 
r/ yes no 
16b. (IF YES TO 16a.) WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS A VERY ACTIVE 
MEMBER, AN ACTIVE MEMBER, A FAIRLY INACTIVE MEMBER OR AN 
INACTIVE MEMBER? 
CJ a very active member 
r/ an active member 
r/ a fairly inactive member 
I I an inactive member 
17a. DO YOU BELONG TO ANY CLUBS OR ORGANISATIONS (FOR EXAMPLE, A TRAt~5 
UNION, A CHURCH GROUP, SOCIAL CLUB, P.T.A. ETC.)? 
yes no 
17b. (IF YES TO 17a.) CAN YOU PLEASE LIST ALL THOSE THAT YOU BELONG 
TO AND SAY HOW ACTIVE A MEMBER YOU ARE OF EACH •. 
18. WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU WERE MORE, LESS, OR AS LIKELY A~ OTHERS IN 
YOUR CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO BE ASKED YOUR OPINION ABOUT SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL ISSUES? 
;---? more likely 
less likely 
as likely 
19a. YOUR SEX IS ma,le female 
19b. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? (IF YOU WORK FOR AN ORGANIZATION PLEASE 
SPECIFY ITS TYPE AND YOUR POSITION IN IT.) 
19c. AND (IF A MARRIED WOMAN) THE OCCUPATION OF YOUR HUSBAND? 
19d. WHAT IS YOUR AGE? (YEARS) 
1ge. AT WHAT AGE DID YOU FINISH YOUR FULL-TIME EDUCATION? 
(YEARS) 
19f. DO YOU HAVE ANY FORMAL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS? (FOR 
EXAMPLE, MATRICULATION, A UNIVERSITY DEGREE, AN ACCOUNTANCY 
QUALIFICATION, A TRADE CERTIFICATE ETC.) 
yes no 
199. (IF YES TO 19f.) WHAT ARE THEY? 
20. 
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FINALLY, CAN YOU TELL ME WHETHER YOUR FAMILY INCOME THIS YEAR (BEFORE 
TAXES) IS: 
less than $2,000 
less than $3,000 but more than $2,000 
less than $4,000 but more than $3,000 
II less than $5,000 but more than $4,000 
less than $6,000 but more than $5,000 
less than $7,000 but more than $6,000 
less than $8,000 but more than $7,000 
less than $9,000 but more than $8,000 
less than $10,000 but more than $9,000 
less than $11,000 but more than $10,000 
less than $12,000 but more than $11,000 
more than $12,000 
PLEASE CHECK BACK TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL APPLICABLE 
QUESTIONS. IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS THAT YOU WOULD LIKE 
TO MAKE ABOUT EITHER OUR'MEDICALCARE SYSTEM OR THE QUESTIONNAIRE, 
PLEASE WRITE THEM IN THE SPACE BELOW. THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP. 
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INTERVIEWING .. 
l)The worth and usefulness of the whole study is crucially 
dependent on your skill and energy in interviewing. How 
good a job you do will depend on how much you care and how 
well you can establish rapport with those you interview, 
neither of which I can much influence.. Interviewing 
largely intangibles (personality, manner etc) plus 
commonsense. Some of that common sense is the following: 
2)Being a good interviewer essentially involves being a good 
listener. You will undoubtedly'be treated to a variety of 
tales which may or may not be interesting and/or relevant9 
As far as possible let people talk, but where necessary 
steer them back to, and try to get them to answer, the questions 
3)Beware of interviewer effects: raised eyebrows and rising 
intonation, putting words into peoples mouths etc. Remember 
that your task is to find out as much as possiple about the 
respondent 1 s view of the world.. -
A special problem arises when you are asked what you think by 
the respondent. In general be as non-specific and non-committal 
as possible. If pressed explain that the purpose of the 
interview is to find out what the respondent thinks and that 
your opinions are irrelevant for this reason r -
4)As far as possible record the respondentls replies in his 
5)Record answers as fully as possible (although some things 
may be clearly not relevant and can be left out). Probe to 
clear up ambiguities (e.g. occupation is Assistant Manager, 
ask of what etc.), and to find out what people have in mind 
(e"g .. the respondent says that "criticism" will improve 
hospital services.. Probe to find out criticism by whom, 
of what, directed through what channels, to whom etc.k Here 
-your skill and sympathy as interviewers as crucial. 
6)Bring the interview in to me as soon as _possible (at the 
latest within 48 hours) so that we can go over it while the 
situation is still fresh in your mind .. 
Some questions that People may ask .. 
l)Why me, how was I chose~ etc" Explain that their name was 
drawn by chance (every 14th name etc .. ).. If they want to know 
the list their names were drawn from explain that it was (the 
waiting list at the Public Hospital/Southern Cross files) .. 
2)Who will see it, is it confidential etc. Explain that the 
interview is confidential and that each person's replies will 
be mixed together with all other replies so that it is imposs-
ible to find out what anyone person answered .. 
3)What's it for etc. Explain that we want to find out what 
those who use hospital services think of them, so that their 
point of view can be taken into accout in futUre planning .. 
4)Does this have anything to do with the hospital? Bmphatically 
NO. 
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AT THE DOOR .. 
1. Ask for the respondent. If he is out find out when he 
will be back and arrange to interview him at that time 
(if possible). If the respondent has moved try and 
find out his new address and interview him there. If 
you can't discover his new addres§ or if he will be 
away until after August 10, or if he is in hospital,or if 
his new address is out of town or a long distance from 
your area, contact me (65819, ext. 617) as soon as 
possible .. 
If the person who answers the door is not the responden~ 
and asks why you want the respondent say: 
"Ny name is ......... I'm from the Department of Sociology at 
the University of Canterbury and I'm interviewing people 
to find out what they think about our medical care system.' 
-
2.. Having obtained the respondent say: 
":My name is .......... I'm from the Department of Sociology 
at the University of Canterbury .. You'll remember that 
we wrote you a letter a few days ago.. We're trying to 
find out what people think of our medical care system 
and we'd like your help. Can I interview you: the 
interview is completELy confidential?" 
3.. If respondent says ~, ask: 
"Are you on a hospital waiting list?,./"Do you have medical 
insurance?" 
If the respondent says ~, proceed with interview. If 
respondent says no, then for waiting list ask, 
"Have you been on a waiting list recently" 
If the respondent says ~ proceed with interview 
(modifying the questions where necessary to make sense.) 
If the respondent still says no or if he does not have 
medical insurance, say "I'm sorry for troubling you. 
In this set of interviews we're only interviewing people 
on the waiting list/with medical insurance." 
4. If respondent says no to your interview request say: 
"We need the opinions of as many people as possible" Are 
you sure you can't help?" 
If the answer is still no, then on the interview schedule 
record everything you can about the person and his dwelline 
and anything else that may help identify the people who 
are not completing ·interviews. 
5. When interview is completed and before you leave the house:! 
quickly check that all applicable questions have been 
answered and that it is clear what the responses mean. 
This is most important. 
APPENDIX 3: 
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LETTERS SENT TO PARLIAMENTARIANS AND HOSPITAL 
BOARD HEMBERS .. · 
c'IO 
29 August 1973 
Dear ,~hospital board member-l 
I am currently doing some research on how North Canterbury 
psople evaluate our hospital services. I would be most 
grateful if (in your capacity as a hospital board member) 
you could answer the following questions for me. 
1. How often, if at all~ are you approached as a Hospital 
Board member by people with complaints about hospital 
services? 
(Once a week, once a month etc.). 
2.. To what kin,ds of things are the complaints related? 
(In particular how many are about bad service within 
the hospital and how many relate to the difficulty of 
getting into hospital, getting access to appropriate 
hospital facilities etc.) .. 
3.. How often do such complaints'come before the Board as 
a whole (at most Board meetings, at no Board meetings 
etc,,) .. 
The negative line of questioning by no means implies a 
negative evaluation of our public hospital services.. I am 
interested simply in finding-out if those people (if there 
are any) who are dissatisfied with the provision of hospital 
care get around to actually venting their dissatisfaction 
in any quarter. . 
I will be most grateful for any help that you can give me. 
Yours sincerely 
GeM. Fougere 
Assistant Lecturer 
in Sociology 
271 
14 Dec ember 1 973 
Dear ,i-hospital board member-1 
Earlier this year I wrote to you explaining that I was doing 
research on how North Canterbury people evaluated their 
hospital services and requesting information on how many 
(if any) complaints you had received as a Hospital Board 
Member. The replies I have reaived from Board Members have 
been most helpful. 
In part of my research I am looking at the use people make 
of private hospitals as an alternative to public hospitalso 
In this regard I would be most grateful if you could answer 
the following questions for me (where possible, I would 
appreciate it if you could give reasons for your answers): 
1 .. Do you think that public and private hospitals together 
have a vital role to play in providing medical care) 
or do you think that public hospitals are handicapped 
in providing medical care by the existence of private 
hospitals? (or neitherpf these things~) 
2. Would you like to see it made easier, or more difficult 
(or neither) for people to make use of private hospitals? 
3. Are you against or in favour (or neither) of the present 
rapid growth in the numbers of people with medical 
insurance? 
Any use I mke of the information will preserve the complete 
anonymity of Board Members, being present in the form "7 out 
of 14 Board Members favour making it easier for people to 
make use of private hosptals ll and so on.. As this is the last 
piece of information I require to write up the research 
(which includes a survey of almost 300 "consum-ers ll of medical 
care in the- Christchurch area, I would be most grateful if 
you could reply as soon as possible. Thank you for your 
time and patience with regard to this letter and the last one. 
I hope to have a summary of my research findings available 
for circulation by about the end of February. 
Yours sincerely, 
G .M" Foug'ere 
Assistant Lecturer 
in Sociology .. 
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9 August 1973 
Dear ,Lmember of parliament-1 
I am currently dOing research aimed at finding out what 
New Zealanders think of our present system of hospital 
care. One of my problems to establish whether or not 
complaints are being lodged by those who are dissatisfied 
(if such people exist). Thus I would be most grateful 
if you could answer the following three questions for me. 
1. In the last year about how many (if any) of 
your constituents have approached you with 
complaints related to (non-psychiatric) 
hospi tal services.? . 
2. How does this number compare with the number 
of complaints arising out of other areas that 
you deal with as a local M.. (for example 
social security problems etc.). 
3. What sort of thing (if any) lead people to 
complain about hospital service. 
I will be most appreciative of any help that you can give me. 
Yours slncere~y, 
G"M. Fougere 
Assistant Lecturer 
In Sociology 
APPENDIX 4: WHY PEOPLE TAKE OQT MEDICAL INSURANCE: THE 
SOUTHERN CROSS E~IDENCE CONSIDERED. 
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My finding that; lithe major source of their Lthose who 
take out medical insurance-1 dissatisfaction is the supply 
rather than the standard of public sector care ...... " appears 
inconsistent with survey evidence cited by Southern Cross 
to refute, 
the regular suggestion that it is only some inability 
on the part of the public hospital system to cope that 
allows private hospitals to have so many patients. In 
other words, people are supposedly forced to enter 
pivate hospitals because they do not want to become 
a statistic on a public hospital waiting list, of 
they do so because they wish to "jump the queue~ 
The survey was of a "random sample of 200 surgical 
patients at five Auckland private hospitals ll " Those 
interviewed were lIoffered the choice of the above five 
alternatives and were asked to state which one most accurately 
described~he reason for them entering a private hospital". 
The results were as follows: . 0% No.. u 
a .. Wished to be operated upon 
by surgeon of own choi'ce 63 31..5 
b .. Preferred Private Hospital 47 23 .. 5 
c .. Could not wait for a public 
hospital bed 43 21,,5 
d .. Covered by Health Insurance 36 18 .. 0 
e .. Other reasons 11 5 .. 5 
--
200 100 .. 0 
LThus-1 the majority of patients either wanted their 
own choice of surgeon, or simply preferred private 
treatment.. But only about one patient in five sought 
private hospital treatment because of the public 
wai ting list .. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the discrepancy 
between the Southern Cross finding and my own.. The first, 
and most obvious, is that the populations on which the 
findings are based are different. My finding refers to the 
reasons why people take out medical insurance ~nd is based 
on a random sample of Southern Cross policy holders in. the 
Christchurch urban area; while Southern Cross's findings 
refer to why people are ina private rather than a public 
hospital and is based on a random sample of Auckland private 
hospital patients.2 Thus, the two populations surveyed are 
overlapping, rather than co-extensive; the difference in 
the findings may simply reflect real differences between 
two populations. 
Let us assume that this is not the case; that for all 
practical purposes the two populations surveyed can be 
treated as identical. Now a second possibility appears: 
that the results are inconsistent because one, or both 
samples are biased.. In the case of the medical insurance 
sample this means either; (or both); 
1. That the sample drawn is atypical of Southern 
Cross members in Christchurch and/or 
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2. That Christchurch members of Southern Cross are 
atypical of national membership. 
The first source of bias is guarded against by the 
sampling procedure used, but, other than the belief of 
the Southern Cross general in;anager that Christchurch is 
not atypical in its membership, there is no check on the 
second. 
Assuming that Southern Cross's sample is equally 
unaffected by bias and that the two samples are drawn 
.from the same population a final possible solution 
(barring simple misreporting) to the discrepancy occurs: 
that the form of the question asked has significantly 
biased the responses. 
Although Southern Cross's question is open to severe 
.criticism on a number of counts only two crucial objections 
will be raised here. First, even although respondents may 
have a number of reasons for choosing a private rather than 
a public hospital, the form of the question allows them 
to nominate only one. In contrast the open ended question 
I used (on the advantages of medical insurance) allows the 
respondent to give as many different kinds of reasons as 
he wishes, while the closed question I used doesmt force 
him to choose between the reasons given. 
Second, the distribution of responses in Southern 
Cross's question is crucially affected by the number of 
choices offered. Thus if respondents were offered only 
a choice between a. and c. the distribution of answers 
would be very likely quite different.. Neither of my 
questions have this feature .. 
Finally, considering the Southern Cross qu'estions and 
my own together, it is clear that the form of any question, 
no matter how well constructed, has some impact on the kind 
of responses given to it.. By using two questions of 
different kinds, as I have done, the researcher has a 
useful check on the validi+y and reliability of the 
information he has obtained. When the findings of two 
different kinds of question are congruent, as they are in 
reporting the overwhelming importance of inadequate supply 
as a factor in taking out medical insurance, the researcher 
can have a great deal of confidence in his findings. I 
have a great deal of confidence in my finding on the crucial 
importance of not being able to get into a public hospital, 
in the decision to take out medical insurance. 
NOTES .. 
'All information on the Southern Cross survey is from 
Southern Cross MedicalSociety~ "Submissions". 
ZIn their submission Southern Cross note, 
re'cent surveys of 650 surgical cases at 5 of 
Auckland's private hospitals revealed that 220 
(or 33.8% were covered by voluntary health 
insurance and a sampling of these figures show 
that almost 80% were Southern Cross members. 
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